CVE-2026-40263

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the login endpoint performs bcrypt password verification only when the supplied username exists, returning immediately for nonexistent usernames. This timing discrepancy allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring response times, enabling targeted credential attacks. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the login endpoint performs bcrypt password verification only when the supplied username exists, returning immediately for nonexistent usernames. This timing discrepancy allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring response times, enabling targeted credential attacks. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Summary

A timing side-channel in the login endpoint allows unauthenticated attackers to determine whether a username exists by measuring response time differences. Requests for valid usernames take noticeably longer because the server performs bcrypt password verification, while requests for nonexistent usernames return much faster. This enables reliable remote username enumeration and increases the risk of targeted credential attacks.

Details

The issue affects the login endpoint:

• POST /api/auth/token

The root cause is that authentication processing takes different code paths depending on whether the supplied username exists. When the username is found, the server performs bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword, which adds substantial latency. When the username does not exist, the server returns immediately without performing an equivalent bcrypt operation.

Vulnerable flow:

user, err := db.Where("username = ?", username).First(&user)
if err != nil {
    return ErrUnauthorized
}
err = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(user.PasswordHash, []byte(password))

This creates a measurable timing discrepancy between:

• existing username + wrong password requests, which incur bcrypt cost
• nonexistent username + any password requests, which avoid bcrypt entirely

Because no constant-time equalization is performed, the endpoint leaks account existence through timing behavior.

The measurements provided show a large and consistent gap between the two cases across repeated trials, making the difference distinguishable without requiring especially high request volume. In the supplied test results:

• existing user requests averaged about 0.0616s
• nonexistent user requests averaged about 0.0027s

That gap is large enough to support reliable username enumeration under typical testing conditions.

PoC

The issue can be reproduced by sending repeated authentication attempts to the login endpoint using the same invalid password while alternating between a known valid username and a nonexistent username, then comparing average response times. Valid usernames consistently take longer because bcrypt verification is performed.

Impact

• Type: Timing side-channel / username enumeration
• Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the affected login endpoint
• Security impact: Unauthenticated attackers can confirm valid usernames one at a time, improving the effectiveness of credential stuffing, password spraying, phishing, and other targeted account attacks
• Attack preconditions: None beyond network access to the login endpoint
• Confidentiality impact: Low to moderate, depending on the sensitivity of account existence in the target environment

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the login endpoint performs bcrypt password verification only when the supplied username exists, returning immediately for nonexistent usernames. This timing discrepancy allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring response times, enabling targeted credential attacks. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. In versions 0.19.1 and prior, the login endpoint performs bcrypt password verification only when the supplied username exists, returning immediately for nonexistent usernames. This timing discrepancy allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring response times, enabling targeted credential attacks. This issue has been fixed in version 0.19.2.

Summary

A timing side-channel in the login endpoint allows unauthenticated attackers to determine whether a username exists by measuring response time differences. Requests for valid usernames take noticeably longer because the server performs bcrypt password verification, while requests for nonexistent usernames return much faster. This enables reliable remote username enumeration and increases the risk of targeted credential attacks.

Details

The issue affects the login endpoint:

• POST /api/auth/token

The root cause is that authentication processing takes different code paths depending on whether the supplied username exists. When the username is found, the server performs bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword, which adds substantial latency. When the username does not exist, the server returns immediately without performing an equivalent bcrypt operation.

Vulnerable flow:

user, err := db.Where("username = ?", username).First(&user)
if err != nil {
    return ErrUnauthorized
}
err = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(user.PasswordHash, []byte(password))

This creates a measurable timing discrepancy between:

• existing username + wrong password requests, which incur bcrypt cost
• nonexistent username + any password requests, which avoid bcrypt entirely

Because no constant-time equalization is performed, the endpoint leaks account existence through timing behavior.

The measurements provided show a large and consistent gap between the two cases across repeated trials, making the difference distinguishable without requiring especially high request volume. In the supplied test results:

• existing user requests averaged about 0.0616s
• nonexistent user requests averaged about 0.0027s

That gap is large enough to support reliable username enumeration under typical testing conditions.

PoC

The issue can be reproduced by sending repeated authentication attempts to the login endpoint using the same invalid password while alternating between a known valid username and a nonexistent username, then comparing average response times. Valid usernames consistently take longer because bcrypt verification is performed.

Impact

• Type: Timing side-channel / username enumeration
• Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the affected login endpoint
• Security impact: Unauthenticated attackers can confirm valid usernames one at a time, improving the effectiveness of credential stuffing, password spraying, phishing, and other targeted account attacks
• Attack preconditions: None beyond network access to the login endpoint
• Confidentiality impact: Low to moderate, depending on the sensitivity of account existence in the target environment

Note Mark: Username Enumeration via Login Endpoint Timing Side-Channel in github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend.

NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.

(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)

The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend before v0.19.2-0.20260411145025-cf4c6f6acf70.

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

• Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
• GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
• GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
• GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
• GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
• GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
• GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
• GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
• GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
• GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
• GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
• GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
• GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
• GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
• GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
• GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
• GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
• GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
• GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
• GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
• GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
• GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
• GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
• GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
• GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
• GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
• GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
• GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
• GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
• GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
• GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
• GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
• GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
• GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
• GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
• GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
• GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
• GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
• GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
• GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
• GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
• GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
• GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
• GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
• GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
• GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
• GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
• GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
• GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
• GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
• GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
• GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
• GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
• GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
• GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
• GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
• GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
• GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
• GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
• GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
• GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
• GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
• GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
• GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
• GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
• GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
• GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
• GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
• GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
• GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
• GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
• GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
• GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
• GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
• GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…