CVE-2026-47696

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

Summary

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter.

The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record.

This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

Details

Affected file:

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php

Relevant code:

$amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0;
$userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : [];

if ($amount <= 0) {
    echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']);
    exit;
}

// TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API
// Example: Call Authorize.Net API here
// $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData);

// Simulate payment success for now
$paymentSuccess = true;
$users_id = @User::getId();

if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) {
    $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet");
    if ($walletPlugin) {
        $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment');
        echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']);
        exit;
    }
}

Vulnerable flow:

1. $_POST['amount'] is read from the client.
2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero.
3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed.
4. $paymentSuccess is hardcoded to true.
5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount.

There is no verification of:

• Authorize.Net transaction ID
• payment token
• webhook signature
• pending payment record
• expected server-side amount
• currency
• duplicate transaction/replay state

PoC

Prerequisites:

• AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled
• YPTWallet plugin enabled
• Attacker has any valid user account

Steps:

1. Log in as a low-privileged user.
2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance.
3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie:

  curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \
    -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \
    --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc'

4. The endpoint returns:

  {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"}

5. Refresh the wallet page.
6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999.

No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required.

Impact

A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance.

Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to:

• purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment
• abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet
• transfer fake funds to other users
• manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows
• bypass monetization controls

Recommended fix

• Remove or disable processPayment.json.php if it is obsolete.
• Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied amount alone.
• Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow.
• Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling addBalance().
• Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

Summary

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter.

The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record.

This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

Details

Affected file:

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php

Relevant code:

$amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0;
$userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : [];

if ($amount <= 0) {
    echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']);
    exit;
}

// TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API
// Example: Call Authorize.Net API here
// $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData);

// Simulate payment success for now
$paymentSuccess = true;
$users_id = @User::getId();

if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) {
    $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet");
    if ($walletPlugin) {
        $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment');
        echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']);
        exit;
    }
}

Vulnerable flow:

1. $_POST['amount'] is read from the client.
2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero.
3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed.
4. $paymentSuccess is hardcoded to true.
5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount.

There is no verification of:

• Authorize.Net transaction ID
• payment token
• webhook signature
• pending payment record
• expected server-side amount
• currency
• duplicate transaction/replay state

PoC

Prerequisites:

• AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled
• YPTWallet plugin enabled
• Attacker has any valid user account

Steps:

1. Log in as a low-privileged user.
2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance.
3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie:

  curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \
    -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \
    --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc'

4. The endpoint returns:

  {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"}

5. Refresh the wallet page.
6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999.

No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required.

Impact

A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance.

Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to:

• purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment
• abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet
• transfer fake funds to other users
• manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows
• bypass monetization controls

Recommended fix

• Remove or disable processPayment.json.php if it is obsolete.
• Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied amount alone.
• Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow.
• Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling addBalance().
• Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.