CVE-2026-48074

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying StaffService.deleteStaffMember() runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central user_invite table by email. The email clause has no tenantId predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email victim[@]example[.]com also deletes the pending invite for victim[@]example[.]com in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when staffId is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying StaffService.deleteStaffMember() runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central user_invite table by email. The email clause has no tenantId predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email victim[@]example[.]com also deletes the pending invite for victim[@]example[.]com in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when staffId is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying StaffService.deleteStaffMember() runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central user_invite table by email. The email clause has no tenantId predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email victim[@]example[.]com also deletes the pending invite for victim[@]example[.]com in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when staffId is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying StaffService.deleteStaffMember() runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central user_invite table by email. The email clause has no tenantId predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email victim[@]example[.]com also deletes the pending invite for victim[@]example[.]com in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when staffId is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.