CVE-2026-32606

IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.

IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.

The default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image.

That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI).

The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one.

The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened.

This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition.

Reproducing steps are effectively:

• Shutdown the system
• Alter the GPT partition table to remove the GPT type UUID from the root partition
• Resize the ESP partition to make space for the attacker's own root partition
• Create a new LUKS encrypted ext4 partition in the space that was freed up and set the GPT type UUID to that of the original root partition
• Populate that new root partition with a systemd unit and script which use systemd-cryptenroll to unlock and extract the key from the original root partition
• Boot the system
• When prompted, enter the passphrase of the new (attacker) root partition
• Let the system boot IncusOS
• Stop the system
• Recover the encryption key that was extracted by the boot time systemd unit
• Access the original root partition using it, steal or modify the data
• Remove the new (attacker) root partition
• Grow back the ESP
• Restore the GPT type UUID on the root partition
• Start the system back up, it will boot as expected with no indication that it was compromised

Impact

This impacts all IncusOS users and is a particular worry for anyone running IncusOS in an unsecured physical environment where the system can be tempered with while stopped or is at risk of being seized or stolen.

Mitigation

The fix we've put in place makes use of PCR15 in addition to the existing PCR7 and PCR11 policies (and PCR4 when running without UEFI Secure Boot). This is significant as PCR15 measures a number of values during system boot, including a measurement of decrypting the root partition while in the initrd.

By binding the LUKS key(s) to an uninitialized PCR15 value, we ensure that only the initrd will be able to automatically decrypt the partitions. As soon as the system boot exits the initrd, whether to boot the legitimate root disk or an attacker's root disk, the TPM state will no longer align with the state required to release the encryption keys, preventing this attack. …

IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.

IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.

The default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image.

That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI).

The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one.

The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened.

This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition.

Reproducing steps are effectively:

• Shutdown the system
• Alter the GPT partition table to remove the GPT type UUID from the root partition
• Resize the ESP partition to make space for the attacker's own root partition
• Create a new LUKS encrypted ext4 partition in the space that was freed up and set the GPT type UUID to that of the original root partition
• Populate that new root partition with a systemd unit and script which use systemd-cryptenroll to unlock and extract the key from the original root partition
• Boot the system
• When prompted, enter the passphrase of the new (attacker) root partition
• Let the system boot IncusOS
• Stop the system
• Recover the encryption key that was extracted by the boot time systemd unit
• Access the original root partition using it, steal or modify the data
• Remove the new (attacker) root partition
• Grow back the ESP
• Restore the GPT type UUID on the root partition
• Start the system back up, it will boot as expected with no indication that it was compromised

Impact

This impacts all IncusOS users and is a particular worry for anyone running IncusOS in an unsecured physical environment where the system can be tempered with while stopped or is at risk of being seized or stolen.

Mitigation

The fix we've put in place makes use of PCR15 in addition to the existing PCR7 and PCR11 policies (and PCR4 when running without UEFI Secure Boot). This is significant as PCR15 measures a number of values during system boot, including a measurement of decrypting the root partition while in the initrd.

By binding the LUKS key(s) to an uninitialized PCR15 value, we ensure that only the initrd will be able to automatically decrypt the partitions. As soon as the system boot exits the initrd, whether to boot the legitimate root disk or an attacker's root disk, the TPM state will no longer align with the state required to release the encryption keys, preventing this attack. …

IncusOS has a LUKS encryption bypass due to insufficient TPM policy in github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

• Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
• GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
• GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
• GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
• GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
• GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
• GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
• GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
• GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
• GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
• GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
• GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
• GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
• GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
• GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
• GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
• GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
• GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
• GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
• GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
• GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
• GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
• GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
• GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
• GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
• GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
• GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
• GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
• GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
• GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
• GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
• GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
• GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
• GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
• GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
• GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
• GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
• GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
• GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
• GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
• GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
• GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
• GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
• GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
• GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
• GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
• GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
• GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
• GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
• GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
• GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
• GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
• GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
• GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
• GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
• GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
• GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
• GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
• GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
• GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
• GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
• GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
• GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
• GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
• GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
• GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
• GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
• GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
• GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
• GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
• GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
• GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
• GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
• GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
• GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

Update to version 0.0.20260326T203309 2026-03-26T20:33:09Z (jsc#PED-11136):

