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CVE-2026-41230

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

8.5 HighFix available

CVE-2026-41230 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.5) in Froxlor, published April 16, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.35%, the 28th percentile. Fixed in froxlor/froxlor 2.3.6.

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Exploit likelihood

0.35%Up 0.3 points since Apr 23, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.5

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-41230
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-93
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-25180 8.5

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Record
EUVD-2026-25180
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c 8.5

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

Summary

DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file.

Details

Missing type whitelist — DomainZones.php:93:

The type parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');

The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a TODO comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:

// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters

Missing newline sanitization — DomainZones.php:154:

The content field only receives trim(), which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:154
$content = trim($content);

Unsafe zone file output — DnsEntry.php:83:

DnsEntry::__toString() concatenates content directly into zone file format without escaping:

// lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php:83
return $this->record . "\t" . $this->ttl . "\t" . $this->class . "\t" . $this->type . "\t"
    . (($this->priority >= 0 && ($this->type == 'MX' || $this->type == 'SRV')) ? $this->priority . "\t" : "")
    . $_content . PHP_EOL;

Newlines in $_content produce new lines in the zone file, each parsed by BIND as an independent resource record or directive.

Zone file write — Bind.php:121:

// lib/Froxlor/Cron/Dns/Bind.php:121
fwrite($zonefile_handler, $zoneContent . $subzones);

The AntiXSS filter applied at the API layer (Api.php:91) targets HTML/JS XSS vectors and does not strip newline characters. The web UI form restricts types via a dropdown (formfield.dns_add.php:42-56), but this is client-side only — the server-side DomainZones::add() has no corresponding whitelist.

Execution flow:

  1. Customer sends API request with type=NAPTR and content containing \n-separated lines
  2. getParam() returns raw values without sanitization
  3. Type NAPTR matches none of the if/elseif conditions — no content validation runs
  4. trim($content) preserves embedded newlines
  5. Content is inserted into domain_dns table via prepared statement
  6. DNS cron creates DnsEntry objects from DB records (Dns.php:297)
  7. DnsEntry::__toString() outputs content with embedded newlines into zone format
  8. Bind.php:121 writes zone to disk; BIND loads the file and processes injected lines as records

PoC

Step 1: Inject a DNS record with embedded newlines via API

curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \
  -u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "command": "DomainZones.add",
    "params": {
      "id": 1,
      "type": "NAPTR",
      "content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n@ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4\n@ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" ."
    }
  }'

Expected: HTTP 200 with success response. The record is stored in the database.

Step 2: Wait for DNS cron to rebuild zones (or trigger manually)

# As admin, trigger the DNS rebuild cron
php /var/www/froxlor/scripts/froxlor_master_cronjob.php --force --dns

Step 3: Inspect the generated zone file

cat /etc/bind/domains/example.com.zone

Expected zone…

Record
GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-93
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.5

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-41230
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-93
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.5

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-41230
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-93
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c 8.5

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

Summary

DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::__toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file.

Details

Missing type whitelist — DomainZones.php:93:

The type parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');

The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a TODO comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:

// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters

Missing newline sanitization — DomainZones.php:154:

The content field only receives trim(), which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:154
$content = trim($content);

Unsafe zone file output — DnsEntry.php:83:

DnsEntry::__toString() concatenates content directly into zone file format without escaping:

// lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php:83
return $this->record . "\t" . $this->ttl . "\t" . $this->class . "\t" . $this->type . "\t"
    . (($this->priority >= 0 && ($this->type == 'MX' || $this->type == 'SRV')) ? $this->priority . "\t" : "")
    . $_content . PHP_EOL;

Newlines in $_content produce new lines in the zone file, each parsed by BIND as an independent resource record or directive.

Zone file write — Bind.php:121:

// lib/Froxlor/Cron/Dns/Bind.php:121
fwrite($zonefile_handler, $zoneContent . $subzones);

The AntiXSS filter applied at the API layer (Api.php:91) targets HTML/JS XSS vectors and does not strip newline characters. The web UI form restricts types via a dropdown (formfield.dns_add.php:42-56), but this is client-side only — the server-side DomainZones::add() has no corresponding whitelist.

Execution flow:

  1. Customer sends API request with type=NAPTR and content containing \n-separated lines
  2. getParam() returns raw values without sanitization
  3. Type NAPTR matches none of the if/elseif conditions — no content validation runs
  4. trim($content) preserves embedded newlines
  5. Content is inserted into domain_dns table via prepared statement
  6. DNS cron creates DnsEntry objects from DB records (Dns.php:297)
  7. DnsEntry::__toString() outputs content with embedded newlines into zone format
  8. Bind.php:121 writes zone to disk; BIND loads the file and processes injected lines as records

PoC

Step 1: Inject a DNS record with embedded newlines via API

curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \
  -u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "command": "DomainZones.add",
    "params": {
      "id": 1,
      "type": "NAPTR",
      "content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n@ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4\n@ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" ."
    }
  }'

Expected: HTTP 200 with success response. The record is stored in the database.

Step 2: Wait for DNS cron to rebuild zones (or trigger manually)

# As admin, trigger the DNS rebuild cron
php /var/www/froxlor/scripts/froxlor_master_cronjob.php --force --dns

Step 3: Inspect the generated zone file

cat /etc/bind/domains/example.com.zone

Expected zone…

Record
GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-93
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
froxlor/froxlor
Packagist
before 2.3.6
2.3.6
froxlor/froxlor
Packagist
before 2.3.6, plus listed versions
0.10.00.10.0-rc10.10.0-rc20.10.10.10.10
Show 45 moreShow less
0.10.110.10.120.10.130.10.140.10.150.10.160.10.170.10.180.10.190.10.20.10.200.10.210.10.220.10.230.10.23.10.10.240.10.250.10.260.10.270.10.280.10.290.10.29.10.10.30.10.300.10.310.10.320.10.330.10.340.10.34.10.10.350.10.35.10.10.360.10.370.10.380.10.38.10.10.38.20.10.38.30.10.40.10.50.10.60.10.70.10.80.10.92.0.02.0.1
2.3.6

History

History
WhenChangedSources
2026-11-02createdCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

References

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