CVE-2026-44561

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Deactivated Channel Members Retain Full Access to Group/DM Channels

Affected Component

Channel membership authorization check:

• backend/open_webui/models/channels.py (lines 663-673, is_user_channel_member)
• Used at 15 locations in backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the group/DM channel feature.

Description

The is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls.

The channel correctly disappears from the deactivated user's channel list (the listing query at get_channels_by_user_id properly filters on is_active), but all 15 message-level endpoints in the router rely on is_user_channel_member for authorization, which does not filter on is_active.

# models/channels.py:663 — missing is_active check
def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
    ).first()
    return membership is not None  # True even when is_active=False

Compare with get_channel_by_id_and_user_id (line 778) which correctly checks ChannelMember.is_active.is_(True).

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API calls | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions beyond knowing the channel ID (which the user had as a former member) | | Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account and prior channel membership | | User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the same authorization boundary (the channel) | | Confidentiality | Low (L) | Can read messages in a channel the user should no longer access | | Integrity | Low (L) | Can post, edit, and delete messages in the channel | | Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |

Attack Scenario

1. User A and User B are members of a private group channel.
2. The channel owner removes User B (or User B leaves). User B's membership is set to is_active=False, status='left'.
3. The channel disappears from User B's UI — but User B noted the channel ID while they were a member.
4. User B calls the API directly:
   • GET /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages — reads all messages, including those posted after deactivation
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/post — posts new messages
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/update — edits messages
   • DELETE /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/delete — deletes messages
5. All requests succeed because is_user_channel_member returns True.

Impact

• Deactivated users can continue reading all new messages posted after their removal (confidentiality breach)
• Deactivated users can post, edit, and delete messages (integrity breach)
• The deactivation mechanism provides a false sense of security — channel owners believe removed users have lost access

Preconditions

• Channels feature must be enabled (disabled by default)
• Attacker must have a valid user account
• Attacker must have been a member of the channel at some point (and thus knows the channel ID)

Recommended Fix

Add is_active filtering to is_user_channel_member:

def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
  …

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Deactivated Channel Members Retain Full Access to Group/DM Channels

Affected Component

Channel membership authorization check:

• backend/open_webui/models/channels.py (lines 663-673, is_user_channel_member)
• Used at 15 locations in backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the group/DM channel feature.

Description

The is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls.

The channel correctly disappears from the deactivated user's channel list (the listing query at get_channels_by_user_id properly filters on is_active), but all 15 message-level endpoints in the router rely on is_user_channel_member for authorization, which does not filter on is_active.

# models/channels.py:663 — missing is_active check
def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
    ).first()
    return membership is not None  # True even when is_active=False

Compare with get_channel_by_id_and_user_id (line 778) which correctly checks ChannelMember.is_active.is_(True).

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API calls | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions beyond knowing the channel ID (which the user had as a former member) | | Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account and prior channel membership | | User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the same authorization boundary (the channel) | | Confidentiality | Low (L) | Can read messages in a channel the user should no longer access | | Integrity | Low (L) | Can post, edit, and delete messages in the channel | | Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |

Attack Scenario

1. User A and User B are members of a private group channel.
2. The channel owner removes User B (or User B leaves). User B's membership is set to is_active=False, status='left'.
3. The channel disappears from User B's UI — but User B noted the channel ID while they were a member.
4. User B calls the API directly:
   • GET /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages — reads all messages, including those posted after deactivation
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/post — posts new messages
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/update — edits messages
   • DELETE /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/delete — deletes messages
5. All requests succeed because is_user_channel_member returns True.

Impact

• Deactivated users can continue reading all new messages posted after their removal (confidentiality breach)
• Deactivated users can post, edit, and delete messages (integrity breach)
• The deactivation mechanism provides a false sense of security — channel owners believe removed users have lost access

Preconditions

• Channels feature must be enabled (disabled by default)
• Attacker must have a valid user account
• Attacker must have been a member of the channel at some point (and thus knows the channel ID)

Recommended Fix

Add is_active filtering to is_user_channel_member:

def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
  …

Deactivated Channel Members Retain Full Access to Group/DM Channels

Affected Component

Channel membership authorization check:

• backend/open_webui/models/channels.py (lines 663-673, is_user_channel_member)
• Used at 15 locations in backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the group/DM channel feature.

Description

The is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls.

The channel correctly disappears from the deactivated user's channel list (the listing query at get_channels_by_user_id properly filters on is_active), but all 15 message-level endpoints in the router rely on is_user_channel_member for authorization, which does not filter on is_active.

# models/channels.py:663 — missing is_active check
def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
    ).first()
    return membership is not None  # True even when is_active=False

Compare with get_channel_by_id_and_user_id (line 778) which correctly checks ChannelMember.is_active.is_(True).

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API calls | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions beyond knowing the channel ID (which the user had as a former member) | | Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account and prior channel membership | | User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the same authorization boundary (the channel) | | Confidentiality | Low (L) | Can read messages in a channel the user should no longer access | | Integrity | Low (L) | Can post, edit, and delete messages in the channel | | Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |

Attack Scenario

1. User A and User B are members of a private group channel.
2. The channel owner removes User B (or User B leaves). User B's membership is set to is_active=False, status='left'.
3. The channel disappears from User B's UI — but User B noted the channel ID while they were a member.
4. User B calls the API directly:
   • GET /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages — reads all messages, including those posted after deactivation
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/post — posts new messages
   • POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/update — edits messages
   • DELETE /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/delete — deletes messages
5. All requests succeed because is_user_channel_member returns True.

Impact

• Deactivated users can continue reading all new messages posted after their removal (confidentiality breach)
• Deactivated users can post, edit, and delete messages (integrity breach)
• The deactivation mechanism provides a false sense of security — channel owners believe removed users have lost access

Preconditions

• Channels feature must be enabled (disabled by default)
• Attacker must have a valid user account
• Attacker must have been a member of the channel at some point (and thus knows the channel ID)

Recommended Fix

Add is_active filtering to is_user_channel_member:

def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
    membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
        ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
        ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
  …