CVE-2026-39805

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

Summary

Bandit is vulnerable to CL.CL HTTP request smuggling: it silently accepts requests with two Content-Length headers whose values differ, takes the first value, and dispatches the body bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9110 §5.3 prohibits multiple lines for singleton fields like Content-Length, and RFC 9112 §6.3 item 5 requires the recipient to treat invalid Content-Length as an unrecoverable framing error. When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length and forwards rather than rejects, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

The vulnerability was introduced prior to v0.1.0 (released Nov 5, 2020) on Nov 16, 2019: https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/e5270b1b19e9f3574aa0f87ec76851d66c38c0af

Details

Bandit.Headers.get_content_length/1 (lib/bandit/headers.ex) calls List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. Bandit already correctly rejects the comma-separated form (Content-Length: 0, 43) when values differ; the bug is that the multi-line form never reaches that check.

Fix: collect every Content-Length value from the header list and reject unless all values parse and are byte-identical — extending the existing rejection to the multi-line case.

PoC

The script below boots a local Bandit server with a Plug that echoes the dispatched method and path, then sends a POST with Content-Length: 0 followed by Content-Length: 43 and a 43-byte body containing a valid GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1 request line. Run with elixir script.exs

On Bandit 1.10.4 / Elixir 1.18, default config: two 200 OK responses on the same TCP connection. First body method=POST path=/, second body method=GET path=/smuggled. Bandit accepted the malformed request and dispatched the embedded request line as a second request.

Impact

Spec violation that becomes request smuggling when paired with a permissive frontend. Practical impact depends entirely on what sits between the internet and Bandit, not on what runs above it.

The application framework (Phoenix, LiveView, Phoenix-API + React SPA) is irrelevant — smuggled requests still flow through the full Plug pipeline, so application auth still runs. The attacker is someone hitting the API directly with curl, not the SPA.

Real exposure concentrates at boundary controls the proxy enforces and Bandit doesn't see: edge WAF, path-based ACLs at the LB, edge rate limiting, centralized audit logging, and — the only realistic data-exfil path — response-queue desync on pooled upstream connections.

Most major frontends already reject CL.CL (Cloudflare, AWS ALB, current nginx, HAProxy in default strict mode). Realistic exposure: custom proxies, older nginx, in-house API gateways, or multi-hop setups where one hop is permissive.

• Bandit directly on the internet: spec violation, no exploit.
• Bandit behind a major CDN/LB: almost certainly safe.
• Bandit behind a custom or unverified proxy: real smuggling exposure, bounded by what that proxy was enforcing.

Worth fixing regardless — the current behavior silently shifts security responsibility onto whichever proxy is deployed.

Script and Logs

# Bandit HTTP/1 duplicate Content-Length first-wins PoC.
#
# Bandit.Headers.get_content_length/1 calls List.keyfind/3, which returns the
# first Content-Length value and silently ignores additional Content-Length
# entries. RFC 9112 §6.3 explicitly classifies this as an unrecoverable error
# and says the recipient MUST treat it as such.
#
# This is the classic CL.CL request-smuggling primitive. If a fronting proxy
# uses the *last* Content-Length while Bandit uses the first (or vice versa),
# the second "request" embedded in the first request's body gets dispatched
# as a new request on the same keep-alive connection - after the proxy has
# already applied its access controls.
#
# Run:…

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

Summary

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

Summary

Bandit is vulnerable to CL.CL HTTP request smuggling: it silently accepts requests with two Content-Length headers whose values differ, takes the first value, and dispatches the body bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9110 §5.3 prohibits multiple lines for singleton fields like Content-Length, and RFC 9112 §6.3 item 5 requires the recipient to treat invalid Content-Length as an unrecoverable framing error. When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length and forwards rather than rejects, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

The vulnerability was introduced prior to v0.1.0 (released Nov 5, 2020) on Nov 16, 2019: https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/e5270b1b19e9f3574aa0f87ec76851d66c38c0af

Details

Bandit.Headers.get_content_length/1 (lib/bandit/headers.ex) calls List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. Bandit already correctly rejects the comma-separated form (Content-Length: 0, 43) when values differ; the bug is that the multi-line form never reaches that check.

Fix: collect every Content-Length value from the header list and reject unless all values parse and are byte-identical — extending the existing rejection to the multi-line case.

PoC

The script below boots a local Bandit server with a Plug that echoes the dispatched method and path, then sends a POST with Content-Length: 0 followed by Content-Length: 43 and a 43-byte body containing a valid GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1 request line. Run with elixir script.exs

On Bandit 1.10.4 / Elixir 1.18, default config: two 200 OK responses on the same TCP connection. First body method=POST path=/, second body method=GET path=/smuggled. Bandit accepted the malformed request and dispatched the embedded request line as a second request.

Impact

Spec violation that becomes request smuggling when paired with a permissive frontend. Practical impact depends entirely on what sits between the internet and Bandit, not on what runs above it.

The application framework (Phoenix, LiveView, Phoenix-API + React SPA) is irrelevant — smuggled requests still flow through the full Plug pipeline, so application auth still runs. The attacker is someone hitting the API directly with curl, not the SPA.

Real exposure concentrates at boundary controls the proxy enforces and Bandit doesn't see: edge WAF, path-based ACLs at the LB, edge rate limiting, centralized audit logging, and — the only realistic data-exfil path — response-queue desync on pooled upstream connections.

Most major frontends already reject CL.CL (Cloudflare, AWS ALB, current nginx, HAProxy in default strict mode). Realistic exposure: custom proxies, older nginx, in-house API gateways, or multi-hop setups where one hop is permissive.

• Bandit directly on the internet: spec violation, no exploit.
• Bandit behind a major CDN/LB: almost certainly safe.
• Bandit behind a custom or unverified proxy: real smuggling exposure, bounded by what that proxy was enforcing.

Worth fixing regardless — the current behavior silently shifts security responsibility onto whichever proxy is deployed.

Script and Logs

# Bandit HTTP/1 duplicate Content-Length first-wins PoC.
#
# Bandit.Headers.get_content_length/1 calls List.keyfind/3, which returns the
# first Content-Length value and silently ignores additional Content-Length
# entries. RFC 9112 §6.3 explicitly classifies this as an unrecoverable error
# and says the recipient MUST treat it as such.
#
# This is the classic CL.CL request-smuggling primitive. If a fronting proxy
# uses the *last* Content-Length while Bandit uses the first (or vice versa),
# the second "request" embedded in the first request's body gets dispatched
# as a new request on the same keep-alive connection - after the proxy has
# already applied its access controls.
#
# Run:…