CVE-2026-45889

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow()

MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops.

Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2].

Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated.

This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow()

MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops.

Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2].

Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated.

This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow()

MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops.

Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2].

Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated.

This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow()

MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops.

Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2].

Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated.

This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops. Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2]. Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated. This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops. Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2]. Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated. This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: do not account for OoO in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow()

MPTCP-level OoOs are physiological when multiple subflows are active concurrently and will not cause retransmissions nor are caused by drops.

Accounting for them in mptcp_rcvbuf_grow() causes the rcvbuf slowly drifting towards tcp_rmem[2].

Remove such accounting. Note that subflows will still account for TCP-level OoO when the MPTCP-level rcvbuf is propagated.

This also closes a subtle and very unlikely race condition with rcvspace init; active sockets with user-space holding the msk-level socket lock, could complete such initialization in the receive callback, after that the first OoO data reaches the rcvbuf and potentially triggering a divide by zero Oops.