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4513 CVE-2026-32284
• GO-2026-4514 CVE-2026-32285
• GO-2026-4518 CVE-2026-32286
• GO-2026-4526 CVE-2026-32287
• GO-2026-4700 CVE-2026-32704 GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x
• GO-2026-4701 CVE-2026-32720 GHSA-7x23-j8gv-v54x
• GO-2026-4702 CVE-2026-32301 GHSA-j77h-rr39-c552
• GO-2026-4703 GHSA-q926-c743-49qj
• GO-2026-4704 CVE-2026-32606 GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc
• GO-2026-4705 CVE-2026-32747 GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6
• GO-2026-4706 CVE-2026-32751 GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3
• GO-2026-4707 CVE-2026-32749 GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v
• GO-2026-4708 CVE-2026-32750 GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv
• GO-2026-4709 CVE-2026-32815 GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6
• GO-2026-4710 CVE-2026-32760 GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73
• GO-2026-4711 CVE-2026-32758 GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp
• GO-2026-4712 CVE-2026-32771 GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25
• GO-2026-4713 CVE-2026-32759 GHSA-ffx7-75gc-jg7c
• GO-2026-4714 CVE-2026-32737 GHSA-fgm3-q9r5-43v9
• GO-2026-4715 CVE-2026-32769 GHSA-hxm7-9q36-c77f
• GO-2026-4716 CVE-2026-32767 GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7
• GO-2026-4717 CVE-2026-32828 GHSA-j94x-8wcp-x7hm
• GO-2026-4718 CVE-2026-32768 GHSA-mw24-f3xh-j3qv
• GO-2026-4719 CVE-2026-32805 GHSA-p799-g7vv-f279
• GO-2026-4721 CVE-2026-32940 GHSA-4mx9-3c2h-hwhg
• GO-2026-4722 CVE-2026-32938 GHSA-fq2j-j8hc-8vw8
• GO-2026-4723 CVE-2026-32941 GHSA-97vp-pwqj-46qc
• GO-2026-4724 CVE-2026-32254 GHSA-phqm-jgc3-qf8g
• GO-2026-4725 CVE-2026-25783 GHSA-2v3w-6g35-5f9v
• GO-2026-4726 CVE-2026-2456 GHSA-34g8-9fpp-46ch
• GO-2026-4727 CVE-2026-26246 GHSA-44mv-jq72-gj49
• GO-2026-4728 CVE-2026-32953 GHSA-4w7r-3222-8h6v
• GO-2026-4729 CVE-2026-2458 GHSA-679f-wmrg-qf57
• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4731 CVE-2026-24458 GHSA-m5rv-56xx-hfc6
• GO-2026-4732 CVE-2026-2457 GHSA-ph22-fw5m-w2q9
• GO-2026-4733 CVE-2026-25780 GHSA-xv2p-wchj-qjhp
• GO-2026-4734 CVE-2026-2578 GHSA-3rhr-jr63-hwq5
• GO-2026-4735 CVE-2026-2463 GHSA-fx49-m253-27jj
• GO-2026-4737 GHSA-594f-3595-c47v
• GO-2026-4740 GHSA-h9q6-hc68-35rp
• GO-2026-4742 CVE-2026-32811 GHSA-r8x2-fhmf-6mxp
• GO-2026-4743 CVE-2026-33066 GHSA-4663-4mpg-879v
• GO-2026-4744 CVE-2026-21386 GHSA-5mr9-crcg-8wh2
• GO-2026-4745 CVE-2026-24692 GHSA-cwfj-642j-gfh4
• GO-2026-4746 CVE-2026-2455 GHSA-gqv7-j2j8-qmwq
• GO-2026-4747 CVE-2026-33067 GHSA-mvpm-v6q4-m2pf
• GO-2026-4748 CVE-2026-33081 GHSA-qwxp-6qf9-wr4m
• GO-2026-4749 CVE-2026-4265 GHSA-xpvf-6qcc-9jqc
• GO-2026-4750 CVE-2026-32937 GHSA-6g43-577r-wf4x
• GO-2026-4751 CVE-2026-33132 GHSA-g2pf-ww5m-2r9m
• GO-2026-4752 CVE-2026-33203 GHSA-3g9h-9hp4-654v
• GO-2026-4754 CVE-2026-33063 GHSA-4jrw-92fg-4jwx
• GO-2026-4755 CVE-2026-33192 GHSA-5rvc-5cwx-g5x8
• GO-2026-4756 CVE-2026-33062 GHSA-7c47-xr7q-p6hg
• GO-2026-4757 CVE-2026-33064 GHSA-7g27-v5wj-jr75
• GO-2026-4758 CVE-2026-33065 GHSA-958m-gxmc-mccm
• GO-2026-4759 CVE-2026-33221 GHSA-g9f6-9775-hffm
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-4763 CVE-2026-33191 GHSA-p9hg-pq3q-v9gv
• GO-2026-4765 GHSA-vccx-p757-pv6h
• GO-2026-4766 CVE-2026-33194 GHSA-vm69-h85x-8p85
• GO-2026-4768 CVE-2026-33320 GHSA-4fcp-jxh7-23x8
• GO-2026-4769 CVE-2026-32691 GHSA-gfgr-6hrj-85ww
• GO-2026-4770 GHSA-q382-vc8q-7jhj
• GO-2026-4773 CVE-2026-33252 GHSA-89xv-2j6f-qhc8
• GO-2026-4774 CVE-2026-30924 GHSA-h8vw-ph9r-xpch
• GO-2026-4775 CVE-2026-30836 GHSA-q4r8-xm5f-56gw
• GO-2026-4776 CVE-2026-33283 GHSA-3366-gw57-fcm5
• GO-2026-4777 CVE-2026-32693 GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc
• GO-2026-4778 CVE-2026-32694 GHSA-5cj2-rqqf-hx9p
• GO-2026-4779 CVE-2026-33322 GHSA-5cx5-wh4m-82fh
• GO-2026-4780 CVE-2026-33282 GHSA-826q-wrq4-p23x
• GO-2026-4781 CVE-2026-32692 GHSA-89x7-5m5m-mcmm
• GO-2026-4782 CVE-2026-2461 GHSA-hf8w-x9h5-5gf9
• GO-2026-4783 CVE-2026-33281 GHSA-q669-4gmv-g8mf
• GO-2026-4784 CVE-2026-2476 GHSA-4ppj-6chv-5pgc
• GO-2026-4785 CVE-2026-33344…