Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-45016

EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose

6.5 MediumFix available

Summary

The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.

str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true

// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = '';
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
					{
						$attachmentData['name'] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == '.') $directory = '';
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData['type'] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) > 1 && !str_ends_with($directory, '/')) { $directory .= '/'; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!='/' && strlen($basedir) > 1 && !str_ends_with($basedir, '/')) { $basedir .= '/'; }
						if ($needTempFile && empty($attachment) && !str_starts_with($myUrl, "http"))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));
							}
							catch (\Throwable $e) {
								_egw_log_exception($e);
							}
						}
					}
					if (str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))

PoC

  1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.
  2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: <img src="file:///etc/passwd">.
  3. The server executes file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd'), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.

Remediation

Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score usedGHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63 6.5

EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose

Summary

The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.

str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true

// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = '';
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
					{
						$attachmentData['name'] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == '.') $directory = '';
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData['type'] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) > 1 && !str_ends_with($directory, '/')) { $directory .= '/'; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!='/' && strlen($basedir) > 1 && !str_ends_with($basedir, '/')) { $basedir .= '/'; }
						if ($needTempFile && empty($attachment) && !str_starts_with($myUrl, "http"))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));
							}
							catch (\Throwable $e) {
								_egw_log_exception($e);
							}
						}
					}
					if (str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))

PoC

  1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.
  2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: <img src="file:///etc/passwd">.
  3. The server executes file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd'), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.

Remediation

Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.

Record
GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63
CVSS 3.0
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-73
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63 6.5

EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose

Summary

The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.

str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true

// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = '';
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
					{
						$attachmentData['name'] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == '.') $directory = '';
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData['type'] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) > 1 && !str_ends_with($directory, '/')) { $directory .= '/'; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!='/' && strlen($basedir) > 1 && !str_ends_with($basedir, '/')) { $basedir .= '/'; }
						if ($needTempFile && empty($attachment) && !str_starts_with($myUrl, "http"))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));
							}
							catch (\Throwable $e) {
								_egw_log_exception($e);
							}
						}
					}
					if (str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))

PoC

  1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.
  2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: <img src="file:///etc/passwd">.
  3. The server executes file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd'), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.

Remediation

Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.

Record
GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63
CVSS 3.0
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-73
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
egroupware/egroupware
Packagist
26.0.20251208 up to 26.5.20260507
26.5.20260507
egroupware/egroupware
Packagist
before 23.1.20260601
23.1.20260601
egroupware/egroupware
Packagist
26.0.20251208 up to 26.5.20260507, plus listed versions
26.0.2025121626.0.2026010826.0.2026011326.0.2026012326.1.20260130
Show 12 moreShow less
26.2.2026020326.2.2026020726.2.2026020926.2.2026021626.2.2026022426.3.2026031626.4.2026040826.4.2026041326.4.2026042326.4.2026042426.4.2026042926.5.20260506
26.5.20260507
egroupware/egroupware
Packagist
before 23.1.20260601, plus listed versions
14.2.2015012114.2.2015020614.2.2015021014.2.2015021214.2.20150218
Show 45 moreShow less
14.2.2015031014.2.2015040214.2.2015042114.2.2015042814.2.2015042914.2.2015050114.2.2015060314.2.2015070714.2.2015071714.3.2015072814.3.2015072914.3.2015081114.3.2015082114.3.2015082614.3.2015090814.3.2015101214.3.2015102714.3.2015102814.3.2015102914.3.2015103014.3.2015111014.3.2015113014.3.2015120114.3.2016011214.3.2016011314.3.2016030414.3.2016042814.3.2016051214.3.2016052214.3.2016052414.3.2016052514.3.2016070816.1.2016060316.1.2016062116.1.2016062716.1.2016063016.1.2016070816.1.2016071516.1.2016080116.1.2016081016.1.2016090516.1.2016100616.1.2016110216.1.2016110716.1.20161208
23.1.20260601

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-45016 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.5) in egroupware/egroupware, published July 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in egroupware/egroupware 26.5.20260507.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: 135 versions. The JSON record has them.

MoveEnter Open