CVE-2026-48080

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the GET /api/tenants/{id} endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated TENANT_ADMIN of that tenant, including the databaseUrl field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official docker-compose.prod.yml deployment, the connection string contained the user postgres with rolsuper=true and the plaintext password from secrets/postgres_password.txt. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via secrets/postgres_user.txt would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central appointment_booking database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A TENANT_ADMIN of one tenant who can reach postgres:5432 (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's pg_read_server_files, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, and CREATE EXTENSION for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the GET /api/tenants/{id} endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated TENANT_ADMIN of that tenant, including the databaseUrl field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official docker-compose.prod.yml deployment, the connection string contained the user postgres with rolsuper=true and the plaintext password from secrets/postgres_password.txt. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via secrets/postgres_user.txt would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central appointment_booking database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A TENANT_ADMIN of one tenant who can reach postgres:5432 (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's pg_read_server_files, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, and CREATE EXTENSION for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the GET /api/tenants/{id} endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated TENANT_ADMIN of that tenant, including the databaseUrl field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official docker-compose.prod.yml deployment, the connection string contained the user postgres with rolsuper=true and the plaintext password from secrets/postgres_password.txt. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via secrets/postgres_user.txt would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central appointment_booking database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A TENANT_ADMIN of one tenant who can reach postgres:5432 (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's pg_read_server_files, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, and CREATE EXTENSION for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the GET /api/tenants/{id} endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated TENANT_ADMIN of that tenant, including the databaseUrl field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official docker-compose.prod.yml deployment, the connection string contained the user postgres with rolsuper=true and the plaintext password from secrets/postgres_password.txt. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via secrets/postgres_user.txt would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central appointment_booking database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A TENANT_ADMIN of one tenant who can reach postgres:5432 (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's pg_read_server_files, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, and CREATE EXTENSION for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.