CVE-2026-48722

Nextflow is a DSL for data-driven computational pipelines. From 25.09.2-edge until 25.10.6 and 26.04.3, nextflow auth login writes Seqera Platform OIDC bearer tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config through AuthCommandImpl.writeConfig in plugins/nf-tower/src/main/io/seqera/tower/plugin/auth/AuthCommandImpl.groovy without setting restrictive file permissions, allowing the default umask 022 to create the file with mode 0644. On a multi-user POSIX host, a local user who can traverse the victim's home directory can read seqera-auth.config and impersonate the victim against Seqera Platform within the token's scope. Single-user systems and headless CI runners that do not use the interactive login flow are not affected. This issue is fixed in 25.10.6 and 26.04.3.

Nextflow is a DSL for data-driven computational pipelines. From 25.09.2-edge until 25.10.6 and 26.04.3, nextflow auth login writes Seqera Platform OIDC bearer tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config through AuthCommandImpl.writeConfig in plugins/nf-tower/src/main/io/seqera/tower/plugin/auth/AuthCommandImpl.groovy without setting restrictive file permissions, allowing the default umask 022 to create the file with mode 0644. On a multi-user POSIX host, a local user who can traverse the victim's home directory can read seqera-auth.config and impersonate the victim against Seqera Platform within the token's scope. Single-user systems and headless CI runners that do not use the interactive login flow are not affected. This issue is fixed in 25.10.6 and 26.04.3.

Impact

nextflow auth login persists Seqera Platform OIDC tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config. The file is created via Java NIO without specifying file permissions, so under the default umask 022 it lands at mode 0644 (world-readable).

On a multi-user POSIX host — typically an HPC login node, shared workstation, or jump host — any local user able to traverse the victim's home directory can read the file and obtain a valid Platform bearer token, enabling impersonation against Seqera Platform within the token's scope.

Single-user systems and headless CI runners, which do not invoke the interactive login flow, are not affected.

Affected versions: 25.09.2-edge through 26.04.1.

Patches

Fixed in <PATCHED_VERSION>. The patched code applies mode 0600 to seqera-auth.config immediately after writing it, and re-applies on every subsequent login so any pre-existing world-readable copy left by an earlier version is tightened.

Tokens previously stored in the file must be treated as disclosed. After upgrading, run nextflow auth logout, revoke the token in the Seqera Platform UI, and run nextflow auth login again.

Workarounds

Restrict the file and its parent directory:

chmod 600 "${NXF_HOME:-$HOME/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config" chmod 700 "${NXF_HOME:-$HOME/.nextflow}"

Alternatively, supply the Platform token via the TOWER_ACCESS_TOKEN environment variable instead of running nextflow auth login.

References

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/276.html

Nextflow is a DSL for data-driven computational pipelines. From 25.09.2-edge until 25.10.6 and 26.04.3, nextflow auth login writes Seqera Platform OIDC bearer tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config through AuthCommandImpl.writeConfig in plugins/nf-tower/src/main/io/seqera/tower/plugin/auth/AuthCommandImpl.groovy without setting restrictive file permissions, allowing the default umask 022 to create the file with mode 0644. On a multi-user POSIX host, a local user who can traverse the victim's home directory can read seqera-auth.config and impersonate the victim against Seqera Platform within the token's scope. Single-user systems and headless CI runners that do not use the interactive login flow are not affected. This issue is fixed in 25.10.6 and 26.04.3.

Nextflow is a DSL for data-driven computational pipelines. From 25.09.2-edge until 25.10.6 and 26.04.3, nextflow auth login writes Seqera Platform OIDC bearer tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config through AuthCommandImpl.writeConfig in plugins/nf-tower/src/main/io/seqera/tower/plugin/auth/AuthCommandImpl.groovy without setting restrictive file permissions, allowing the default umask 022 to create the file with mode 0644. On a multi-user POSIX host, a local user who can traverse the victim's home directory can read seqera-auth.config and impersonate the victim against Seqera Platform within the token's scope. Single-user systems and headless CI runners that do not use the interactive login flow are not affected. This issue is fixed in 25.10.6 and 26.04.3.

Impact

nextflow auth login persists Seqera Platform OIDC tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config. The file is created via Java NIO without specifying file permissions, so under the default umask 022 it lands at mode 0644 (world-readable).

On a multi-user POSIX host — typically an HPC login node, shared workstation, or jump host — any local user able to traverse the victim's home directory can read the file and obtain a valid Platform bearer token, enabling impersonation against Seqera Platform within the token's scope.

Single-user systems and headless CI runners, which do not invoke the interactive login flow, are not affected.

Affected versions: 25.09.2-edge through 26.04.1.

Patches

Fixed in <PATCHED_VERSION>. The patched code applies mode 0600 to seqera-auth.config immediately after writing it, and re-applies on every subsequent login so any pre-existing world-readable copy left by an earlier version is tightened.

Tokens previously stored in the file must be treated as disclosed. After upgrading, run nextflow auth logout, revoke the token in the Seqera Platform UI, and run nextflow auth login again.

Workarounds

Restrict the file and its parent directory:

chmod 600 "${NXF_HOME:-$HOME/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config" chmod 700 "${NXF_HOME:-$HOME/.nextflow}"

Alternatively, supply the Platform token via the TOWER_ACCESS_TOKEN environment variable instead of running nextflow auth login.

References

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/276.html