CVE-2026-45792

rtk filters and compresses command outputs before they reach your LLM context. Prior to 0.32.0, RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified. This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.32.0.

rtk filters and compresses command outputs before they reach your LLM context. Prior to 0.32.0, RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified. This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.32.0.

RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. In versions prior to 0.32.0, RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified.

This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review.

Patch

Fixed in v0.32.0 (PRs #623, #625):

• .rtk/filters.toml is now blocked by default when untrusted, with a visible warning: [rtk] WARNING: untrusted project filters — Filters NOT applied. Run rtk trust to review and enable.
• SHA-256 hash verification: if the file changes after trust, filters are blocked again until re-reviewed.
• New rtk trust / rtk untrust commands for explicit user consent.
• Trust store implemented in src/trust.rs; trust gate added in src/toml_filter.rs.

rtk filters and compresses command outputs before they reach your LLM context. Prior to 0.32.0, RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified. This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.32.0.

RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. In versions prior to 0.32.0, RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified.

This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review.

Patch

Fixed in v0.32.0 (PRs #623, #625):

• .rtk/filters.toml is now blocked by default when untrusted, with a visible warning: [rtk] WARNING: untrusted project filters — Filters NOT applied. Run rtk trust to review and enable.
• SHA-256 hash verification: if the file changes after trust, filters are blocked again until re-reviewed.
• New rtk trust / rtk untrust commands for explicit user consent.
• Trust store implemented in src/trust.rs; trust gate added in src/toml_filter.rs.