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CVE-2026-47268

Nezha Monitoring: Authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host

6.4 MediumFix available

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.22%Up 0.2 points since Jun 12, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.4

Nezha Monitoring: Authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

Record
CVE-2026-47268
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-36588 6.4

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

Record
EUVD-2026-36588
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9 6.4

Nezha's authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host

Summary

An authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks.

This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive.

Details

The DDNS API is available to authenticated users, not only administrators:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:137 registers GET /api/v1/ddns.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:139 registers POST /api/v1/ddns.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:140 registers PATCH /api/v1/ddns/:id.

The create and update handlers copy attacker-controlled webhook fields directly from JSON request bodies into model.DDNSProfile:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:47-74 accepts model.DDNSForm and stores WebhookURL, WebhookMethod, WebhookRequestType, WebhookRequestBody, and WebhookHeaders.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:112-145 updates the same fields after profile ownership is checked.
  • model/ddns_api.go:11-15 exposes these fields as JSON input.
  • model/ddns.go:28-33 stores these fields on the persisted profile.

Users can attach owned DDNS profiles to owned servers, and DDNS updates are triggered in common server update and agent IP-reporting paths:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/server.go:63-83 checks DDNS profile ownership, then stores EnableDDNS, DDNSProfiles, and OverrideDDNSDomains on an owned server.
  • service/singleton/server.go:44-58 calls UpdateDDNS when a server with DDNS enabled is updated.
  • service/rpc/nezha.go:247-279 calls UpdateDDNS when an authenticated agent reports a changed IP.

The DDNS provider dispatcher instantiates the webhook provider when Provider == "webhook":

  • service/singleton/ddns.go:58-95, especially service/singleton/ddns.go:79-81.

The sink is the DDNS webhook provider:

  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:49-65 prepares and sends the HTTP request with utils.HttpClient.Do(req).
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:85-100 formats and applies attacker-controlled headers.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:91-92 creates the request with the configured method and URL.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:117-134 parses the configured URL and only formats query parameters; it does not restrict scheme, host, IP range, or redirects.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:137-158 builds attacker-controlled request bodies for POST/PATCH/PUT.

The project already contains SSRF defenses for notification webhooks, showing the expected mitigation pattern is absent from the DDNS webhook path:

  • model/notification.go:34-58 defines blocked private/reserved CIDRs.
  • model/notification.go:193-221 creates a notification HTTP client that resolves and pins a validated IP and disables redirects.
  • model/notification.go:229-263 only allows http/https, requires a hostname, resolves all addresses, and rejects disallowed IPs.
  • model/notification.go:265-276 rejects blocked ranges and non-global-unicast targets.

Equivalent validation was not found in pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go.

Safe local PoC

Environment:

  • Repository: https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha.git
  • Commit tested: 05e5da2535197fc223b79601d50eeea362dcf853
  • Tag at commit: v2.0.9
  • Module: github.com/nezhahq/nezha
  • Go version: go1.26.3 linux/amd64
  • Testing scope: local-only; loopback HTTP listener and fake local UDP DNS SOA server only.

A temporary same-package test was created and removed automatically after execution. It used a local httptest listener as the internal…

Record
GHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.4

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

Record
CVE-2026-47268
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.4

Nezha Monitoring: Authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

Record
CVE-2026-47268
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9 6.4

Nezha's authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host

Summary

An authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks.

This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive.

Details

The DDNS API is available to authenticated users, not only administrators:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:137 registers GET /api/v1/ddns.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:139 registers POST /api/v1/ddns.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:140 registers PATCH /api/v1/ddns/:id.

The create and update handlers copy attacker-controlled webhook fields directly from JSON request bodies into model.DDNSProfile:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:47-74 accepts model.DDNSForm and stores WebhookURL, WebhookMethod, WebhookRequestType, WebhookRequestBody, and WebhookHeaders.
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:112-145 updates the same fields after profile ownership is checked.
  • model/ddns_api.go:11-15 exposes these fields as JSON input.
  • model/ddns.go:28-33 stores these fields on the persisted profile.

Users can attach owned DDNS profiles to owned servers, and DDNS updates are triggered in common server update and agent IP-reporting paths:

  • cmd/dashboard/controller/server.go:63-83 checks DDNS profile ownership, then stores EnableDDNS, DDNSProfiles, and OverrideDDNSDomains on an owned server.
  • service/singleton/server.go:44-58 calls UpdateDDNS when a server with DDNS enabled is updated.
  • service/rpc/nezha.go:247-279 calls UpdateDDNS when an authenticated agent reports a changed IP.

The DDNS provider dispatcher instantiates the webhook provider when Provider == "webhook":

  • service/singleton/ddns.go:58-95, especially service/singleton/ddns.go:79-81.

The sink is the DDNS webhook provider:

  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:49-65 prepares and sends the HTTP request with utils.HttpClient.Do(req).
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:85-100 formats and applies attacker-controlled headers.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:91-92 creates the request with the configured method and URL.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:117-134 parses the configured URL and only formats query parameters; it does not restrict scheme, host, IP range, or redirects.
  • pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go:137-158 builds attacker-controlled request bodies for POST/PATCH/PUT.

The project already contains SSRF defenses for notification webhooks, showing the expected mitigation pattern is absent from the DDNS webhook path:

  • model/notification.go:34-58 defines blocked private/reserved CIDRs.
  • model/notification.go:193-221 creates a notification HTTP client that resolves and pins a validated IP and disables redirects.
  • model/notification.go:229-263 only allows http/https, requires a hostname, resolves all addresses, and rejects disallowed IPs.
  • model/notification.go:265-276 rejects blocked ranges and non-global-unicast targets.

Equivalent validation was not found in pkg/ddns/webhook/webhook.go.

Safe local PoC

Environment:

  • Repository: https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha.git
  • Commit tested: 05e5da2535197fc223b79601d50eeea362dcf853
  • Tag at commit: v2.0.9
  • Module: github.com/nezhahq/nezha
  • Go version: go1.26.3 linux/amd64
  • Testing scope: local-only; loopback HTTP listener and fake local UDP DNS SOA server only.

A temporary same-package test was created and removed automatically after execution. It used a local httptest listener as the internal…

Record
GHSA-6x26-5727-rrm9
CVSS 3.1
6.4 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5194 No score

Nezha's authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host in github.com/nezhahq/nezha in github.com/naiba/nezha

Nezha's authenticated DDNS webhook configuration allows blind SSRF from the dashboard host in github.com/nezhahq/nezha in github.com/naiba/nezha.

NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.

(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)

The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/naiba/nezha before v2.0.10.

Record
GO-2026-5194
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Go
 0.20.0 up to 2.0.10
2.0.10
github.com/naiba/nezha
Go
 0.20.0 and later None known
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
aliasesEUVD
first indexedCVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-47268 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.4) in Nezhahq Nezha, published May 29, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.22%, the 12th percentile. Fixed in github.com/nezhahq/nezha 2.0.10.

References

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