CVE-2026-49291

mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

Summary

The HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope.

Technical Details

src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/mcp.py declares mcp_endpoint with user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access). For tools/call, it extracts the requested tool name and arguments, then calls handle_tool_call(storage, tool_name, arguments) without passing the authenticated user or checking a per-tool required scope.

The MCP tool registry includes both read tools and write tools. In the same handler file, store_memory creates a Memory object and calls storage.store(...), while delete_memory calls storage.delete(content_hash). These operations are reachable with only the read scope.

The REST endpoint demonstrates the intended boundary: POST /api/memories uses Depends(require_write_access) and rejects a read-only token with 403 insufficient_scope.

Reproduction

1. Enable OAuth and disable anonymous access.
2. Generate a valid OAuth JWT with only scope: read.
3. Confirm the REST write endpoint rejects it:

POST /api/memories
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"content":"rest denied control"}

Expected and observed: HTTP 403 with Required scope 'write' not granted.

4. Send the same read-only token to the MCP endpoint:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "store_memory",
    "arguments": {
      "content": "mcp read scope stored this",
      "tags": ["poc"]
    }
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage store sink is reached.

5. A read-only token can also call delete_memory through MCP if it knows a content hash:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "delete_memory",
    "arguments": {"content_hash": "<known_hash>"}
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage delete sink is reached.

Impact

A client intended to be read-only can inject or delete memories through the MCP API. This can corrupt the memory database, influence future agent context, and destroy stored user memories without the OAuth write scope required by the REST API.

Affected Versions

Confirmed present on current main commit c99a922477df41f75a44db11182ae48a57311910 and latest release tag v10.65.0 (4eb4a62665589f9dd9f8c393afa32de434b4098a).

Suggested Fix

Enforce authorization per MCP tool at tools/call time. Require write for store_memory and delete_memory, keep read only for read-only tools, and add regression tests proving direct tools/call to mutating tools is rejected before the handler reaches storage when the caller has only read scope.

mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

Summary

The HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope.

Technical Details

src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/mcp.py declares mcp_endpoint with user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access). For tools/call, it extracts the requested tool name and arguments, then calls handle_tool_call(storage, tool_name, arguments) without passing the authenticated user or checking a per-tool required scope.

The MCP tool registry includes both read tools and write tools. In the same handler file, store_memory creates a Memory object and calls storage.store(...), while delete_memory calls storage.delete(content_hash). These operations are reachable with only the read scope.

The REST endpoint demonstrates the intended boundary: POST /api/memories uses Depends(require_write_access) and rejects a read-only token with 403 insufficient_scope.

Reproduction

1. Enable OAuth and disable anonymous access.
2. Generate a valid OAuth JWT with only scope: read.
3. Confirm the REST write endpoint rejects it:

POST /api/memories
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"content":"rest denied control"}

Expected and observed: HTTP 403 with Required scope 'write' not granted.

4. Send the same read-only token to the MCP endpoint:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "store_memory",
    "arguments": {
      "content": "mcp read scope stored this",
      "tags": ["poc"]
    }
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage store sink is reached.

5. A read-only token can also call delete_memory through MCP if it knows a content hash:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "delete_memory",
    "arguments": {"content_hash": "<known_hash>"}
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage delete sink is reached.

Impact

A client intended to be read-only can inject or delete memories through the MCP API. This can corrupt the memory database, influence future agent context, and destroy stored user memories without the OAuth write scope required by the REST API.

Affected Versions

Confirmed present on current main commit c99a922477df41f75a44db11182ae48a57311910 and latest release tag v10.65.0 (4eb4a62665589f9dd9f8c393afa32de434b4098a).

Suggested Fix

Enforce authorization per MCP tool at tools/call time. Require write for store_memory and delete_memory, keep read only for read-only tools, and add regression tests proving direct tools/call to mutating tools is rejected before the handler reaches storage when the caller has only read scope.

Summary

The HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call store_memory and delete_memory through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require write scope.

Technical Details

src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/mcp.py declares mcp_endpoint with user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access). For tools/call, it extracts the requested tool name and arguments, then calls handle_tool_call(storage, tool_name, arguments) without passing the authenticated user or checking a per-tool required scope.

The MCP tool registry includes both read tools and write tools. In the same handler file, store_memory creates a Memory object and calls storage.store(...), while delete_memory calls storage.delete(content_hash). These operations are reachable with only the read scope.

The REST endpoint demonstrates the intended boundary: POST /api/memories uses Depends(require_write_access) and rejects a read-only token with 403 insufficient_scope.

Reproduction

1. Enable OAuth and disable anonymous access.
2. Generate a valid OAuth JWT with only scope: read.
3. Confirm the REST write endpoint rejects it:

POST /api/memories
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"content":"rest denied control"}

Expected and observed: HTTP 403 with Required scope 'write' not granted.

4. Send the same read-only token to the MCP endpoint:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "store_memory",
    "arguments": {
      "content": "mcp read scope stored this",
      "tags": ["poc"]
    }
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage store sink is reached.

5. A read-only token can also call delete_memory through MCP if it knows a content hash:

POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <read-only-token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "delete_memory",
    "arguments": {"content_hash": "<known_hash>"}
  }
}

Observed: HTTP 200 JSON-RPC success and the storage delete sink is reached.

Impact

A client intended to be read-only can inject or delete memories through the MCP API. This can corrupt the memory database, influence future agent context, and destroy stored user memories without the OAuth write scope required by the REST API.

Affected Versions

Confirmed present on current main commit c99a922477df41f75a44db11182ae48a57311910 and latest release tag v10.65.0 (4eb4a62665589f9dd9f8c393afa32de434b4098a).

Suggested Fix

Enforce authorization per MCP tool at tools/call time. Require write for store_memory and delete_memory, keep read only for read-only tools, and add regression tests proving direct tools/call to mutating tools is rejected before the handler reaches storage when the caller has only read scope.