CVE-2026-32762

Summary

Rack::Utils.forwarded_values parses the RFC 7239 Forwarded header by splitting on semicolons before handling quoted-string values. Because quoted values may legally contain semicolons, a header such as:

Forwarded: for="127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https"

can be interpreted by Rack as multiple Forwarded directives rather than as a single quoted for value.

In deployments where an upstream proxy, WAF, or intermediary validates or preserves quoted Forwarded values differently, this discrepancy can allow an attacker to smuggle host, proto, for, or by parameters through a single header value.

Details

Rack::Utils.forwarded_values processes the header using logic equivalent to:

forwarded_header.split(';').each_with_object({}) do |field, values|
  field.split(',').each do |pair|
    pair = pair.split('=').map(&:strip).join('=')
    return nil unless pair =~ /\A(by|for|host|proto)="?([^"]+)"?\Z/i
    (values[$1.downcase.to_sym] ||= []) << $2
  end
end

The method splits on ; before it parses individual name=value pairs. This is inconsistent with RFC 7239, which permits quoted-string values, and quoted strings may contain semicolons as literal content.

As a result, a header value such as:

Forwarded: for="127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https"

is not treated as a single for value. Instead, Rack may interpret it as if the client had supplied separate for, host, and proto directives.

This creates an interpretation conflict when another component in front of Rack treats the quoted value as valid literal content, while Rack reparses it as multiple forwarding parameters.

Impact

Applications that rely on Forwarded to derive request metadata may observe attacker-controlled values for host, proto, for, or related URL components.

In affected deployments, this can lead to host or scheme spoofing in derived values such as req.host, req.scheme, req.base_url, or req.url. Applications that use those values for password reset links, redirects, absolute URL generation, logging, IP-based decisions, or backend requests may be vulnerable to downstream security impact.

The practical security impact depends on deployment architecture. If clients can already supply arbitrary trusted Forwarded parameters directly, this bug may not add meaningful attacker capability. The issue is most relevant where an upstream component and Rack interpret the same Forwarded header differently.

Mitigation

• Update to a patched version of Rack that parses Forwarded quoted-string values before splitting on parameter delimiters.
• Avoid trusting client-supplied Forwarded headers unless they are normalized or regenerated by a trusted reverse proxy.
• Prefer stripping inbound Forwarded headers at the edge and reconstructing them from trusted proxy metadata.
• Avoid using req.host, req.scheme, req.base_url, or req.url for security-sensitive operations unless the forwarding chain is explicitly trusted and validated.

Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. From versions 3.0.0.beta1 to before 3.1.21 and 3.2.0 to before 3.2.6, Rack::Utils.forwarded_values parses the RFC 7239 Forwarded header by splitting on semicolons before handling quoted-string values. Because quoted values may legally contain semicolons, a header can be interpreted by Rack as multiple Forwarded directives rather than as a single quoted for value. In deployments where an upstream proxy, WAF, or intermediary validates or preserves quoted Forwarded values differently, this discrepancy can allow an attacker to smuggle host, proto, for, or by parameters through a single header value. This issue has been patched in versions 3.1.21 and 3.2.6.

CVE-2026-26961 Greedy multipart boundary parsing can cause parser differentials and WAF bypass. Forwarded header semicolon injection enables Host and Scheme spoofing. CVE-2026-34230 Quadratic complexity in Rack::Utils.select_best_encoding via wildcard Accept-Encoding header. CVE-2026-34763 Root directory disclosure via unescaped regex interpolation in Rack::Directory. CVE-2026-34785 Rack::Static prefix matching can expose unintended files under the static root. CVE-2026-34786 Rack::Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded path mismatch. CVE-2026-34826 Multipart byte range processing allows denial of service via excessive overlapping ranges. CVE-2026-34827 Multipart header parsing allows denial of service via escape-heavy quoted parameters. CVE-2026-34829 Multipart parsing without Content-Length header allows unbounded chunked file uploads. CVE-2026-34830 Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect. CVE-2026-34831 Content-Length mismatch in Rack::Files error responses. CVE-2026-34835 Rack::Request accepts invalid Host characters, enabling host allowlist bypass.

Andrew Lacambra discovered that Rack did not properly parse certain regular expressions. An attacker could possibly use this issue to bypass network security filters. (CVE-2026-26961)

William T. Nelson discovered that Rack did not handle multipart headers correctly. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause downstream parsing issues or a denial of service. (CVE-2026-26962)

It was discovered that Rack did not handle the Forwarded header correctly. An attacker could possibly use this issue to manipulate header values. (CVE-2026-32762)

It was discovered that Rack could consume excessive CPU when handling certain Accept-Encoding values. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2026-34230)

Haruki Oyama discovered that certain configurations of Rack could erroneously fail to derive the displayed directory path, and expose the full file system path. An attacker could possibly use this issue to disclose deployment details such as layout and usernames. (CVE-2026-34763)

It was discovered that Rack did not properly handle static file paths. An attacker could possibly use this issue to exfiltrate unintentionally served data. (CVE-2026-34785)

Haruki Oyama discovered that Rack did not apply header rules to certain requests for URL-encoded static paths. An attacker could possibly use this issue to bypass security-relevant response headers. (CVE-2026-34786)

It was discovered that Rack did not limit the number of ranges requested in the Range header. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2026-34826)

It was discovered that Rack could consume excessive CPU when parsing certain multipart parameters. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2026-34827)

It was discovered that Rack could consume unbounded disk space when handling requests without a Content-Length header. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2026-34829)

Mehtab Zafar discovered that Rack directly interpreted the X-Accel-Mapping header as a regular expression without escaping. An attacker could possibly use this issue to exfiltrate arbitrary files from internal locations. (CVE-2026-34830)

It was discovered that Rack did not properly handle messages with Unicode. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2026-34831)

It was discovered that Rack did not properly parse the Host header. An attacker could possibly use this issue to bypass security filters or poison generated links. (CVE-2026-34835)