CVE-2026-32025

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an authentication hardening gap in browser-origin WebSocket clients that allows attackers to bypass origin checks and auth throttling on loopback deployments. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious webpage and perform password brute-force attacks against the gateway to establish an authenticated operator session and invoke control-plane methods.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an authentication hardening gap in browser-origin WebSocket clients that allows attackers to bypass origin checks and auth throttling on loopback deployments. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious webpage and perform password brute-force attacks against the gateway to establish an authenticated operator session and invoke control-plane methods.

This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.

Context and Preconditions

OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:

• Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.
• Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.
• Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.

Successful exploitation requires all of the following:

• Gateway reachable on loopback (default).
• Password auth mode in use.
• Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.
• Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.

Practical Impact

If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: <=2026.2.24 (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)
• Patched versions : >=2026.2.25

Fix Commit(s)

• c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb

Fix Details

• Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).
• Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.
• Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next npm release (2026.2.25) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.

OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an authentication hardening gap in browser-origin WebSocket clients that allows attackers to bypass origin checks and auth throttling on loopback deployments. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious webpage and perform password brute-force attacks against the gateway to establish an authenticated operator session and invoke control-plane methods.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an authentication hardening gap in browser-origin WebSocket clients that allows attackers to bypass origin checks and auth throttling on loopback deployments. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious webpage and perform password brute-force attacks against the gateway to establish an authenticated operator session and invoke control-plane methods.

This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.

Context and Preconditions

OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:

• Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.
• Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.
• Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.

Successful exploitation requires all of the following:

• Gateway reachable on loopback (default).
• Password auth mode in use.
• Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.
• Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.

Practical Impact

If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: <=2026.2.24 (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)
• Patched versions : >=2026.2.25

Fix Commit(s)

• c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb

Fix Details

• Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).
• Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.
• Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next npm release (2026.2.25) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.

OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.