CVE-2026-46415
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
CVE-2026-46415- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284, CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-45975
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
EUVD-2026-45975- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
Impact
Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy.
In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value.
As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP.
Patches
The issue is fixed by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP.
Users should upgrade to v0.10.1 or later.
Workarounds
There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddys trusted proxy client IP resolution.
Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy.
Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
GHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284, CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
CVE-2026-46415- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284, CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
CVE-2026-46415- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284, CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
Impact
Caddy Defender used r.RemoteAddr when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. RemoteAddr is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy.
In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its client_ip request variable after applying the configured trusted_proxies policy, but Defender did not use that value.
As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP.
Patches
The issue is fixed by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved client_ip request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to RemoteAddr only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP.
Users should upgrade to v0.10.1 or later.
Workarounds
There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddys trusted proxy client IP resolution.
Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy.
Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
- Record
GHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284, CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5086 No score
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass in pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defender
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass in pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defender
- Record
GO-2026-5086- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score
Security update for govulncheck-vulndb
This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:
- Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).
Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:
- GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
- GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
- GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
- GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
- GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
- GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
- GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
- GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
- GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
- GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
- GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
- GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
- GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
- GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
- GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
- GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
- GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
- GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
- GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
- GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
- GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
- GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
- GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
- GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
- GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
- GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
- GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
- GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
- GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
- GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
- GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
- GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
- GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
- GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
- GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
- GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
- GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
- GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
- GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
- GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
- GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
- GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
- GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
- GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
- GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
- GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
- GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
- GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
- GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
- GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
- GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
- GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
- GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
- GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
- GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
- GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
- GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
- GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
- GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
- GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
- GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
- GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
- GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
- GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
- GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
- GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
- GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
- GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
- GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
- GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
- GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
- GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
- GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
- GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
- GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
- GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
- GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defenderGo |
before 0.10.1 | 0.10.1 |
govulncheck-vulndbopenSUSE:Leap 16.0 From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs |
before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1 | 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | ||
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-46415 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.2) in Jasonlovesdoggo Caddy-defender, published May 19, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.23%, the 14th percentile. Fixed in pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defender 0.10.1.
References
github.com/JasonLovesDoggo/caddy-defender/security/advisories/GHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87
caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/matchers
Show 194 moreShow less
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46415
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-11063
Left out here: 1,542 references and the rest of 1 source description. The JSON record has them.