CVE-2026-47377

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

Summary

The client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.

Details

In packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into cleanUrl:

let cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith('/') ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`
if (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`
window.location.replace(cleanUrl)

startsWith('/') returns true for //attacker.com/..., which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early if (/^\/[/\\]/.test(hashPath)) return to reject protocol-relative paths.

Impact

• Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.
• No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.

Credit

This issue was reported by @fg0x0.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

Summary

The client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.

Details

In packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into cleanUrl:

let cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith('/') ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`
if (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`
window.location.replace(cleanUrl)

startsWith('/') returns true for //attacker.com/..., which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early if (/^\/[/\\]/.test(hashPath)) return to reject protocol-relative paths.

Impact

• Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.
• No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.

Credit

This issue was reported by @fg0x0.