CVE-2026-43926

FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Prior to version 0.8.0, the password reset confirmation endpoint /client/reset-password-confirm/:hash is handled by a non-API controller and is not covered by FOSSBilling's rate limiter, which only applies to /api/* routes. This allows an attacker to probe the endpoint for valid reset tokens without any per-IP request limiting, attempt counting, or lockout mechanism. The endpoint acts as an oracle, returning a distinguishable response for valid versus invalid tokens (HTTP 200 vs HTTP 302 redirect). An attacker can submit unlimited token guesses to the password reset confirmation endpoint with no throttling applied. However, practical exploitability is significantly mitigated by the current token generation, which uses hash('sha256', random_bytes(32)), providing 256 bits of entropy. Tokens also expire after 15 minutes and are deleted after successful use. The same architectural gap applies to other controller-served auth routes, including /staff/email/:hash (admin password reset confirmation) and /client/confirm-email/:hash (email confirmation). Version 0.8.0 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the /client/reset-password-confirm/* and /staff/email/* paths and/or use a WAF rule to limit request rates to these endpoints.

FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Prior to version 0.8.0, the password reset confirmation endpoint /client/reset-password-confirm/:hash is handled by a non-API controller and is not covered by FOSSBilling's rate limiter, which only applies to /api/* routes. This allows an attacker to probe the endpoint for valid reset tokens without any per-IP request limiting, attempt counting, or lockout mechanism. The endpoint acts as an oracle, returning a distinguishable response for valid versus invalid tokens (HTTP 200 vs HTTP 302 redirect). An attacker can submit unlimited token guesses to the password reset confirmation endpoint with no throttling applied. However, practical exploitability is significantly mitigated by the current token generation, which uses hash('sha256', random_bytes(32)), providing 256 bits of entropy. Tokens also expire after 15 minutes and are deleted after successful use. The same architectural gap applies to other controller-served auth routes, including /staff/email/:hash (admin password reset confirmation) and /client/confirm-email/:hash (email confirmation). Version 0.8.0 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the /client/reset-password-confirm/* and /staff/email/* paths and/or use a WAF rule to limit request rates to these endpoints.

FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Prior to version 0.8.0, the password reset confirmation endpoint /client/reset-password-confirm/:hash is handled by a non-API controller and is not covered by FOSSBilling's rate limiter, which only applies to /api/* routes. This allows an attacker to probe the endpoint for valid reset tokens without any per-IP request limiting, attempt counting, or lockout mechanism. The endpoint acts as an oracle, returning a distinguishable response for valid versus invalid tokens (HTTP 200 vs HTTP 302 redirect). An attacker can submit unlimited token guesses to the password reset confirmation endpoint with no throttling applied. However, practical exploitability is significantly mitigated by the current token generation, which uses hash('sha256', random_bytes(32)), providing 256 bits of entropy. Tokens also expire after 15 minutes and are deleted after successful use. The same architectural gap applies to other controller-served auth routes, including /staff/email/:hash (admin password reset confirmation) and /client/confirm-email/:hash (email confirmation). Version 0.8.0 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the /client/reset-password-confirm/* and /staff/email/* paths and/or use a WAF rule to limit request rates to these endpoints.

FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Prior to version 0.8.0, the password reset confirmation endpoint /client/reset-password-confirm/:hash is handled by a non-API controller and is not covered by FOSSBilling's rate limiter, which only applies to /api/* routes. This allows an attacker to probe the endpoint for valid reset tokens without any per-IP request limiting, attempt counting, or lockout mechanism. The endpoint acts as an oracle, returning a distinguishable response for valid versus invalid tokens (HTTP 200 vs HTTP 302 redirect). An attacker can submit unlimited token guesses to the password reset confirmation endpoint with no throttling applied. However, practical exploitability is significantly mitigated by the current token generation, which uses hash('sha256', random_bytes(32)), providing 256 bits of entropy. Tokens also expire after 15 minutes and are deleted after successful use. The same architectural gap applies to other controller-served auth routes, including /staff/email/:hash (admin password reset confirmation) and /client/confirm-email/:hash (email confirmation). Version 0.8.0 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the /client/reset-password-confirm/* and /staff/email/* paths and/or use a WAF rule to limit request rates to these endpoints.