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CVE-2026-33497

Langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

8.7 HighFix available

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

19.6%Up 19.6 points since Mar 25, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.7

Langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Record
CVE-2026-33497
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-14877 8.7

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Record
EUVD-2026-14877
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-ph9w-r52h-28p7 8.7

langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

Vulnerability

Path Traversal in GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}

The download_profile_picture function in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied folder_name and file_name path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.

An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. ../secret_key) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

This exposed the server to:

  • Sensitive file disclosure — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved
  • Secret key exfiltration — the application's secret_key file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via ../secret_key
  • Authentication bypass — with the secret_key in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators

Proof of Concept

curl --path-as-is 'http://<host>:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key'

A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.


Fix

The fix was applied in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py (PR #12263).

Two layers of defense were introduced:

1. Typed path validation — the folder_name and file_name parameters were changed from plain str to ValidatedFolderName and ValidatedFileName annotated types that reject traversal characters at the FastAPI input layer.

2. Path containment check — Path.name is used to strip any directory component from the inputs before path construction, and Path.is_relative_to() verifies the resolved path remains within the allowed base directory. This replaces the previous startswith() check, which was susceptible to prefix-ambiguity bugs.

 @router.get("/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}")
 async def download_profile_picture(
-    folder_name: str,
-    file_name: str,
+    folder_name: ValidatedFolderName,
+    file_name: ValidatedFileName,
     settings_service: Annotated[SettingsService, Depends(get_settings_service)],
 ):
-        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / folder_name / file_name).resolve()
+        safe_folder = Path(folder_name).name
+        safe_file = Path(file_name).name
+        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / safe_folder / safe_file).resolve()

         allowed_base = (config_path / "profile_pictures").resolve()
-        if not str(file_path).startswith(str(allowed_base)):
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")
+        if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/ endpoint at the reverse-proxy or firewall level. Rotating the secret_key is strongly recommended if exposure cannot be ruled out.


Acknowledgements

We thank the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability.

Record
GHSA-ph9w-r52h-28p7
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.7

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Record
CVE-2026-33497
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.7

Langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Record
CVE-2026-33497
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-ph9w-r52h-28p7 8.7

langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

Vulnerability

Path Traversal in GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}

The download_profile_picture function in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied folder_name and file_name path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.

An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. ../secret_key) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

This exposed the server to:

  • Sensitive file disclosure — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved
  • Secret key exfiltration — the application's secret_key file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via ../secret_key
  • Authentication bypass — with the secret_key in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators

Proof of Concept

curl --path-as-is 'http://<host>:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key'

A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.


Fix

The fix was applied in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py (PR #12263).

Two layers of defense were introduced:

1. Typed path validation — the folder_name and file_name parameters were changed from plain str to ValidatedFolderName and ValidatedFileName annotated types that reject traversal characters at the FastAPI input layer.

2. Path containment check — Path.name is used to strip any directory component from the inputs before path construction, and Path.is_relative_to() verifies the resolved path remains within the allowed base directory. This replaces the previous startswith() check, which was susceptible to prefix-ambiguity bugs.

 @router.get("/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}")
 async def download_profile_picture(
-    folder_name: str,
-    file_name: str,
+    folder_name: ValidatedFolderName,
+    file_name: ValidatedFileName,
     settings_service: Annotated[SettingsService, Depends(get_settings_service)],
 ):
-        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / folder_name / file_name).resolve()
+        safe_folder = Path(folder_name).name
+        safe_file = Path(file_name).name
+        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / safe_folder / safe_file).resolve()

         allowed_base = (config_path / "profile_pictures").resolve()
-        if not str(file_path).startswith(str(allowed_base)):
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")
+        if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/ endpoint at the reverse-proxy or firewall level. Rotating the secret_key is strongly recommended if exposure cannot be ruled out.


Acknowledgements

We thank the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability.

Record
GHSA-ph9w-r52h-28p7
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-81 7.5

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

Record
PYSEC-2026-81
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
langflow
PyPI
before 1.7.1
1.7.1
langflow
PyPI
before 1.7.1, plus listed versions
0.0.310.0.320.0.330.0.400.0.44
Show 45 moreShow less
0.0.450.0.460.0.520.0.530.0.540.0.550.0.560.0.570.0.580.0.610.0.620.0.630.0.640.0.650.0.660.0.670.0.680.0.690.0.700.0.710.0.720.0.730.0.740.0.750.0.760.0.780.0.790.0.800.0.810.0.830.0.840.0.850.0.860.0.870.0.880.0.890.1.00.1.20.1.30.1.40.1.50.1.60.1.70.2.00.2.1
1.7.1

Public exploits

Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.

Public exploits
SourceLinkDate
NucleiLangflow < 1.7.0 - Path Traversal

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, Nuclei, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-33497 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in Langflow, published March 20, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 19.6%, the 97th percentile. Fixed in langflow 1.7.1.

References

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