CVE-2026-42804

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.

The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875).

The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.

A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.

This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.

Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.

The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875).

The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.

A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.

This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.

Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.

The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875).

The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.

A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.

This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.

Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.

The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875).

The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.

A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.

This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.

Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).