CVE-2026-32067

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

Summary

OpenClaw had account-scope gaps in pairing-store access for DM pairing policy, which could let a pairing approval from one account authorize the same sender on another account in multi-account setups.

Impact

This is an authorization-boundary weakness in multi-account channel deployments. A sender approved in one account could be accepted in another account before explicit approval there.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Latest published version affected: 2026.2.25
• Vulnerable range: <= 2026.2.25
• Patched version (planned next release): >= 2026.2.26

Fix

OpenClaw now enforces account-scoped pairing reads/writes consistently across core and extension message channels, with stricter runtime/SDK helpers and shared policy wiring to prevent cross-account pairing bleed.

Fix Commit(s)

• a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcf
• bce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-vjp8-wprm-2jw9. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

Summary

OpenClaw had account-scope gaps in pairing-store access for DM pairing policy, which could let a pairing approval from one account authorize the same sender on another account in multi-account setups.

Impact

This is an authorization-boundary weakness in multi-account channel deployments. A sender approved in one account could be accepted in another account before explicit approval there.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Latest published version affected: 2026.2.25
• Vulnerable range: <= 2026.2.25
• Patched version (planned next release): >= 2026.2.26

Fix

OpenClaw now enforces account-scoped pairing reads/writes consistently across core and extension message channels, with stricter runtime/SDK helpers and shared policy wiring to prevent cross-account pairing bleed.

Fix Commit(s)

• a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcf
• bce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-vjp8-wprm-2jw9. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.