CVE-2026-39974

n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.

n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.

Impact

An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to.

The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected.

Affected versions

n8n-mcp ≤ 2.47.3 (all versions up to and including 2.47.3).

Patched versions

n8n-mcp 2.47.4 and later.

Workarounds

If you cannot immediately upgrade:

1. Egress filtering at the network layer — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp container to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and any other internal ranges. This defends against any future SSRF-class issue and is recommended even after upgrading.
2. Disable multi-tenant headers — if your deployment does not require per-request instance switching, unset ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT and do not accept x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers at the reverse proxy.
3. Restrict AUTH_TOKEN distribution — ensure the bearer token is only held by fully trusted operators until you can upgrade.

Remediation

Upgrade to n8n-mcp 2.47.4 or later. No configuration changes are required; the fix adds validation at the URL entry points and normalizes URLs at the API client layer.

Credits

Reported by the Eresus Security Research Team. @ibrahmsql

n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.

n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.

Impact

An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to.

The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected.

Affected versions

n8n-mcp ≤ 2.47.3 (all versions up to and including 2.47.3).

Patched versions

n8n-mcp 2.47.4 and later.

Workarounds

If you cannot immediately upgrade:

1. Egress filtering at the network layer — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp container to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and any other internal ranges. This defends against any future SSRF-class issue and is recommended even after upgrading.
2. Disable multi-tenant headers — if your deployment does not require per-request instance switching, unset ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT and do not accept x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers at the reverse proxy.
3. Restrict AUTH_TOKEN distribution — ensure the bearer token is only held by fully trusted operators until you can upgrade.

Remediation

Upgrade to n8n-mcp 2.47.4 or later. No configuration changes are required; the fix adds validation at the URL entry points and normalizes URLs at the API client layer.

Credits

Reported by the Eresus Security Research Team. @ibrahmsql