CVE-2026-46548

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

Summary

The request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.

Details

axios.post(url, data, config) expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:

// packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern)
return await axios.post(webhook_url, {
  text,
  httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),   // wrong position — serialised, not used
  httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),
});

The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url pointing to an internal host; on trigger, WebhookInvoker.invoke() calls the plugin's sendMessage() which performs the outbound axios.post with no SSRF filtering applied.

This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.

Impact

• Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) and internal services.
• Combined with verbose hook logging (NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL), response bodies may be exfiltrated.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

Summary

The request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.

Details

axios.post(url, data, config) expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:

// packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern)
return await axios.post(webhook_url, {
  text,
  httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),   // wrong position — serialised, not used
  httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),
});

The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url pointing to an internal host; on trigger, WebhookInvoker.invoke() calls the plugin's sendMessage() which performs the outbound axios.post with no SSRF filtering applied.

This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.

Impact

• Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) and internal services.
• Combined with verbose hook logging (NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL), response bodies may be exfiltrated.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.