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CVE-2026-44266

Elo: Remote Code Execution in Elo Ruby backend via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels

9.8 CriticalFix available

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

1.00%Unchanged since Nov 4, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.8

Elo: Remote Code Execution in Elo Ruby backend via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Record
CVE-2026-44266
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-94, CWE-116, CWE-1336
Updated
2026-11-03
EUVDEUVD-2026-116110 9.8

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Record
EUVD-2026-116110
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542 9.8

Elo Ruby backend has Remote Code Execution via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels

Summary

Elo's Ruby backend emits attacker-controlled text into Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping the # character. Because # begins Ruby's interpolation sequences — #{expr}, #@ivar, #@@cvar, #$gvar — and any expression wrapped in #{...} may use backticks for shell execution, an Elo program that contains a crafted string literal or a labelled subtype constraint compiles to Ruby that evaluates attacker-chosen Ruby, and through backticks runs attacker-chosen shell commands, at runtime.

The same Elo source compiled to JavaScript, Python, or SQL is benign, so the bug also breaks the cross-target portability guarantee the rest of the compiler honours.

Vulnerable sinks

Two sinks exist in src/compilers/ruby.ts at commit 749af7b:

  1. String-literal emitter — lines 180–184. The emitter escapes backslash, double quote, and control characters, but not #. Any #{...} sequence in an Elo string literal flows straight into the emitted Ruby source.

  2. Labelled subtype-constraint branch — lines 405–412. The error message passed to p_fail(p, "...") is wrapped in a Ruby double-quoted string with no escape pass at all. Because the parser at src/parser.ts:1339–1348 accepts single-quoted Elo strings as constraint labels, a label such as '#{ `id` }' flows unchanged into the emitted Ruby.

Attack surfaces

All three surfaces share the same root cause (the missing # escape in the Ruby double-quoted-string emission path) and are addressed by the same patch:

| # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | /try playground on elo-lang.org (Ruby target) | 0-click server-side RCE against elo-lang.org infrastructure from a shared PoC URL | | 2 | bin/eloc -t ruby -x on a CI or DevOps host | RCE on any host that passes Elo strings through the CLI | | 3 | Library API — defaultFormats.elo.parse() with a Ruby emission step | Ruby RCE for any downstream integrator using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases) |

Proof of Concept

String-literal sink:

# poc.elo
'RES=#{`id 2>&1`}'
$ eloc -t ruby -x poc.elo
# emitted Ruby contains:  "RES=#{`id 2>&1`}"
# running it returns the output of id(1).

Replacing `id 2>&1` with `touch /tmp/pwned` produces a trivially observable filesystem side effect.

Subtype-constraint label sink:

# poc-subtype.elo
let X = Int(i | '#{`touch /tmp/pwned2`}': i > 0) in X(-1)

The predicate fails for -1, causing p_fail(p, "#{...}") to interpolate and execute the backtick command at the Ruby layer.

Both flows are automated in the reproduction script submitted with the original report and were verified against Ruby 3.x.

Root cause

The Ruby-emitter's double-quoted-string escape routine omitted # from its character set, and one emission path (the subtype-constraint label branch) performed no escape pass at all.

Record
GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-94, CWE-116, CWE-1336
Updated
2026-11-03
NVD 9.8

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Record
CVE-2026-44266
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-94, CWE-116, CWE-1336
Updated
2026-11-03
OSV 9.8

Elo: Remote Code Execution in Elo Ruby backend via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Record
CVE-2026-44266
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-116, CWE-1336, CWE-94
Updated
2026-11-05
OSVGHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542 9.8

Elo Ruby backend has Remote Code Execution via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels

Summary

Elo's Ruby backend emits attacker-controlled text into Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping the # character. Because # begins Ruby's interpolation sequences — #{expr}, #@ivar, #@@cvar, #$gvar — and any expression wrapped in #{...} may use backticks for shell execution, an Elo program that contains a crafted string literal or a labelled subtype constraint compiles to Ruby that evaluates attacker-chosen Ruby, and through backticks runs attacker-chosen shell commands, at runtime.

The same Elo source compiled to JavaScript, Python, or SQL is benign, so the bug also breaks the cross-target portability guarantee the rest of the compiler honours.

Vulnerable sinks

Two sinks exist in src/compilers/ruby.ts at commit 749af7b:

  1. String-literal emitter — lines 180–184. The emitter escapes backslash, double quote, and control characters, but not #. Any #{...} sequence in an Elo string literal flows straight into the emitted Ruby source.

  2. Labelled subtype-constraint branch — lines 405–412. The error message passed to p_fail(p, "...") is wrapped in a Ruby double-quoted string with no escape pass at all. Because the parser at src/parser.ts:1339–1348 accepts single-quoted Elo strings as constraint labels, a label such as '#{ `id` }' flows unchanged into the emitted Ruby.

Attack surfaces

All three surfaces share the same root cause (the missing # escape in the Ruby double-quoted-string emission path) and are addressed by the same patch:

| # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | /try playground on elo-lang.org (Ruby target) | 0-click server-side RCE against elo-lang.org infrastructure from a shared PoC URL | | 2 | bin/eloc -t ruby -x on a CI or DevOps host | RCE on any host that passes Elo strings through the CLI | | 3 | Library API — defaultFormats.elo.parse() with a Ruby emission step | Ruby RCE for any downstream integrator using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases) |

Proof of Concept

String-literal sink:

# poc.elo
'RES=#{`id 2>&1`}'
$ eloc -t ruby -x poc.elo
# emitted Ruby contains:  "RES=#{`id 2>&1`}"
# running it returns the output of id(1).

Replacing `id 2>&1` with `touch /tmp/pwned` produces a trivially observable filesystem side effect.

Subtype-constraint label sink:

# poc-subtype.elo
let X = Int(i | '#{`touch /tmp/pwned2`}': i > 0) in X(-1)

The predicate fails for -1, causing p_fail(p, "#{...}") to interpolate and execute the backtick command at the Ruby layer.

Both flows are automated in the reproduction script submitted with the original report and were verified against Ruby 3.x.

Root cause

The Ruby-emitter's double-quoted-string escape routine omitted # from its character set, and one emission path (the subtype-constraint label branch) performed no escape pass at all.

Record
GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
CVSS 3.1
9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-116, CWE-1336, CWE-94
Updated
2026-11-03

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
@enspirit/elo
npm
through 1.0.0
1.0.1
@enspirit/elo
npm
before 1.0.1
1.0.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
referencesEUVD, NVD, OSV
referencesCVE List
publishedEUVD, NVD
aliasesEUVD
description, products, published, references, severity, titleCVE List
affected, referencesOSV
first indexedGitHub Advisories

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-44266 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in Enspirit Elo, published November 3, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1.00%, the 62nd percentile. Fixed in @enspirit/elo 1.0.1.

References

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