CVE-2026-48862

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client via PUSH_PROMISE flooding.

In lib/mint/http2.ex, Mint.HTTP2.decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5 inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for every promised stream ID. The neighbouring Mint.HTTP2.assert_valid_promised_stream_id/2 only verifies that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time. The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive, so a server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and withholds the matching HEADERS never trips that check.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true). A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets that server pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame it sends, with no upper bound, until the client process runs out of memory.

This issue affects mint: from 0.2.0 before 1.9.0.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client via PUSH_PROMISE flooding.

In lib/mint/http2.ex, Mint.HTTP2.decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5 inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for every promised stream ID. The neighbouring Mint.HTTP2.assert_valid_promised_stream_id/2 only verifies that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time. The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive, so a server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and withholds the matching HEADERS never trips that check.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true). A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets that server pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame it sends, with no upper bound, until the client process runs out of memory.

This issue affects mint: from 0.2.0 before 1.9.0.

Summary

Mint's HTTP/2 client accepts PUSH_PROMISE frames from any server it connects to and inserts every promised stream into a per-connection map without consulting max_concurrent_streams. A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can flood the client with PUSH_PROMISE frames and withhold the matching response HEADERS, pinning one map entry per frame indefinitely until the client process runs out of memory.

Details

'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_push_promise/3 in lib/mint/http2.ex dispatches every inbound PUSH_PROMISE frame to 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5, which inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for the promised ID. The only validation applied is that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time.

The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive. A server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and never sends the matching HEADERS never trips that check, and the existing tally counts only streams in open states, not :reserved_remote entries.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true), so no application opt-in is required. A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets it pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame, with no upper bound.

PoC

1. Stand up a raw TCP HTTP/2 server that completes the handshake and ACKs the client's SETTINGS.
2. Wait for the client's request HEADERS and capture its odd stream ID.
3. Send a flood of PUSH_PROMISE frames (flags = END_HEADERS) associated with the captured stream, each promising a fresh even stream ID and carrying a minimal HPACK-encoded header block.
4. Never send the matching response HEADERS for any of the promised IDs.
5. The client's conn.streams map grows by one entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame (~148 bytes/entry); memory grows linearly and the BEAM process eventually crashes with OOM.

Impact

Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service against any process using Mint as an HTTP/2 client against an untrusted or attacker-influenced server. Server push is on by default, so no application code change can prevent it short of disabling push or upgrading. Affected populations include outbound HTTP/2 clients in web backends, webhook delivery systems, scrapers, federated and proxy components, and any service that follows redirects to third-party HTTP/2 origins.

Workarounds

Disable HTTP/2 server push on connections to untrusted servers by passing client_settings: [enable_push: false] to 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP':connect/4. Mint will then reject any inbound PUSH_PROMISE frame with a PROTOCOL_ERROR before the vulnerable code path is reached.

Resources

• Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/65c6394d05a1b8aa4a7461708c3aa173e8d7a5cf
• Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/70b97b6a5209fb288b0e04d8e657dda26c59de67

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client via PUSH_PROMISE flooding.

In lib/mint/http2.ex, Mint.HTTP2.decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5 inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for every promised stream ID. The neighbouring Mint.HTTP2.assert_valid_promised_stream_id/2 only verifies that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time. The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive, so a server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and withholds the matching HEADERS never trips that check.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true). A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets that server pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame it sends, with no upper bound, until the client process runs out of memory.

This issue affects mint: from 0.2.0 before 1.9.0.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client via PUSH_PROMISE flooding.

In lib/mint/http2.ex, Mint.HTTP2.decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5 inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for every promised stream ID. The neighbouring Mint.HTTP2.assert_valid_promised_stream_id/2 only verifies that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time. The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive, so a server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and withholds the matching HEADERS never trips that check.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true). A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets that server pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame it sends, with no upper bound, until the client process runs out of memory.

This issue affects mint: from 0.2.0 before 1.9.0.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client via PUSH_PROMISE flooding.

In lib/mint/http2.ex, Mint.HTTP2.decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5 inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for every promised stream ID. The neighbouring Mint.HTTP2.assert_valid_promised_stream_id/2 only verifies that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time. The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive, so a server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and withholds the matching HEADERS never trips that check.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true). A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets that server pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame it sends, with no upper bound, until the client process runs out of memory.

This issue affects mint: from 0.2.0 before 1.9.0.

Workarounds

Disable HTTP/2 server push on connections to untrusted servers by passing client_settings: [enable_push: false] to Mint.HTTP.connect/4. This makes Mint reject any inbound PUSH_PROMISE frame with a PROTOCOL_ERROR before the vulnerable code path is reached.

Summary

Mint's HTTP/2 client accepts PUSH_PROMISE frames from any server it connects to and inserts every promised stream into a per-connection map without consulting max_concurrent_streams. A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can flood the client with PUSH_PROMISE frames and withhold the matching response HEADERS, pinning one map entry per frame indefinitely until the client process runs out of memory.

Details

'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_push_promise/3 in lib/mint/http2.ex dispatches every inbound PUSH_PROMISE frame to 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':decode_push_promise_headers_and_add_response/5, which inserts a :reserved_remote entry into conn.streams for the promised ID. The only validation applied is that the promised ID is even and not already present; client_settings.max_concurrent_streams is not consulted at promise time.

The concurrency cap is only checked when the response HEADERS for the promised stream arrive. A server that emits PUSH_PROMISE frames and never sends the matching HEADERS never trips that check, and the existing tally counts only streams in open states, not :reserved_remote entries.

HTTP/2 server push is accepted by default (client_settings.enable_push defaults to true), so no application opt-in is required. A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection to a hostile server lets it pin one conn.streams entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame, with no upper bound.

PoC

1. Stand up a raw TCP HTTP/2 server that completes the handshake and ACKs the client's SETTINGS.
2. Wait for the client's request HEADERS and capture its odd stream ID.
3. Send a flood of PUSH_PROMISE frames (flags = END_HEADERS) associated with the captured stream, each promising a fresh even stream ID and carrying a minimal HPACK-encoded header block.
4. Never send the matching response HEADERS for any of the promised IDs.
5. The client's conn.streams map grows by one entry per PUSH_PROMISE frame (~148 bytes/entry); memory grows linearly and the BEAM process eventually crashes with OOM.

Impact

Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service against any process using Mint as an HTTP/2 client against an untrusted or attacker-influenced server. Server push is on by default, so no application code change can prevent it short of disabling push or upgrading. Affected populations include outbound HTTP/2 clients in web backends, webhook delivery systems, scrapers, federated and proxy components, and any service that follows redirects to third-party HTTP/2 origins.

Workarounds

Disable HTTP/2 server push on connections to untrusted servers by passing client_settings: [enable_push: false] to 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP':connect/4. Mint will then reject any inbound PUSH_PROMISE frame with a PROTOCOL_ERROR before the vulnerable code path is reached.

Resources

• Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/65c6394d05a1b8aa4a7461708c3aa173e8d7a5cf
• Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/70b97b6a5209fb288b0e04d8e657dda26c59de67