CVE-2026-41230
Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()
CVE-2026-41230 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.5) in Froxlor, published April 16, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.35%, the 28th percentile. Fixed in froxlor/froxlor 2.3.6.
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.5
Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-41230- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-93
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-25180
8.5
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
EUVD-2026-25180- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
8.5
Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()
Summary
DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file.
Details
Missing type whitelist — DomainZones.php:93:
The type parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');
The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a TODO comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:
// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters
Missing newline sanitization — DomainZones.php:154:
The content field only receives trim(), which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:154
$content = trim($content);
Unsafe zone file output — DnsEntry.php:83:
DnsEntry::__toString() concatenates content directly into zone file format without escaping:
// lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php:83
return $this->record . "\t" . $this->ttl . "\t" . $this->class . "\t" . $this->type . "\t"
. (($this->priority >= 0 && ($this->type == 'MX' || $this->type == 'SRV')) ? $this->priority . "\t" : "")
. $_content . PHP_EOL;
Newlines in $_content produce new lines in the zone file, each parsed by BIND as an independent resource record or directive.
Zone file write — Bind.php:121:
// lib/Froxlor/Cron/Dns/Bind.php:121
fwrite($zonefile_handler, $zoneContent . $subzones);
The AntiXSS filter applied at the API layer (Api.php:91) targets HTML/JS XSS vectors and does not strip newline characters. The web UI form restricts types via a dropdown (formfield.dns_add.php:42-56), but this is client-side only — the server-side DomainZones::add() has no corresponding whitelist.
Execution flow:
- Customer sends API request with
type=NAPTRandcontentcontaining\n-separated lines getParam()returns raw values without sanitization- Type
NAPTRmatches none of the if/elseif conditions — no content validation runs trim($content)preserves embedded newlines- Content is inserted into
domain_dnstable via prepared statement - DNS cron creates
DnsEntryobjects from DB records (Dns.php:297) DnsEntry::__toString()outputs content with embedded newlines into zone formatBind.php:121writes zone to disk; BIND loads the file and processes injected lines as records
PoC
Step 1: Inject a DNS record with embedded newlines via API
curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \
-u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"command": "DomainZones.add",
"params": {
"id": 1,
"type": "NAPTR",
"content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n@ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4\n@ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" ."
}
}'
Expected: HTTP 200 with success response. The record is stored in the database.
Step 2: Wait for DNS cron to rebuild zones (or trigger manually)
# As admin, trigger the DNS rebuild cron
php /var/www/froxlor/scripts/froxlor_master_cronjob.php --force --dns
Step 3: Inspect the generated zone file
cat /etc/bind/domains/example.com.zone
Expected zone…
- Record
GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-93
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.5
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-41230- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-93
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.5
Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-41230- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-93
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
8.5
Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()
Summary
DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file.
Details
Missing type whitelist — DomainZones.php:93:
The type parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');
The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a TODO comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:
// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters
Missing newline sanitization — DomainZones.php:154:
The content field only receives trim(), which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:154
$content = trim($content);
Unsafe zone file output — DnsEntry.php:83:
DnsEntry::__toString() concatenates content directly into zone file format without escaping:
// lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php:83
return $this->record . "\t" . $this->ttl . "\t" . $this->class . "\t" . $this->type . "\t"
. (($this->priority >= 0 && ($this->type == 'MX' || $this->type == 'SRV')) ? $this->priority . "\t" : "")
. $_content . PHP_EOL;
Newlines in $_content produce new lines in the zone file, each parsed by BIND as an independent resource record or directive.
Zone file write — Bind.php:121:
// lib/Froxlor/Cron/Dns/Bind.php:121
fwrite($zonefile_handler, $zoneContent . $subzones);
The AntiXSS filter applied at the API layer (Api.php:91) targets HTML/JS XSS vectors and does not strip newline characters. The web UI form restricts types via a dropdown (formfield.dns_add.php:42-56), but this is client-side only — the server-side DomainZones::add() has no corresponding whitelist.
Execution flow:
- Customer sends API request with
type=NAPTRandcontentcontaining\n-separated lines getParam()returns raw values without sanitization- Type
NAPTRmatches none of the if/elseif conditions — no content validation runs trim($content)preserves embedded newlines- Content is inserted into
domain_dnstable via prepared statement - DNS cron creates
DnsEntryobjects from DB records (Dns.php:297) DnsEntry::__toString()outputs content with embedded newlines into zone formatBind.php:121writes zone to disk; BIND loads the file and processes injected lines as records
PoC
Step 1: Inject a DNS record with embedded newlines via API
curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \
-u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"command": "DomainZones.add",
"params": {
"id": 1,
"type": "NAPTR",
"content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n@ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4\n@ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" ."
}
}'
Expected: HTTP 200 with success response. The record is stored in the database.
Step 2: Wait for DNS cron to rebuild zones (or trigger manually)
# As admin, trigger the DNS rebuild cron
php /var/www/froxlor/scripts/froxlor_master_cronjob.php --force --dns
Step 3: Inspect the generated zone file
cat /etc/bind/domains/example.com.zone
Expected zone…
- Record
GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-93
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
froxlor/froxlorPackagist |
before 2.3.6 | 2.3.6 |
froxlor/froxlorPackagist |
before 2.3.6, plus listed versions 0.10.00.10.0-rc10.10.0-rc20.10.10.10.10 Show 45 moreShow less0.10.110.10.120.10.130.10.140.10.150.10.160.10.170.10.180.10.190.10.20.10.200.10.210.10.220.10.230.10.23.10.10.240.10.250.10.260.10.270.10.280.10.290.10.29.10.10.30.10.300.10.310.10.320.10.330.10.340.10.34.10.10.350.10.35.10.10.360.10.370.10.380.10.38.10.10.38.20.10.38.30.10.40.10.50.10.60.10.70.10.80.10.92.0.02.0.1 |
2.3.6 |
History
| When | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-02 | created | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
References
github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/47a8af5d9523cb6ec94567405cfc2e294d3a1442
github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41230
github.com/advisories/GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41230.json
github.com/froxlor/froxlor
Left out here: 57 versions and the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.