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CVE-2026-41574

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass

9.3 CriticalFix available

Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 0.49.1, Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. This issue has been patched in version 0.49.1.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.80%Up 0.8 points since May 9, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.3

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass

Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 0.49.1, Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. This issue has been patched in version 0.49.1.

Record
CVE-2026-41574
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-287
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-28650 9.3

Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 0.49.1, Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. This issue has been patched in version 0.49.1.

Record
EUVD-2026-28650
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr 9.3

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass

Summary

Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter.

The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified.

The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session.

Root Cause

In services/auth/go/controller/sign_in_id_token.go, providerFlowSignIn() links a new provider identity to an existing account by email match with no verification guard:

// sign_in_id_token.go:267-296
func (ctrl *Controller) providerFlowSignIn(
    ctx context.Context,
    user sql.AuthUser,
    providerFound bool,
    provider string,
    providerUserID string,
    logger *slog.Logger,
) (*api.Session, *APIError) {
    if !providerFound {
        // Links attacker's provider identity to the victim's account.
        // profile.EmailVerified is NEVER checked here.
        ctrl.wf.InsertUserProvider(ctx, user.ID, provider, providerUserID, logger)
    }
    // Issues a full session  to the attacker.
    session, _ := ctrl.wf.NewSession(ctx, user, nil, logger)
    return session, nil
}

The controller places full trust in whatever profile.EmailVerified the adapter returned. The vulnerabilities below show how that trust is violated.

Correct Implementation (For Reference)

GitHub: providers/github.go

GitHub fetches /user/emails and reads the verified boolean per entry. selectEmail() picks only verified emails. The result is correctly mapped:

selected := selectEmail(emails)   // only selects verified: true entries

return oidc.Profile{
    Email:         selected.Email,
    EmailVerified: selected.Verified,  // real boolean from GitHub API
    ...
}

Vulnerable Providers

1. Discord: providers/discord.go

The Discord GET /users/@me API returns a verified boolean field. Per Discord's official documentation and example User Object:

{
  "id": "80351110224678912",
  "username": "Nelly",
  "email": "[email protected]",
  "verified": true
}

The Nhost struct is missing this field. Go's JSON decoder silently discards it:

type discordUserProfile struct {
    ID            string `json:"id"`
    Username      string `json:"username"`
    Discriminator string `json:"discriminator"`
    Email         string `json:"email"`
    Locale        string `json:"locale"`
    Avatar        string `json:"avatar"`
    // MISSING: Verified bool `json:"verified"`
}

The adapter then sets:

EmailVerified: userProfile.Email != "",  // always true when email is present

Why this is exploitable: Discord allows users to create account without verifying the email address and change their email address without immediately verifying it. After changing email, the account has "verified": false in the API response until the user clicks a confirmation link. An attacker can change their Discord email to the victim's address, leave it unverified, and the Nhost adapter will still present EmailVerified: true, because it never reads the verified field at all.

Fix:

type discordUserProfile struct {
    ID            string `json:"id"`
    Username      string `json:"username"`
    Discriminator string `json:"discriminator"`
    Email         string `json:"email"`
    Verified      bool   `json:"verified"`   // add this
    Locale        string…
Record
GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-287
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 9.3

Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 0.49.1, Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. This issue has been patched in version 0.49.1.

Record
CVE-2026-41574
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-287
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 9.3

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass

Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 0.49.1, Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. This issue has been patched in version 0.49.1.

Record
CVE-2026-41574
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-287
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr 9.3

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass

Summary

Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter.

The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified.

The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session.

Root Cause

In services/auth/go/controller/sign_in_id_token.go, providerFlowSignIn() links a new provider identity to an existing account by email match with no verification guard:

// sign_in_id_token.go:267-296
func (ctrl *Controller) providerFlowSignIn(
    ctx context.Context,
    user sql.AuthUser,
    providerFound bool,
    provider string,
    providerUserID string,
    logger *slog.Logger,
) (*api.Session, *APIError) {
    if !providerFound {
        // Links attacker's provider identity to the victim's account.
        // profile.EmailVerified is NEVER checked here.
        ctrl.wf.InsertUserProvider(ctx, user.ID, provider, providerUserID, logger)
    }
    // Issues a full session  to the attacker.
    session, _ := ctrl.wf.NewSession(ctx, user, nil, logger)
    return session, nil
}

The controller places full trust in whatever profile.EmailVerified the adapter returned. The vulnerabilities below show how that trust is violated.

Correct Implementation (For Reference)

GitHub: providers/github.go

GitHub fetches /user/emails and reads the verified boolean per entry. selectEmail() picks only verified emails. The result is correctly mapped:

selected := selectEmail(emails)   // only selects verified: true entries

return oidc.Profile{
    Email:         selected.Email,
    EmailVerified: selected.Verified,  // real boolean from GitHub API
    ...
}

Vulnerable Providers

1. Discord: providers/discord.go

The Discord GET /users/@me API returns a verified boolean field. Per Discord's official documentation and example User Object:

{
  "id": "80351110224678912",
  "username": "Nelly",
  "email": "[email protected]",
  "verified": true
}

The Nhost struct is missing this field. Go's JSON decoder silently discards it:

type discordUserProfile struct {
    ID            string `json:"id"`
    Username      string `json:"username"`
    Discriminator string `json:"discriminator"`
    Email         string `json:"email"`
    Locale        string `json:"locale"`
    Avatar        string `json:"avatar"`
    // MISSING: Verified bool `json:"verified"`
}

The adapter then sets:

EmailVerified: userProfile.Email != "",  // always true when email is present

Why this is exploitable: Discord allows users to create account without verifying the email address and change their email address without immediately verifying it. After changing email, the account has "verified": false in the API response until the user clicks a confirmation link. An attacker can change their Discord email to the victim's address, leave it unverified, and the Nhost adapter will still present EmailVerified: true, because it never reads the verified field at all.

Fix:

type discordUserProfile struct {
    ID            string `json:"id"`
    Username      string `json:"username"`
    Discriminator string `json:"discriminator"`
    Email         string `json:"email"`
    Verified      bool   `json:"verified"`   // add this
    Locale        string…
Record
GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr
CVSS 4.0
9.3 CriticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-287
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5176 No score

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass in github.com/nhost/nhost

Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass in github.com/nhost/nhost

Record
GO-2026-5176
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/nhost/nhost
Go
 before 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4
0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-41574 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.3) in Nhost, published April 18, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.80%, the 56th percentile. Fixed in github.com/nhost/nhost 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4.

References

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