CVE-2026-45006

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

Summary

The agent-facing gateway tool protects config.apply and config.patch with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.

Impact

A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only gateway tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw on npm
• Affected: versions before 2026.4.23
• Fixed: 2026.4.23
• Latest stable verified fixed: [email protected], tag v2026.4.23

Fix

OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven gateway config.apply and gateway config.patch now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.

Fix Commit(s)

• bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec (fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits)

Severity

Severity remains high. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

Summary

The agent-facing gateway tool protects config.apply and config.patch with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.

Impact

A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only gateway tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw on npm
• Affected: versions before 2026.4.23
• Fixed: 2026.4.23
• Latest stable verified fixed: [email protected], tag v2026.4.23

Fix

OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven gateway config.apply and gateway config.patch now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.

Fix Commit(s)

• bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec (fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits)

Severity

Severity remains high. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.