CVE-2026-42572

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.83.39, a missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.83.39.

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.83.39, a missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.83.39.

Summary

A missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG.

This issue has been patched in v0.83.39. Hatchet Cloud has been patched and requires no action from users. Self-hosted users should upgrade.

Impact

Who is affected. Multi-tenant Hatchet instances reachable by an attacker who can obtain an account on that instance. On Hatchet Cloud, account creation is open by default. On self-hosted instances, the API must be reachable by the attacker and the hostname known; instances deployed inside a VPC or with signup restricted are not exposed to arbitrary external actors.

Prerequisites for exploitation. An attacker needed:

1. An account on the target Hatchet instance.
2. The victim tenant's UUID.
3. At least one DAG UUID (external_id) belonging to that tenant.

The two UUIDs are not treated as secrets — they appear in URLs, API responses, audit logs, invitation flows, shared run links, and dashboard screenshots — but an attacker does need to learn them through some out-of-band channel before exploitation is possible.

What could be disclosed. For each child task of a targeted DAG, the endpoint returned:

• display_name, action_id, step_id
• workflow_id, workflow_version_id, workflow_run_id, task_external_id
• tenant_id, retry_count, status, timestamps
• additional_metadata (JSON)

The additional_metadata field is the most sensitive: Hatchet workflows commonly use it to carry domain context such as user identifiers, customer IDs, feature flags, or correlation tokens. Its contents vary by deployment.

What was not disclosed. The raw task input payload is not part of this endpoint's response shape and was not exposed through this issue. The scope is limited to task metadata, not task arguments or results.

Exploitation status. We have no evidence that this vulnerability was exploited prior to the patch.

Root cause

Hatchet's multi-tenant authorization relies on an OpenAPI-driven middleware pipeline. Each authenticated operation declares x-resources: ["tenant", ...] in its spec. The populator middleware reads the declared resources, looks up the corresponding entities from request parameters, and stores them on the request context. The authz middleware then verifies that the authenticated user is a member of the tenant found on the context.

The listTasksByDAGIds operation accepted a tenant UUID as a query parameter, but its OpenAPI definition did not declare x-resources: ["tenant"]. As a result:

1. The populator, which early-returns when no resources are declared, did not populate the tenant onto the request context.
2. The authz middleware, which runs its membership check only when a tenant is present on the context, silently passed the request through.
3. The handler read the tenant UUID directly from the query parameter and used it as the filter in the downstream OLAP query.

The SQL query itself correctly filters by tenant_id, so it returned only rows matching the supplied UUID — but the UUID came from the caller rather than from an authorization-validated context, so the filter bounded the response to the attacker-named tenant rather than to a tenant the caller was authorized to read.

Every other authenticated operation in the same path file (tasks.yaml) correctly declared x-resources. This endpoint was the only authenticated operation in the file that did not.

Patch

The fix adds the missing resource authz checks inline on the handler, enforcing valid tenant membership before the handler runs.

Shipped in v0.83.39.

Remediation

Hatchet Cloud. No action required. The patch was deployed on April 23, 2026 within the same day…

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.83.39, a missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.83.39.

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.83.39, a missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.83.39.

Summary

A missing authorization directive on the GET /api/v1/stable/dags/tasks endpoint caused Hatchet's tenant-membership check to be skipped for this route. A user authenticated to any tenant on the same Hatchet instance could query the endpoint with another tenant's UUID and a DAG UUID belonging to that tenant, and receive task metadata for that DAG.

This issue has been patched in v0.83.39. Hatchet Cloud has been patched and requires no action from users. Self-hosted users should upgrade.

Impact

Who is affected. Multi-tenant Hatchet instances reachable by an attacker who can obtain an account on that instance. On Hatchet Cloud, account creation is open by default. On self-hosted instances, the API must be reachable by the attacker and the hostname known; instances deployed inside a VPC or with signup restricted are not exposed to arbitrary external actors.

Prerequisites for exploitation. An attacker needed:

1. An account on the target Hatchet instance.
2. The victim tenant's UUID.
3. At least one DAG UUID (external_id) belonging to that tenant.

The two UUIDs are not treated as secrets — they appear in URLs, API responses, audit logs, invitation flows, shared run links, and dashboard screenshots — but an attacker does need to learn them through some out-of-band channel before exploitation is possible.

What could be disclosed. For each child task of a targeted DAG, the endpoint returned:

• display_name, action_id, step_id
• workflow_id, workflow_version_id, workflow_run_id, task_external_id
• tenant_id, retry_count, status, timestamps
• additional_metadata (JSON)

The additional_metadata field is the most sensitive: Hatchet workflows commonly use it to carry domain context such as user identifiers, customer IDs, feature flags, or correlation tokens. Its contents vary by deployment.

What was not disclosed. The raw task input payload is not part of this endpoint's response shape and was not exposed through this issue. The scope is limited to task metadata, not task arguments or results.

Exploitation status. We have no evidence that this vulnerability was exploited prior to the patch.

Root cause

Hatchet's multi-tenant authorization relies on an OpenAPI-driven middleware pipeline. Each authenticated operation declares x-resources: ["tenant", ...] in its spec. The populator middleware reads the declared resources, looks up the corresponding entities from request parameters, and stores them on the request context. The authz middleware then verifies that the authenticated user is a member of the tenant found on the context.

The listTasksByDAGIds operation accepted a tenant UUID as a query parameter, but its OpenAPI definition did not declare x-resources: ["tenant"]. As a result:

1. The populator, which early-returns when no resources are declared, did not populate the tenant onto the request context.
2. The authz middleware, which runs its membership check only when a tenant is present on the context, silently passed the request through.
3. The handler read the tenant UUID directly from the query parameter and used it as the filter in the downstream OLAP query.

The SQL query itself correctly filters by tenant_id, so it returned only rows matching the supplied UUID — but the UUID came from the caller rather than from an authorization-validated context, so the filter bounded the response to the attacker-named tenant rather than to a tenant the caller was authorized to read.

Every other authenticated operation in the same path file (tasks.yaml) correctly declared x-resources. This endpoint was the only authenticated operation in the file that did not.

Patch

The fix adds the missing resource authz checks inline on the handler, enforcing valid tenant membership before the handler runs.

Shipped in v0.83.39.

Remediation

Hatchet Cloud. No action required. The patch was deployed on April 23, 2026 within the same day…

Hatchet affected by cross-tenant information disclosure in listTasksByDAGIds in github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

• Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
• GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
• GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
• GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
• GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
• GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
• GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
• GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
• GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
• GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
• GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
• GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
• GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
• GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
• GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
• GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
• GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
• GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
• GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
• GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
• GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
• GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
• GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
• GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
• GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
• GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
• GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
• GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
• GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
• GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
• GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
• GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
• GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
• GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
• GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
• GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
• GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
• GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
• GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
• GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
• GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
• GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
• GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
• GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
• GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
• GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
• GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
• GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
• GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
• GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
• GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
• GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
• GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
• GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
• GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
• GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
• GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
• GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
• GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
• GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
• GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
• GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
• GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
• GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
• GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
• GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
• GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
• GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
• GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
• GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
• GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
• GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
• GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
• GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
• GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…