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CVE-2026-40324

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

9.1 CriticalFix available

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.90%Up 0.8 points since Apr 18, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.1

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Record
CVE-2026-40324
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-674
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-23579 9.1

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Record
EUVD-2026-23579
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3 9.1

ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

Impact

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.

Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.

This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.

Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Patches

  • v12 line: Fixed in 12.22.7
  • v13 line: Fixed in 13.9.16
  • v14 line: Fixed in 14.3.1
  • v15 line: Fixed in 15.1.14

The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.

Workarounds

There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.

Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

References

Record
GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-674
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 9.1

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Record
CVE-2026-40324
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-674
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 9.1

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser has Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser Utf8GraphQLParser has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Record
CVE-2026-40324
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-674
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3 9.1

ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

Impact

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.

Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.

This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.

Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Patches

  • v12 line: Fixed in 12.22.7
  • v13 line: Fixed in 13.9.16
  • v14 line: Fixed in 14.3.1
  • v15 line: Fixed in 15.1.14

The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.

Workarounds

There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.

Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

References

Record
GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-674
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
before 12.22.7
12.22.7
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
13.0.0 up to 13.9.16
13.9.16
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
14.0.0 up to 14.3.1
14.3.1
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
15.0.0 up to 15.1.14
15.1.14
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
before 12.22.7, plus listed versions
0.1.00.1.10.1.20.1.30.1.4
Show 45 moreShow less
0.2.00.2.10.2.20.2.30.3.00.3.0-preview-10.3.0-preview-20.3.10.3.20.4.00.4.0-preview-10.4.0-preview-20.4.0-preview-30.4.10.4.20.4.30.4.40.4.50.4.5-preview-10.4.5-preview-20.4.5-preview-30.4.60.5.00.5.0-preview-10.5.0-preview-20.5.0-preview-30.5.0-preview-40.5.0-preview-50.5.0-preview-60.5.0-preview-70.5.10.5.20.5.3-preview-10.6.00.6.0-preview-20.6.0-preview-30.6.0-preview-40.6.0-preview-50.6.0-preview-60.6.0-preview-70.6.0-preview-80.6.0-preview-90.6.0-rc-10.6.10.6.10
12.22.7
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
13.0.0 up to 13.9.16, plus listed versions
13.0.113.0.213.0.313.0.413.0.5
Show 31 moreShow less
13.1.013.2.013.2.113.3.013.3.113.3.213.3.313.4.013.5.013.5.113.6.013.6.113.7.013.8.013.8.113.9.013.9.113.9.1013.9.1113.9.1213.9.1313.9.1413.9.1513.9.213.9.313.9.413.9.513.9.613.9.713.9.813.9.9
13.9.16
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
14.0.0 up to 14.3.1, plus listed versions
14.1.014.2.014.3.0
14.3.1
HotChocolate.Language
NuGet
15.0.0 up to 15.1.14, plus listed versions
15.0.115.0.215.0.315.1.015.1.1
Show 12 moreShow less
15.1.1015.1.1115.1.1215.1.1315.1.215.1.315.1.415.1.515.1.615.1.715.1.815.1.9
15.1.14

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-40324 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.1) in Chillicream Graphql-platform, published April 16, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.90%, the 60th percentile. Fixed in HotChocolate.Language 12.22.7.

References

Show 10 moreShow less
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