CVE-2026-39305

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.

The Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host.

Details

Location: src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/action_orchestrator.py (Lines 402, 409, 423)

Vulnerable Code snippet:

target = workspace / step.target

In the _apply_step method, paths are constructed by concatenating the workspace path with a user-supplied step.target string: target = workspace / step.target. The code fails to resolve and validate that the final absolute path remains within the bounds of the workspace directory. When processing FILE_CREATE or FILE_EDIT actions, this flaw permits arbitrary file modification.

PoC

Construct a malicious ActionStep payload with path traversal characters:

from praisonai.cli.features.action_orchestrator import ActionStep, ActionType, ActionStatus

# Payload targeting a file outside the workspace
step = ActionStep(
    id="test_traversal",
    action_type=ActionType.FILE_CREATE,
    description="Malicious file write",
    target="../../../../../../../tmp/orchestrator_pwned.txt",
    params={"content": "pwned"},
    status=ActionStatus.APPROVED
)

# When the orchestrator applies this step, it writes to the traversed path
# _apply_step(step)

Impact

This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Anyone running the Action Orchestrator to apply modifications is vulnerable. A malicious prompt could trick the agent into generating a plan that overwrites critical files (e.g., ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, .bashrc) leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or system corruption.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.

The Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host.

Details

Location: src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/action_orchestrator.py (Lines 402, 409, 423)

Vulnerable Code snippet:

target = workspace / step.target

In the _apply_step method, paths are constructed by concatenating the workspace path with a user-supplied step.target string: target = workspace / step.target. The code fails to resolve and validate that the final absolute path remains within the bounds of the workspace directory. When processing FILE_CREATE or FILE_EDIT actions, this flaw permits arbitrary file modification.

PoC

Construct a malicious ActionStep payload with path traversal characters:

from praisonai.cli.features.action_orchestrator import ActionStep, ActionType, ActionStatus

# Payload targeting a file outside the workspace
step = ActionStep(
    id="test_traversal",
    action_type=ActionType.FILE_CREATE,
    description="Malicious file write",
    target="../../../../../../../tmp/orchestrator_pwned.txt",
    params={"content": "pwned"},
    status=ActionStatus.APPROVED
)

# When the orchestrator applies this step, it writes to the traversed path
# _apply_step(step)

Impact

This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Anyone running the Action Orchestrator to apply modifications is vulnerable. A malicious prompt could trick the agent into generating a plan that overwrites critical files (e.g., ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, .bashrc) leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or system corruption.

The Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host.

Details

Location: src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/action_orchestrator.py (Lines 402, 409, 423)

Vulnerable Code snippet:

target = workspace / step.target

In the _apply_step method, paths are constructed by concatenating the workspace path with a user-supplied step.target string: target = workspace / step.target. The code fails to resolve and validate that the final absolute path remains within the bounds of the workspace directory. When processing FILE_CREATE or FILE_EDIT actions, this flaw permits arbitrary file modification.

PoC

Construct a malicious ActionStep payload with path traversal characters:

 from praisonai.cli.features.action_orchestrator import ActionStep, ActionType, ActionStatus
 
# Payload targeting a file outside the workspace
step = ActionStep(
    id="test_traversal",
    action_type=ActionType.FILE_CREATE,
    description="Malicious file write",
    target="../../../../../../../tmp/orchestrator_pwned.txt",
    params={"content": "pwned"},
    status=ActionStatus.APPROVED
)

# When the orchestrator applies this step, it writes to the traversed path
# _apply_step(step)

Impact

This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Anyone running the Action Orchestrator to apply modifications is vulnerable. A malicious prompt could trick the agent into generating a plan that overwrites critical files (e.g., ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, .bashrc) leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or system corruption.