CVE-2026-46420

setup-php is a GitHub action to set up PHP with extensions, php.ini configuration, coverage drivers, and tools. From 2.25.0 prior to 2.37.1, shivammathur/setup-php resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files such as .php-version, composer.lock through platform-overrides.php, and composer.json through config.platform.php, and insufficiently constrains those values before incorporating them into generated shell or PowerShell setup scripts, allowing command injection on a GitHub Actions runner when workflows such as pull_request_target check out attacker-controlled contents before invoking setup-php. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.1.

setup-php is a GitHub action to set up PHP with extensions, php.ini configuration, coverage drivers, and tools. From 2.25.0 prior to 2.37.1, shivammathur/setup-php resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files such as .php-version, composer.lock through platform-overrides.php, and composer.json through config.platform.php, and insufficiently constrains those values before incorporating them into generated shell or PowerShell setup scripts, allowing command injection on a GitHub Actions runner when workflows such as pull_request_target check out attacker-controlled contents before invoking setup-php. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.1.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability was identified in shivammathur/setup-php when the action resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files and uses that value while generating the platform setup script.

In affected versions, setup-php may read the PHP version from:

• .php-version
• composer.lock via platform-overrides.php
• composer.json via config.platform.php

If an attacker can influence one of these files and the workflow executes setup-php in a trusted context, they may be able to execute commands on the GitHub Actions runner.

Impact

This issue is exploitable when setup-php is run after checking out attacker-controlled repository contents and resolves the PHP version from repository files.

The most significant example is a privileged workflow such as pull_request_target that checks out untrusted pull request code before invoking setup-php. Similar risk can also arise in other workflows that operate on attacker-controlled refs, branches, or repository contents in a trusted context.

This is not a separate security boundary when an attacker can already modify the workflow definition itself or directly control the php-version workflow input, since that level of access already permits arbitrary command execution in GitHub Actions.

Technical details

In affected versions, repository-derived PHP version values were insufficiently constrained before being incorporated into the generated shell or PowerShell setup script executed by the action. This could allow attacker-controlled values from supported repository files to influence script execution in trusted workflow contexts.

Remediation

If you are using shivammathur/setup-php@v2, no action is needed on your end. Users who pin the setup-php release version or release version SHA should upgrade to a patched version.

The fix validates PHP version inputs, constrains manifest-derived versions, hardens script generation at the execution, and includes additional checks in related input-handling paths.

setup-php is a GitHub action to set up PHP with extensions, php.ini configuration, coverage drivers, and tools. From 2.25.0 prior to 2.37.1, shivammathur/setup-php resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files such as .php-version, composer.lock through platform-overrides.php, and composer.json through config.platform.php, and insufficiently constrains those values before incorporating them into generated shell or PowerShell setup scripts, allowing command injection on a GitHub Actions runner when workflows such as pull_request_target check out attacker-controlled contents before invoking setup-php. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.1.

setup-php is a GitHub action to set up PHP with extensions, php.ini configuration, coverage drivers, and tools. From 2.25.0 prior to 2.37.1, shivammathur/setup-php resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files such as .php-version, composer.lock through platform-overrides.php, and composer.json through config.platform.php, and insufficiently constrains those values before incorporating them into generated shell or PowerShell setup scripts, allowing command injection on a GitHub Actions runner when workflows such as pull_request_target check out attacker-controlled contents before invoking setup-php. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.1.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability was identified in shivammathur/setup-php when the action resolves the PHP version from repository-controlled files and uses that value while generating the platform setup script.

In affected versions, setup-php may read the PHP version from:

• .php-version
• composer.lock via platform-overrides.php
• composer.json via config.platform.php

If an attacker can influence one of these files and the workflow executes setup-php in a trusted context, they may be able to execute commands on the GitHub Actions runner.

Impact

This issue is exploitable when setup-php is run after checking out attacker-controlled repository contents and resolves the PHP version from repository files.

The most significant example is a privileged workflow such as pull_request_target that checks out untrusted pull request code before invoking setup-php. Similar risk can also arise in other workflows that operate on attacker-controlled refs, branches, or repository contents in a trusted context.

This is not a separate security boundary when an attacker can already modify the workflow definition itself or directly control the php-version workflow input, since that level of access already permits arbitrary command execution in GitHub Actions.

Technical details

In affected versions, repository-derived PHP version values were insufficiently constrained before being incorporated into the generated shell or PowerShell setup script executed by the action. This could allow attacker-controlled values from supported repository files to influence script execution in trusted workflow contexts.

Remediation

If you are using shivammathur/setup-php@v2, no action is needed on your end. Users who pin the setup-php release version or release version SHA should upgrade to a patched version.

The fix validates PHP version inputs, constrains manifest-derived versions, hardens script generation at the execution, and includes additional checks in related input-handling paths.