CVE-2026-44335

SSRF bypass in PraisonAI

7.7 HighFix available

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.6.32, the URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.32.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector: Network
Complexity: Low
Privileges needed: None
User interaction: None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality: None
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Exploit likelihood

0.38%Up 0.3 points since May 9, 2026

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 7.7

SSRF bypass in PraisonAI

Record: CVE-2026-44335
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness: CWE-918
Updated: 2026-11-02

EUVDEUVD-2026-28637 7.7

Record: EUVD-2026-28637
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Updated: 2026-11-02

GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g 7.7

PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass

Summary

The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details

The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.

In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code.

import sys
from pathlib import Path
from pprint import pprint

sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(r"D:/BaiduNetdiskDownload/PraisonAI-main/PraisonAI-main/src/praisonai-agents")))

from praisonaiagents.tools import spider_tools

# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"

result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)

if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
    print("scrape failed:", result["error"])
else:
    pprint(result)

When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.

However, when an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1, the detection logic resolves the host to 1.1.1.1, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to http://127.0.0.1:6666, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact

SSRF

Record: GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1: 9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness: CWE-918
Updated: 2026-11-02

NVD 7.7

Record: CVE-2026-44335
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1: 9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness: CWE-918
Updated: 2026-11-02

OSVGHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g 7.7

PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass

Summary

The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details

The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code.

import sys
from pathlib import Path
from pprint import pprint

sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(r"D:/BaiduNetdiskDownload/PraisonAI-main/PraisonAI-main/src/praisonai-agents")))

from praisonaiagents.tools import spider_tools

# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"

result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)

if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
    print("scrape failed:", result["error"])
else:
    pprint(result)

When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact

SSRF

Record: GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1: 9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness: CWE-918
Updated: 2026-11-02

OSVPYSEC-2026-2950 7.7

PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass

Summary

The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details

The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code.

import sys
from pathlib import Path
from pprint import pprint

sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(r"D:/BaiduNetdiskDownload/PraisonAI-main/PraisonAI-main/src/praisonai-agents")))

from praisonaiagents.tools import spider_tools

# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"

result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)

if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
    print("scrape failed:", result["error"])
else:
    pprint(result)

When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact

SSRF

Record: PYSEC-2026-2950
CVSS 4.0: 7.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1: 9.8 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated: 2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
Package	Affected	Fixed
`praisonaiagents` PyPI	through 1.6.31	1.6.32
`praisonaiagents` PyPI	before 1.6.32, plus listed versions 0.0.10.0.100.0.1000.0.1010.0.102 Show 45 moreShow less 0.0.1030.0.1040.0.1050.0.1060.0.1070.0.1080.0.1090.0.110.0.1100.0.1110.0.1120.0.1130.0.1140.0.1150.0.1160.0.1170.0.1180.0.1190.0.120.0.1200.0.1210.0.1220.0.1230.0.1240.0.1250.0.1260.0.1270.0.1280.0.1290.0.130.0.1300.0.1310.0.1320.0.1330.0.1340.0.1350.0.1360.0.1370.0.1380.0.1390.0.140.0.1400.0.1410.0.1420.0.143	1.6.32

History

History
Recorded	Changed	Sources
Nov 2, 2026	first indexed	CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-44335 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) in Mervinpraison Praisonai, published May 6, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.38%, the 32nd percentile. Fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.32.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: 510 versions. The JSON record has them.