CVE-2026-44025

Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin in_monitor_agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints unintentionally include internal instance variables that may contain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3.

Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin in_monitor_agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints unintentionally include internal instance variables that may contain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3.

Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin (in_monitor_agent) exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API. It was discovered that the API response (/api/plugins.json and related endpoints) unintentionally includes internal instance variables of loaded plugins.

If any plugins store sensitive information—such as database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials—in its instance variables, this information may be exposed in plain text to any user or system that has HTTP access to the Monitor Agent API.

Impact

This vulnerability allows for unauthorized information disclosure. An attacker who can reach the Monitor Agent API port (default: 24220) can potentially extract sensitive credentials used by other Fluentd plugins. The impact severity depends highly on the network configuration (whether the Monitor Agent port is exposed to untrusted networks) and the specific plugins configured in the Fluentd instance.

Patches:

v1.19.3

Workarounds

If usesrs cannot immediately update Fluentd to the patched version, they can mitigate this risk by strictly controlling access to the Monitor Agent port.

Ensure the Monitor Agent is only bound to localhost (127.0.0.1) rather than 0.0.0.0.

<source>
  @type monitor_agent
  bind 127.0.0.1
  port 24220
</source>

Use firewall rules (e.g., iptables, AWS Security Groups) to block access to the Monitor Agent port (24220) from untrusted networks or instances.

Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin in_monitor_agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints unintentionally include internal instance variables that may contain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3.

Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin in_monitor_agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints unintentionally include internal instance variables that may contain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3.

Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin (in_monitor_agent) exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API. It was discovered that the API response (/api/plugins.json and related endpoints) unintentionally includes internal instance variables of loaded plugins.

If any plugins store sensitive information—such as database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials—in its instance variables, this information may be exposed in plain text to any user or system that has HTTP access to the Monitor Agent API.

Impact

This vulnerability allows for unauthorized information disclosure. An attacker who can reach the Monitor Agent API port (default: 24220) can potentially extract sensitive credentials used by other Fluentd plugins. The impact severity depends highly on the network configuration (whether the Monitor Agent port is exposed to untrusted networks) and the specific plugins configured in the Fluentd instance.

Patches:

v1.19.3

Workarounds

If usesrs cannot immediately update Fluentd to the patched version, they can mitigate this risk by strictly controlling access to the Monitor Agent port.

Ensure the Monitor Agent is only bound to localhost (127.0.0.1) rather than 0.0.0.0.

<source>
  @type monitor_agent
  bind 127.0.0.1
  port 24220
</source>

Use firewall rules (e.g., iptables, AWS Security Groups) to block access to the Monitor Agent port (24220) from untrusted networks or instances.

Fluentd is an open source data collector designed to scale and simplify log management. It can collect, process and ship many kinds of data in near real-time.

Security Fix(es):

Fluentd allows dynamically constructing file paths using the ${tag} placeholder. It was discovered that validation for this placeholder was insufficient.

If a Fluentd instance is configured to receive logs from untrusted sources and uses the ${tag} placeholder in file configurations (such as the path parameter in the out_file plugin), an attacker can inject path traversal characters (e.g., ../).

When combined with certain formatting options, this vulnerability allows an attacker to write arbitrary files or overwrite existing files on the system with attacker-controlled content, bypassing intended directory restrictions.

Impact

This vulnerability allows for Arbitrary File Write, which can be directly escalated to full Remote Code Execution (RCE). An attacker could achieve RCE by overwriting critical system files, injecting executable plugins, or modifying configuration files. The impact is Critical as it can lead to full system compromise without any authentication, depending on the Fluentd configuration and the privileges of the Fluentd process.

Patches

v1.19.3

Workarounds

If an immediate upgrade is not possible, users are strongly advised to apply the following mitigations:

1. Restrict Network Access
   • Ensure that Fluentd input ports (such as in_forward on default port 24224) are deployed within a closed, trusted network. Use firewall rules (e.g., iptables, AWS Security Groups) to block access from untrusted networks or instances.
2. Run Fluentd as a non-root user
   • Dropping privileges prevents Fluentd from writing to sensitive system directories (e.g., /etc/), significantly mitigating the risk of system-wide RCE.
3. Revise configurations
   • Do not use the ${tag} placeholder in the path parameter of output plugins (like out_file) if the tag originates from an untrusted source.
4. Filter incoming tags
   • Strictly validate and filter incoming tags at the input layer (e.g., using fluent-plugin-rewrite-tag-filter) to drop any tags containing . or / characters.(CVE-2026-44024)

Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin (in_monitor_agent) exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API. It was discovered that the API response (/api/plugins.json and related endpoints) unintentionally includes internal instance variables of loaded plugins. If any plugins store sensitive information—such as database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials—in its instance variables, this information may be exposed in plain text to any user or system that has HTTP access to the Monitor Agent API.(CVE-2026-44025)

Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin in_monitor_agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints unintentionally include internal instance variables that may contain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3.