CVE-2026-40324
Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.1
Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
- Record
CVE-2026-40324- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-674
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-23579
9.1
Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
- Record
EUVD-2026-23579- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
9.1
ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Impact
Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.
Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.
This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.
Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Patches
- v12 line: Fixed in
12.22.7 - v13 line: Fixed in
13.9.16 - v14 line: Fixed in
14.3.1 - v15 line: Fixed in
15.1.14
The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.
Workarounds
There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.
Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
References
- Record
GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-674
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
9.1
Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
- Record
CVE-2026-40324- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-674
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
9.1
Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
- Record
CVE-2026-40324- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-674
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
9.1
ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Impact
Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.
Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.
This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.
Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Patches
- v12 line: Fixed in
12.22.7 - v13 line: Fixed in
13.9.16 - v14 line: Fixed in
14.3.1 - v15 line: Fixed in
15.1.14
The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.
Workarounds
There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.
Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).
References
- Record
GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3- CVSS 3.1
- 9.1 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-674
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
before 12.22.7 | 12.22.7 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
13.0.0 up to 13.9.16 | 13.9.16 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
14.0.0 up to 14.3.1 | 14.3.1 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
15.0.0 up to 15.1.14 | 15.1.14 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
before 12.22.7, plus listed versions 0.1.00.1.10.1.20.1.30.1.4 Show 45 moreShow less0.2.00.2.10.2.20.2.30.3.00.3.0-preview-10.3.0-preview-20.3.10.3.20.4.00.4.0-preview-10.4.0-preview-20.4.0-preview-30.4.10.4.20.4.30.4.40.4.50.4.5-preview-10.4.5-preview-20.4.5-preview-30.4.60.5.00.5.0-preview-10.5.0-preview-20.5.0-preview-30.5.0-preview-40.5.0-preview-50.5.0-preview-60.5.0-preview-70.5.10.5.20.5.3-preview-10.6.00.6.0-preview-20.6.0-preview-30.6.0-preview-40.6.0-preview-50.6.0-preview-60.6.0-preview-70.6.0-preview-80.6.0-preview-90.6.0-rc-10.6.10.6.10 |
12.22.7 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
13.0.0 up to 13.9.16, plus listed versions 13.0.113.0.213.0.313.0.413.0.5 Show 31 moreShow less13.1.013.2.013.2.113.3.013.3.113.3.213.3.313.4.013.5.013.5.113.6.013.6.113.7.013.8.013.8.113.9.013.9.113.9.1013.9.1113.9.1213.9.1313.9.1413.9.1513.9.213.9.313.9.413.9.513.9.613.9.713.9.813.9.9 |
13.9.16 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
14.0.0 up to 14.3.1, plus listed versions 14.1.014.2.014.3.0 |
14.3.1 |
HotChocolate.LanguageNuGet |
15.0.0 up to 15.1.14, plus listed versions 15.0.115.0.215.0.315.1.015.1.1 Show 12 moreShow less15.1.1015.1.1115.1.1215.1.1315.1.215.1.315.1.415.1.515.1.615.1.715.1.815.1.9 |
15.1.14 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-40324 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.1) in Chillicream Graphql-platform, published April 16, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.90%, the 60th percentile. Fixed in HotChocolate.Language 12.22.7.
References
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9530
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9531
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/08c0caa42ca33c121bbed49d2db892e5bf6fb541
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/4cbaf67d366f800fc1e484bc5c06dfcf27b45023
Show 10 moreShow less
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b185eb276c9ee227bd44616ff113be7f01a66c69
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b9271e6a500484c002fd528dcd34d1a9b445480f
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/12.22.7
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/13.9.16
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/14.3.1
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/15.1.14
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40324
github.com/advisories/GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40324.json
github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform
Left out here: 140 versions. The JSON record has them.