CVE-2026-35619

OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the HTTP /v1/models endpoint that fails to enforce operator read scope requirements. Attackers with only operator.approvals scope can enumerate gateway model metadata through the HTTP compatibility route, bypassing the stricter WebSocket RPC authorization checks.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the HTTP /v1/models endpoint that fails to enforce operator read scope requirements. Attackers with only operator.approvals scope can enumerate gateway model metadata through the HTTP compatibility route, bypassing the stricter WebSocket RPC authorization checks.

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Summary

The OpenAI-compatible HTTP endpoint /v1/models accepts bearer auth but does not enforce operator method scopes.

In contrast, the WebSocket RPC path enforces operator.read for models.list.

A caller connected with operator.approvals (no read scope) is rejected for models.list (missing scope: operator.read) but can still enumerate model metadata through HTTP /v1/models.

Confirmed on current main at commit 06de515b6c42816b62ec752e1c221cab67b38501.

Details

The WS control-plane path enforces role/scope checks centrally before dispatching methods. For non-admin operators, this includes required method scopes such as operator.read for models.list.

The HTTP compatibility path for /v1/models performs bearer authorization and then returns model metadata; it does not apply an equivalent scope check.

As reproduced, a caller with only operator.approvals can:

1. connect successfully,
2. fail models.list over WS with missing scope: operator.read,
3. fetch /v1/models over HTTP with status 200 and model data.

This is a cross-surface authorization inconsistency where the stricter WS policy can be bypassed via HTTP.

Impact

• Callers lacking operator.read can still enumerate gateway model metadata through HTTP compatibility routes.
• Breaks scope model consistency between WS RPC and HTTP surfaces.
• Weakens least-privilege expectations for operators granted non-read scopes.

Patch Suggestion

1) Enforce read scope on /v1/models routes

Apply a scope gate equivalent to models.list before serving /v1/models or /v1/models/:id.

2) Reuse centralized scope-authorization helper for HTTP compatibility endpoints

Use the same operator scope logic used by WS dispatch (authorizeOperatorScopesForMethod(...)) to prevent policy drift.

3) Add regression tests

Keep this PoC and add explicit negative/positive controls:

• operator.approvals without read is rejected on HTTP /v1/models.
• operator.read is accepted on both WS models.list and HTTP /v1/models.

Credit

Reported by @zpbrent.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the HTTP /v1/models endpoint that fails to enforce operator read scope requirements. Attackers with only operator.approvals scope can enumerate gateway model metadata through the HTTP compatibility route, bypassing the stricter WebSocket RPC authorization checks.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the HTTP /v1/models endpoint that fails to enforce operator read scope requirements. Attackers with only operator.approvals scope can enumerate gateway model metadata through the HTTP compatibility route, bypassing the stricter WebSocket RPC authorization checks.

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Summary

The OpenAI-compatible HTTP endpoint /v1/models accepts bearer auth but does not enforce operator method scopes.

In contrast, the WebSocket RPC path enforces operator.read for models.list.

A caller connected with operator.approvals (no read scope) is rejected for models.list (missing scope: operator.read) but can still enumerate model metadata through HTTP /v1/models.

Confirmed on current main at commit 06de515b6c42816b62ec752e1c221cab67b38501.

Details

The WS control-plane path enforces role/scope checks centrally before dispatching methods. For non-admin operators, this includes required method scopes such as operator.read for models.list.

The HTTP compatibility path for /v1/models performs bearer authorization and then returns model metadata; it does not apply an equivalent scope check.

As reproduced, a caller with only operator.approvals can:

1. connect successfully,
2. fail models.list over WS with missing scope: operator.read,
3. fetch /v1/models over HTTP with status 200 and model data.

This is a cross-surface authorization inconsistency where the stricter WS policy can be bypassed via HTTP.

Impact

• Callers lacking operator.read can still enumerate gateway model metadata through HTTP compatibility routes.
• Breaks scope model consistency between WS RPC and HTTP surfaces.
• Weakens least-privilege expectations for operators granted non-read scopes.

Patch Suggestion

1) Enforce read scope on /v1/models routes

Apply a scope gate equivalent to models.list before serving /v1/models or /v1/models/:id.

2) Reuse centralized scope-authorization helper for HTTP compatibility endpoints

Use the same operator scope logic used by WS dispatch (authorizeOperatorScopesForMethod(...)) to prevent policy drift.

3) Add regression tests

Keep this PoC and add explicit negative/positive controls:

• operator.approvals without read is rejected on HTTP /v1/models.
• operator.read is accepted on both WS models.list and HTTP /v1/models.

Credit

Reported by @zpbrent.