CVE-2026-32977

OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

Summary

In affected versions of openclaw, the sandbox fs-bridge writeFile commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.

Impact

This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved writeFile operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

Affected Packages and Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: < 2026.3.11
• Fixed in: 2026.3.11

Technical Details

The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the writeFile commit path. The final mv still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.

Fix

OpenClaw now anchors the writeFile commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in [email protected].

Workarounds

Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

Summary

In affected versions of openclaw, the sandbox fs-bridge writeFile commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.

Impact

This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved writeFile operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

Affected Packages and Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: < 2026.3.11
• Fixed in: 2026.3.11

Technical Details

The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the writeFile commit path. The final mv still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.

Fix

OpenClaw now anchors the writeFile commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in [email protected].

Workarounds

Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.