CVE-2026-41012

Traffic interception vulnerability in BOSH Director vCenter CPI allows attackers positioned between BOSH Director and vCenter to impersonate vCenter REST API and capture administrator credentials via HTTP Basic auth, leading to complete virtualization infrastructure takeover.

An attacker who can intercept traffic between the BOSH Director and vCenter can establish a malicious server impersonating the vCenter REST API. When the BOSH Director makes CPI calls to perform routine cloud infrastructure operations, the attacker captures the vCenter administrator username and password transmitted via HTTP Basic authentication.

The vulnerability stems from insufficient authentication security in the communication protocol between BOSH Director and vCenter. While HTTPS may be used, the lack of proper certificate validation and pinning allows attackers to successfully impersonate vCenter endpoints. Because vCenter credentials typically grant full administrative control over the entire virtualization estate, successful credential capture yields complete takeover of every VM, datastore, and network the CPI manages.

This exposure exists on every CPI call (including routine deployment operations, not just when tags are configured) and cannot be mitigated by supplying a CA certificate alone. The attack impacts all infrastructure managed by the compromised vCenter instance, potentially affecting hundreds or thousands of VMs across multiple deployments and environments.

Traffic interception vulnerability in BOSH Director vCenter CPI allows attackers positioned between BOSH Director and vCenter to impersonate vCenter REST API and capture administrator credentials via HTTP Basic auth, leading to complete virtualization infrastructure takeover.

An attacker who can intercept traffic between the BOSH Director and vCenter can establish a malicious server impersonating the vCenter REST API. When the BOSH Director makes CPI calls to perform routine cloud infrastructure operations, the attacker captures the vCenter administrator username and password transmitted via HTTP Basic authentication.

The vulnerability stems from insufficient authentication security in the communication protocol between BOSH Director and vCenter. While HTTPS may be used, the lack of proper certificate validation and pinning allows attackers to successfully impersonate vCenter endpoints. Because vCenter credentials typically grant full administrative control over the entire virtualization estate, successful credential capture yields complete takeover of every VM, datastore, and network the CPI manages.

This exposure exists on every CPI call (including routine deployment operations, not just when tags are configured) and cannot be mitigated by supplying a CA certificate alone. The attack impacts all infrastructure managed by the compromised vCenter instance, potentially affecting hundreds or thousands of VMs across multiple deployments and environments.

Traffic interception vulnerability in BOSH Director vCenter CPI allows attackers positioned between BOSH Director and vCenter to impersonate vCenter REST API and capture administrator credentials via HTTP Basic auth, leading to complete virtualization infrastructure takeover.

An attacker who can intercept traffic between the BOSH Director and vCenter can establish a malicious server impersonating the vCenter REST API. When the BOSH Director makes CPI calls to perform routine cloud infrastructure operations, the attacker captures the vCenter administrator username and password transmitted via HTTP Basic authentication.

The vulnerability stems from insufficient authentication security in the communication protocol between BOSH Director and vCenter. While HTTPS may be used, the lack of proper certificate validation and pinning allows attackers to successfully impersonate vCenter endpoints. Because vCenter credentials typically grant full administrative control over the entire virtualization estate, successful credential capture yields complete takeover of every VM, datastore, and network the CPI manages.

This exposure exists on every CPI call (including routine deployment operations, not just when tags are configured) and cannot be mitigated by supplying a CA certificate alone. The attack impacts all infrastructure managed by the compromised vCenter instance, potentially affecting hundreds or thousands of VMs across multiple deployments and environments.

Traffic interception vulnerability in BOSH Director vCenter CPI allows attackers positioned between BOSH Director and vCenter to impersonate vCenter REST API and capture administrator credentials via HTTP Basic auth, leading to complete virtualization infrastructure takeover.

An attacker who can intercept traffic between the BOSH Director and vCenter can establish a malicious server impersonating the vCenter REST API. When the BOSH Director makes CPI calls to perform routine cloud infrastructure operations, the attacker captures the vCenter administrator username and password transmitted via HTTP Basic authentication.

The vulnerability stems from insufficient authentication security in the communication protocol between BOSH Director and vCenter. While HTTPS may be used, the lack of proper certificate validation and pinning allows attackers to successfully impersonate vCenter endpoints. Because vCenter credentials typically grant full administrative control over the entire virtualization estate, successful credential capture yields complete takeover of every VM, datastore, and network the CPI manages.

This exposure exists on every CPI call (including routine deployment operations, not just when tags are configured) and cannot be mitigated by supplying a CA certificate alone. The attack impacts all infrastructure managed by the compromised vCenter instance, potentially affecting hundreds or thousands of VMs across multiple deployments and environments.