CVE-2026-43127

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 & V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 & X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE & A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 & A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.(CVE-2025-10263)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: let smbd_destroy() call disable_work_sync(&info->post_send_credits_work)

In smbd_destroy() we may destroy the memory so we better wait until post_send_credits_work is no longer pending and will never be started again.

I actually just hit the case using rxe:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 138 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1032 rxe_post_recv+0x1ee/0x480 [rdma_rxe] ... [ 5305.686979] [ T138] smbd_post_recv+0x445/0xc10 [cifs] [ 5305.687135] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687149] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 5305.687185] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 5305.687329] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687356] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687368] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687378] [ T138] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x60 [ 5305.687389] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687399] [ T138] ? get_receive_buffer+0x168/0x210 [cifs] [ 5305.687555] [ T138] smbd_post_send_credits+0x382/0x4b0 [cifs] [ 5305.687701] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_send_credits+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 5305.687855] [ T138] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687865] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687875] [ T138] ? queue_delayed_work_on+0x8e/0xa0 [ 5305.687889] [ T138] process_one_work+0x629/0xf80 [ 5305.687908] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687917] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 5305.687933] [ T138] worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570 ...

It means rxe_post_recv was called after rdma_destroy_qp(). This happened because put_receive_buffer() was triggered by ib_drain_qp() and called: queue_work(info->workqueue, &info->post_send_credits_work);(CVE-2025-39932)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation

The syscall number is a user-controlled value used to index into the syscall table. Use array_index_nospec() to clamp this value after the bounds check to prevent speculative out-of-bounds access and subsequent data leakage via cache side channels.(CVE-2025-71203)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-fc: release admin tagset if init fails

nvme_fabrics creates an NVMe/FC controller in following path:

nvmf_dev_write()
  -> nvmf_create_ctrl()
    -> nvme_fc_create_ctrl()
      -> nvme_fc_init_ctrl()

nvme_fc_init_ctrl() allocates the admin blk-mq resources right after nvme_add_ctrl() succeeds. If any of the subsequent steps fail (changing the controller state, scheduling connect work, etc.), we jump to the fail_ctrl path, which tears down the controller references but never frees the admin queue/tag set. The leaked blk-mq allocations match the kmemleak report seen during blktests nvme/fc.

Check ctrl->ctrl.admin_tagset in the fail_ctrl path and call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() when it is set so that all admin queue allocations are reclaimed whenever controller setup aborts.(CVE-2026-23261)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()

The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap() implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a 'pgprot_t' value determined from the user mapping of the target 'pfn' being accessed by the kernel. On arm64, the…

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 & V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 & X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE & A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 & A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.(CVE-2025-10263)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: let smbd_destroy() call disable_work_sync(&info->post_send_credits_work)

In smbd_destroy() we may destroy the memory so we better wait until post_send_credits_work is no longer pending and will never be started again.

I actually just hit the case using rxe:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 138 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1032 rxe_post_recv+0x1ee/0x480 [rdma_rxe] ... [ 5305.686979] [ T138] smbd_post_recv+0x445/0xc10 [cifs] [ 5305.687135] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687149] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 5305.687185] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 5305.687329] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687356] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687368] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687378] [ T138] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x60 [ 5305.687389] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687399] [ T138] ? get_receive_buffer+0x168/0x210 [cifs] [ 5305.687555] [ T138] smbd_post_send_credits+0x382/0x4b0 [cifs] [ 5305.687701] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_send_credits+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 5305.687855] [ T138] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687865] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 5305.687875] [ T138] ? queue_delayed_work_on+0x8e/0xa0 [ 5305.687889] [ T138] process_one_work+0x629/0xf80 [ 5305.687908] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5305.687917] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 5305.687933] [ T138] worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570 ...

It means rxe_post_recv was called after rdma_destroy_qp(). This happened because put_receive_buffer() was triggered by ib_drain_qp() and called: queue_work(info->workqueue, &info->post_send_credits_work);(CVE-2025-39932)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

MIPS: ftrace: Fix memory corruption when kernel is located beyond 32 bits

Since commit e424054000878 ("MIPS: Tracing: Reduce the overhead of dynamic Function Tracer"), the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly has been used, and this macro can generate more than 2 instructions. At the same time, the code in ftrace assumes that no more than 2 instructions can be generated, which is why it stores them in an int[2] array. However, as previously noted, the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly (and now UASM_i_LA) causes a buffer overflow when _mcount is beyond 32 bits. This leads to corruption of the variables located in the __read_mostly section.

This corruption was observed because the variable __cpu_primary_thread_mask was corrupted, causing a hang very early during boot.

This fix prevents the corruption by avoiding the generation of instructions if they could exceed 2 instructions in length. Fortunately, insn_la_mcount is only used if the instrumented code is located outside the kernel code section, so dynamic ftrace can still be used, albeit in a more limited scope. This is still preferable to corrupting memory and/or crashing the kernel.(CVE-2025-71109)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation

The syscall number is a user-controlled value used to index into the syscall table. Use array_index_nospec() to clamp this value after the bounds check to prevent speculative out-of-bounds access and subsequent data leakage via cache side channels.(CVE-2025-71203)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: …

Root has patched CVE-2026-43127 in the linux package for Root:Debian:11. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-43127 in the linux package for Root:Debian:12. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-43127 in the linux package for Root:Ubuntu:22.04. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-43127 in the linux package for Root:Ubuntu:24.04. Multiple fixed versions available.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: fix circular locking dependency in run_unpack_ex Syzbot reported a circular locking dependency between wnd->rw_lock (sbi->used.bitmap) and ni->file.run_lock. The deadlock scenario: 1. ntfs_extend_mft() takes ni->file.run_lock then wnd->rw_lock. 2. run_unpack_ex() takes wnd->rw_lock then tries to acquire ni->file.run_lock inside ntfs_refresh_zone(). This creates an AB-BA deadlock. Fix this by using down_read_trylock() instead of down_read() when acquiring run_lock in run_unpack_ex(). If the lock is contended, skip ntfs_refresh_zone() - the MFT zone will be refreshed on the next MFT operation. This breaks the circular dependency since we never block waiting for run_lock while holding wnd->rw_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix circular locking dependency in run_unpack_ex

Syzbot reported a circular locking dependency between wnd->rw_lock (sbi->used.bitmap) and ni->file.run_lock.

The deadlock scenario:

1. ntfs_extend_mft() takes ni->file.run_lock then wnd->rw_lock.
2. run_unpack_ex() takes wnd->rw_lock then tries to acquire ni->file.run_lock inside ntfs_refresh_zone().

This creates an AB-BA deadlock.

Fix this by using down_read_trylock() instead of down_read() when acquiring run_lock in run_unpack_ex(). If the lock is contended, skip ntfs_refresh_zone() - the MFT zone will be refreshed on the next MFT operation. This breaks the circular dependency since we never block waiting for run_lock while holding wnd->rw_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix circular locking dependency in run_unpack_ex

Syzbot reported a circular locking dependency between wnd->rw_lock (sbi->used.bitmap) and ni->file.run_lock.

The deadlock scenario:

1. ntfs_extend_mft() takes ni->file.run_lock then wnd->rw_lock.
2. run_unpack_ex() takes wnd->rw_lock then tries to acquire ni->file.run_lock inside ntfs_refresh_zone().

This creates an AB-BA deadlock.

Fix this by using down_read_trylock() instead of down_read() when acquiring run_lock in run_unpack_ex(). If the lock is contended, skip ntfs_refresh_zone() - the MFT zone will be refreshed on the next MFT operation. This breaks the circular dependency since we never block waiting for run_lock while holding wnd->rw_lock.