CVE-2026-43435

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection

The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.

Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.

Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection

The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.

Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.

Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection

The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.

Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.

Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection

The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.

Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.

Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted. Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange. Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted. Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange. Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection

The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.

Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.

Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.